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Abstract
Airport strategic planning in the context of low-cost carriers ascendency: insights from the
European experience
During the last  decades  the airport  industry  has undergone significant  structural  changes.
Before, airport planning used to follow broad political goals and extensive governmental regulation.
Airports  were  mere  providers  of  infrastructure  that  favoured  the  construction  of  monumental
facilities, often reflecting a kind of national or regional pride. This form of airport planning and
design became a paradigm that still applies for many major airports.
Liberalisation of the air transport market has played a key role in reshaping the entire aviation
industry. Low-Cost Carriers (LCC) have proliferated in liberalised markets and have disrupted the
industry by offering a different value proposition and operative model with impacts in traditional
airlines and airports alike. The emergence of LCCs allowed underused airports and former military
bases,  particularly  in  Europe  and  the  United  States,  to  grow  significantly.  Yet,  as  the  low-cost
segment  matures,  LCCs move to  bigger  airports  to  keep growing.  The impact  of  this  trend for
airport strategic planning is not clear in the existing literature.
This  dissertation  combines  qualitative  and  quantitative  methods  to  analyse  in  detail  the
airports in which LCCs operate in Europe, by using empirical data, unstructured interviews with key
informants,  direct  observations  at  airport  visits  and  a  comprehensive  document  review.  A
transversal study analyses the characteristics of a sample of 171 airports and their relation with the
importance of LCCs at each of them. A longitudinal study, covering a second sample of 42 airports
over the past decade (2004 to 2013), identifies relevant dynamics in airport evolution concerning
the developments of the low-cost segment.
A comprehensive understanding of the airport business in the current context supports the
definition  of  an  integrated  framework  that  complements  other  methods  for  airport  strategic
planning: the [New] Airport Business Network. This framework may assist planners and managers in
incorporating, in the same process, the planning and design of infrastructure, and the definition of
a  corresponding  business  strategy.  Moreover,  given  the  inherent  uncertainty  of  the  aviation
industry,  the framework allows airports to set the attributes of their product and shape their own
future.
Keywords:  airport  planning,  airport  strategies,  airport  development,  airport  management,
low-cost carriers, low-cost airports
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Resumo
Planeamento estratégico de aeroportos no contexto da ascendência das companhias  low-
cost: lições do caso europeu
A indústria dos aeroportos tem testemunhado mudanças estruturais significativas nas últimas
décadas.  Anteriormente o  planeamento dos  aeroportos  estava mais  determinado por  objetivos
políticos e uma vasta regulação governamental. Nesse contexto, os aeroportos eram considerados
simplesmente  como  fornecedores  de  infraestrutura  e  era  favorecida  a  construção  de  edifícios
monumentais, com frequência refletindo algum tipo de orgulho nacional ou regional.
Um  dos  aspetos  chave  nas  mudanças  que  têm  redefinido  a  indústria  da  aviação  é  a
liberalização do mercado de transporte aéreo. Num mercado liberalizado as companhias  low-cost
(LCC) têm proliferado. As LCC revolucionaram a indústria ao oferecer uma proposta de valor e um
modelo  operativo  diferentes  com  impacto  tanto  nas  companhias  tradicionais  quanto  nos
aeroportos.  O  surgimento  das  LCC  permitiu a  alguns  aeroportos  secundários  subutilizados  e  a
antigas  bases  militares,  particularmente  na  Europa,  atrair  um  significativo  incremento  no  seu
tráfego. No entanto, à medida que o segmento low-cost  se consolida, as LCC têm vindo a utilizar
aeroportos principais com maior relevo. O impacto desta tendência no planeamento estratégico
dos aeroportos ainda não é completamente entendido na literatura.
Esta dissertação combina métodos quantitativos e qualitativos para analisar em detalhe os
aeroportos  que  as  LCC  utilizam  na  Europa,  servindo-se  de  dados  empíricos,  entrevistas  não-
estruturadas,  observação  direta  em  visitas  a  aeroportos  e  revisão  documental.  Num  estudo
transversal são analisadas as características de uma amostra de 171 aeroportos e a sua relação com
a importância  que  as  LCC  têm  em cada  um deles.  Um  estudo longitudinal,  que  abrange  uma
segunda  amostra  de  42  aeroportos  na  última década  (2004  –  2013),  serve  para  identificar  as
dinâmicas mais relevantes na evolução dos aeroportos em relação ao tráfego low-cost.
Neste sentido, um claro entendimento do negócio aeroportuário no contexto atual serve de
apoio para a definição de um modelo geral que complementa outros métodos de planeamento
estratégico  de aeroportos:  a  [Nova]  Rede de  Negócios  do  Aeroporto.  Este  modelo  serve  como
ferramenta  para  apoiar  os  gestores  e  projetistas  na  incorporação,  no  mesmo  processo,  do
planeamento e dimensionamento da infraestrutura, bem como da definição de uma estratégia de
negócio concordante. De igual forma, considerando a incerteza inerente à indústria da aviação, o
modelo permite aos aeroportos definir as características do seus produtos de forma a construir com
sucesso o seu próprio futuro.
Palavras chave:  planeamento de aeroportos, estratégia de aeroportos, desenvolvimento de
aeroportos, gestão de aeroportos, companhias low-cost, aeroportos low-cost
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Resumen
Planeación estratégica de aeropuertos en el contexto del crecimiento y predominancia de
las compañías de bajo coste: enseñanzas de la experiencia en Europa
La  industria  aeroportuaria  ha  sufrido  cambios  estructurales  durante  las  últimas  décadas.
Anteriormente la planeación de aeropuertos estaba más determinada por objetivos políticos y una
vasta  regulación  gubernamental.  En  ese  contexto,  los  aeropuertos  eran  considerados  meros
proveedores de infraestructura y se favorecía la construcción de edificios monumentales, a menudo
asociados de cierta forma al orgullo de una nación o región. Esta forma de planeación y diseño de
aeropuertos se convirtió en un paradigma que aún aplica para muchos aeropuertos principales.
La liberalización del mercado aéreo ha jugado un papel clave en la revolución de la industria
de la aviación. En un mercado liberalizado las compañías de bajo coste (LCC) han proliferado y han
revolucionado  la  industria  ofreciendo  una  propuesta  de  valor  y  un  modelo  de  operaciones
diferentes que han impactado tanto a las aerolíneas convencionales como a los aeropuertos. El
surgimiento  de  las  LCC  permitió  que  aeropuertos  subutilizados  y  antiguas  bases  militares,
especialmente en Europa, crecieran significativamente. Sin embargo, a medida que el segmento se
consolida, las LCC han comenzado a utilizar aeropuertos principales a gran escala. El impacto de
esta tendencia aún no ha sido totalmente comprendido en la literatura.
Esta  disertación  combina  métodos  cuantitativos  y  cualitativos  para  analizar  en  detalle  los
aeropuertos  que  las  LCC  usan  en  Europa,  por  medio  de  datos  empíricos,  entrevistas  no-
estructuradas, observación directa en visitas técnicas a aeropuertos y revisión documental. En un
estudio  transversal  son  analizadas  las  características  de  una  muestra  de  171  aeropuertos  y  su
relación con la importancia de las LCC en cada uno de ellos. Por otro lado, un estudio longitudinal,
que comprende una segunda muestra de 42 aeropuertos durante la última década (2004 – 2013),
sirve para identificar las dinámicas más relevantes en la evolución de los aeropuertos, sobre todo
en relación al segmento de tráfico de bajo coste.
Un  claro  entendimiento  del  negocio  aeroportuario  en  la  actualidad  sirve  como  punto  de
partida  para  proponer  un  modelo  general  que  complementa  los  métodos  existentes  para
planeación estratégica de aeropuertos: la [Nueva] Red de Negocios del Aeropuerto. Este modelo
sirve como herramienta para ayudar a los  administradores y planeadores de aeropuertos en la
incorporación, en un mismo proceso, tanto la planeación y diseño de la infraestructura como la
definición de una estrategia de negocio coincidente. Además, teniendo en cuenta la incertidumbre
inherente  a  la  industria  de  la  aviación,  el  modelo  permite  a  los  aeropuertos  definir  las
características de sus productos de manera que puedan forjar su propio futuro.
Palabras  clave:  planeación  de  aeropuertos,  estrategia  de  aeropuertos,  desarrollo  de
aeropuertos, administración de aeropuertos, compañías de bajo coste, aeropuertos low-cost
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1 Introduction
During  the  last  decades  the  airport  industry  has  undergone  multiple  structural
changes (GAO, 2006; Gillen, 2011; Goetz and Vowles, 2009). The controlled environment of
the  past,  dominated  by  extensive  governmental  regulation,  favoured  the  building  of
monumental facilities, often reflecting a kind of national or regional pride. This form of
airport  planning  and  design,  which  considered  airports  as  mere  providers  of
infrastructure, became a paradigm that still applies for many major airports (de Neufville,
2008).
Bilateral agreements still play a major role in international air transportation but the
new context  of  the airport  industry is  increasingly  dominated by less  regulation,  both
within countries and across borders  (Belobaba et al., 2009). In addition, the widespread
growth  of  the Internet  and the World  Wide Web is  decreasing  the cost  and effort  for
airlines to reach new markets, and for consumers to compare travel alternatives. In this
context, airports are becoming commercially-oriented firms that offer multiple services –
not  just  access  to  air  travel  –  to  a  variety  of  customers  (Graham,  2003;  Jarach,  2001;
Jimenez et al., 2013a).
Arguably, liberalisation of the air transport market, with different forms around the
world, played a critical role in reshaping the entire aviation industry. A liberalised market
provides an ideal  ground for low-cost  carriers (LCC) to proliferate.  LCCs disrupted the
industry by offering a different value proposition to customers and by implementing a
different operative model that impacted traditional airlines and airports alike. At the same
time, the growth of LCCs provided a good opportunity for underused airports and former
military  bases,  particularly  in  the USA and Europe,  to  attract  the segment  of  low cost
airlines and travellers (de Neufville, 2008).
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During the initial rise of the LCCs many secondary airports emerged to satisfy their
need for simple, affordable and uncongested facilities. In this sense, the growth of LCCs
catalysed the development of 'low cost airports', largely as part of Multi-Airport Systems
(MAS)  in  which  primary  airports  were  dedicated  to  the  'legacy'  airlines  (de  Neufville,
2008).
The ascendency of LCCs is nowadays undeniable.  As their market share increased,
most LCCs turned to the larger traditional airports to keep growing (Abda et al., 2012). At
the same time, traditional or 'legacy' airlines modified their business model and operation
strategies to reduce costs or, in many cases, established 'low-cost' subsidiaries to compete
more directly with incumbent LCCs. To a large extent, these 'low-cost' subsidiaries use the
same airports as their parent companies.  Hence this trend expands the impact of LCCs
beyond the initial 'low cost airports' and challenges their sustainability.
The  adaptations  that  the  aviation  industry  has  implemented to  accommodate  the
ascendency of LCCs may imply a significant shift in the standards for airport planning and
design. The traditional paradigm of the  master plan does not account for the increased
uncertainty that airports experience in a liberalised context due to increased competition
(Jimenez et al.,  2013a) and market volatility.  In particular, master plans do not provide
flexibility  to adapt  to unavoidable  changes,  such as  the rise  of  the low-cost  model  for
airlines (de Neufville, 2008).
Indeed, the inherent rigidity of master plans led some airport managers to overlook
the value of LCCs in the air transport market. A lack of understanding about the actual
requirements of  LCCs may result  in the development of  infrastructure that  is  not  well
suited for the operational requirements of this type of airlines. Moreover, as LCCs mature,
new opportunities and challenges for airports may emerge.
This dissertation argues that a new paradigm in airport strategic development should
incorporate  in  the  same  process  the  planning  and  design  of  infrastructure,  and  the
definition of a matching business strategy. Such a paradigm must take into account the
existence of different airline business models that entail differences in airport facilities and
operation, or that may challenge airport strategies. Furthermore, airline business models
will inevitably continue to evolve and their requirements may differ slightly in the near
future and substantially  in  the long-term,  with a  clear  need to  deal  with the inherent
uncertainty of the aviation industry.
Overall, the ascendency of LCCs has been in the core of the changes that the airport
industry witnessed in recent decades. These changes may have impacted the way some
airports approach their long-term planning, partially because LCCs increased competition
between  airlines,  which,  in  turn,  increased  the  uncertainty  for  airport  planning.  In  a
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volatile environment airports are more likely to be affected by tactical decisions made by
airlines that face difficult market conditions, such as abandoning an airport due to hub
relocation, abandoning or downsizing operations due to bankruptcy or restructuring, or
refusing to use facilities that do not meet their operational requirements (de Neufville and
Odoni, 2003).
The  research  presented  in  this  dissertation  combines  qualitative  and quantitative
methods for the analysis of the airports that LCCs use in Europe. Then, building upon the
insights of  the European experience,  it  proposes an integrated framework as a tool  to
support airport strategic planning.
1.1 Research design
1.1.1 Research questions
The traditional paradigm of long-term airport planning, the  master plan, has proven
ineffective in dealing with the dynamic environment that prevails in the industry today and
is likely to continue in the future. The aviation industry in general has been revolutionised
by the ascendency of LCCs but the impact of this trend on airport planning, particularly in
the  long-term,  remains  unclear.  Moreover,  airport  planning  has  been  too  much
infrastructure-centric,  with  the  definition  of  strategies  to  attract  customers  left  for
subsequent phases in the process, often when investments in infrastructure have already
been committed. This hinders the possibility to tailor airport facilities to the requirements
of the different types of customers.
Thus the challenge of integrating airport infrastructure and strategy development in a
context dominated by changing paradigms in airline operations (in which LCCs are now
prominent)  remains  and  becomes  even  more  critical.  The  research  design  of  this
dissertation is framed by two main hypotheses that summarise the gaps in the literature
(see chapter 2 for a detailed review of relevant literature):
1. The  emergence  and expansion of  transnational,  innovative (generally  low-cost)
airlines impacts the planning, design, and practical operation of airports, in a way
that  is  similar to the way this  trend has revolutionised the business plans and
operational practices of airlines.
2. Some  airport  strategies  deliver  value  for  airport  owners  and  customers,
particularly  in  the  case  of  airports  that  consider  low-cost  carriers  as  relevant
partners.  In  addition,  the  design  of  flexible  infrastructure  facilitates  the
implementation of such strategies.
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Having in mind these hypotheses, and in order to address the challenge proposed
above, the following research questions guide this dissertation:
 1. How  should  European  airports  design  strategies  to  deal  with  the  increased
uncertainty produced by the liberalisation of the airline/airport industry and the
ascendency of LCCs?
 2. In what way have LCCs influenced airport strategic planning? In particular:
 2.1. To what extent have European airports implemented low-cost facilities?
 2.2. To what extent do LCCs operating in Europe use airport facilities developed for
traditional airlines?
 2.3. Is the implementation of low-cost facilities setting new standards for airport
design? If so, in what ways?
 2.4. Is  the establishment of  LCCs in existing facilities  setting new guidelines for
airport strategy? If so, in what ways?
1.1.2 Methodological approach
This  research  follows  an  engineering  systems  perspective.  It  studies  airports  as
systems  where  social,  technical,  environmental,  managerial  and  regulatory  elements
interact (Bonnefoy, 2008; de Neufville and Odoni, 2003). Therefore it explicitly recognises
that airport  strategies may provide a better,  hardly “optimal”,  performance in all  these
aspects.  Moreover,  some  airport  systems  may  favour  one  aspect  over  the  others  in
response to their particular interests.
Following  this  perspective,  a  mixed  methodological  approach  (i.e.  one  combining
quantitative  and  qualitative  methods)  should  provide  a  better  understanding  of  the
research problem and an appropriate answer for the research questions. As Yin  (2009)
states, such approach allows researchers to “collect a richer and stronger array of evidence
than  can  be  accomplished  by  any  single  method  alone”.  The  unit  of  analysis  of  this
dissertation is the airports.
The  mixed  research  approach  is  non-experimental  in  the  sense  that  existing
conditions of the unit of analysis will not be modified. The quantitative part of the analysis
includes a transversal study as data collection concerns a single period of time (mostly
2013 or the latest available information), as well as a longitudinal study to identify and
analyse trends in the dynamic evolution of airports (in most cases with data for 2004,
2008, 2012 and 2013).
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i) Geographical scope
This dissertation has a greater focus on the European context. The aviation industry
in Europe presents quite interesting features in what concerns the development of airports
and airlines in the recent decades. The liberalisation process in Europe is unique because
it encompasses a large number of different countries with a varying degree of maturity in
their aviation markets and of government involvement. So far, it has been the only region
in the world in which airlines can exploit all nine freedoms of the air 1 (including domestic
services by foreign carriers).
All these elements have produced an equally unique competitive environment. A mix
of airlines that includes: private and government-owned flag carriers (some in the process
of  privatisation)  that  have  extensive  intercontinental  networks  based  on  bilateral
agreements;  small  and large  regional  carriers  that  provide  access  to  smaller  markets;
leisure  (usually  charter)  airlines  focused  on  largely  seasonal  destinations  for  holiday
makers; and a wide range of diverse LCCs, from small to huge, that have taken the most of
liberalisation  opportunities.  In  addition,  Europe  has  a  large  number  of  war-time
aerodromes and bases that  have been gradually converted to civilian use,  especially  in
regions eager to support aviation as a means to attract employment, tourism and business
opportunities.
On top of that,  the liberalisation process is  already two decades old and thus the
aviation market  is  regaining some maturity.  It  followed some trends  of  the pioneering
deregulation  in  the  USA  but  with  clear  differences  (particularly  concerning  airport
privatisation and the approach to the airport business, in which airlines normally do not
develop their own facilities through long-term leases). Studying the European experience
can then provide some lessons for the future, not only for Europe but also for other regions
in which LCCs are still incipient.
The quantitative methods followed in the research design are largely based on airline
capacity data from Innovata Schedule Reference Service database  (IATA, n.d.).  Thus the
geographical scope of this research is framed by the definition of Europe included within
the  database.  This  classification  includes  countries  that  straddle  the  border  between
Europe  and  Asia  (Turkey,  Georgia,  Azerbaijan,  Russia  and  Kazakhstan)  and  also  some
countries that are often politically associated to Europe (Cyprus and Armenia).
ii) Qualitative research methods
The qualitative component of the study includes an extensive document review, non-
structured interviews with airport representatives, direct observation at airport visits, and
the formulation of a conceptual framework to articulate the analysis performed along the
1 See Belobaba et al. (2009) for more details on the freedoms of the air.
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dissertation.  The  document  review  follows  a  thorough  and  comprehensive  review  of
airport  documentation on planning and marketing,  as  well  as  industry and specialised
trade press reports (such as anna.aero, CAPA Centre for Aviation or ACI Europe's Airport
Business).  In  addition,  nine  unstructured  interviews  with  key  informants  within  the
airport  industry  –  from  ANA  Aeroportos  de  Portugal,  Fraport  AG,  Schiphol  Group,
Flughafen Zürich AG, Athens International Airport S.A., S.A.C.B.O. S.p.A., London Gatwick
Limited and S.A.  Aéroport de Bordeaux Mérignac – were conducted between 2011 and
2014 (see Table 1 for details).
Table 1: Summary of key informants and interview topics.
Airport company
[Airport]
Key informant(s)
[Position]
Interview topics
[Duration of the interview]
Place
[Date]
ANA Aeroportos de 
Portugal  S.A.
[Lisbon Portela 
Airport]
Leonel Horta Ribeiro
[Strategy and marketing director]
Airport marketing, airport 
strategy, airport stakeholders, 
airport-airline relationship
[1 h 30]
ANA HQ at Lisbon 
Airport
[July 2011]
Jose Tomas Baganha
[Director ANA Consulting]
Airport stakeholders, airport 
development, airport 
competition
[1 h 00]
Fraport AG
[Frankfurt am Main 
Airport]*
Sascha Schmitt
[Business development senior 
project manager]
Airport development, airport 
city, airport strategy
[1 h 00]
Fraport HQ at Frankfurt
am Main Airport
[January 2012]
Schiphol Group
[Amsterdam 
Schiphol Airport]*
Maurits Schaafsma
[the GROUNDS initiative]
Airport city, airport 
stakeholders, airport strategy
[1 h 00]
Schiphol-Centrum 
(Schiphol airport city)
[January 2012]
Flughafen Zürich AG
[Zurich Airport]*
Andrea Jorger
[Marketing and real state “The 
Circle”]
Airport strategy, airport city, 
“the circle” project
[1 h 00]
Zurich Airport
[January 2012]
Athens International 
Airport S.A.
[Athens Airport]*
Stratos Papadimitriou
[Chairman of the Board of 
Directors]
Ioanna Papadopoulou
[Director, communications and 
marketing]
George Kallimassias
[Director, corporate planning]
Airport marketing, airport 
strategy, airport stakeholders, 
airport development, airport-
airline relationship
[2 h 30]
Athens Venizelos 
Airport
[January 2012]
S.A.C.B.O. S.p.A.
[Milan Bergamo 
Airport]
Alberto Cominassi
[Planning and process 
improvement manager]
Airport development, airport 
infrastructure, airport-airline 
relationship, 'low-cost 
airports', airport strategy, 
airport competition
[1 h 30]
Orio al Serio 
International Airport 
(Milan Bergamo)
[June 2013]
Gatwick Airport 
Limited
[London Gatwick 
Airport]
Colin Garland
[Senior manager, economic 
regulation]
Airport strategy, airport 
competition, airport-airline 
relationship
[0 h 45]
European Aviation 
Conference at St. 
Gallen, Switzerland
[November 2013]
S.A. Aéroport de 
Bordeaux Merignac
[Bordeaux Airport]
Jean-Luc Poiroux
[Development director]
Bordeaux Airport low-cost 
terminal (billi), airport-airline 
relationship
[0 h 30]
2014 ATRS World 
Conference at 
Bordeaux, France
[July 2014]
* Interview conducted within the scope of MIT Portugal's Airdev Research Project accompanied by other interviewees.
The original intention was to perform semi-structured, recorded interviews. For the
first interviews there was a guiding script, but the interviewees expressed their preference
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not to be recorded and were open to discuss more topics than those set in the script. Hence
we opted for unstructured interviews, taking notes during the meetings. Nonetheless, the
airports that were the object of the interviews were studied beforehand in order to guide
the questions and frame the answers of the interviewees.
Except for the last two, the interviews took place in or near the airport sites that were
being discussed. This allowed for a better contextualisation of the answers or helped raise
more  questions  than  originally  intended.  The  last  two  interviews  were  not  previously
arranged, as they were performed during conferences. However, they happened in a later
stage  of  the  research,  with  sufficient  background  information  about  the  two  airports
covered.
Interviews are a flexible research tool that can be used at any stage of the research
process and can be combined with other approaches in a mixed-method design, as it is the
case. The main objective of unstructured interviews is to obtain rich, salient data from the
individuals interviewed. Unstructured interviews give the researchers freedom to address
any topic they consider interesting for the research (Brewerton and Millward, 2001), and
allow the interviewees to convey information that  they deem important  for the issues
under analysis  (Bryman, 1989). This type of interview also allows researchers to collect
relevant information outside the previously defined topics.
The  advantages  of  unstructured  interviews  were  critical  given  the  diversity  of
implementations, contexts, scale and main focus of the airports that the key informants
represented. This justified the use of unstructured interviews instead of other types of
primary  data  collection  (namely  surveys,  questionnaires,  or  close-ended  structured
interviews).  Nevertheless,  unstructured  interviews  hinder  comparability  between  the
responses of the different subjects due to the open-ended and flexible nature of questions.
Moreover, the interview is more likely to drift towards the interests of the interviewee. And
interviews are also subject to bias and shortcomings in terms of reliability and validity of
the information (Brewerton and Millward, 2001).
To  overcome  these  shortcomings  and corroborate  the  validity  of  information,  the
unstructured  interviews  were  complemented  with  direct  observations,  ranging  from
formal  to casual  data collection activities,  and used as yet  another source of  evidence.
“Direct  observations might  be made throughout  a field visit,  including those occasions
during which other evidence, such as that from interviews, is being collected” (Yin, 2009).
Table  2 summarises the technical  visits  to a  variety of  airports,  including some of  the
airports visited for the interviews.
The qualitative part of this research was closed with the formulation of an integrated
framework to analyse airport strategic planning (in chapter 7). This conceptual framework
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consolidates and integrates the quantitative and qualitative methods.  The unstructured
interviews and the airport visits have therefore strongly influenced the building blocks of
the  framework,  with  the  quantitative  analysis  supporting  the  definition  of  different
strategic focuses from airports.
Table 2: Summary of technical visits to airports.
Airport Air-side Land-side Notes
Amsterdam Schiphol (AMS) X X
Athens International (ATH) X X Airdev Research Project, visit granted access to restricted
areas, air-side included platforms
Atlanta Hartsfield–Jackson (ATL) X Airdev Research Project
Barcelona El Prat (BCN) X X Air-side only in terminal 2
Barcelona Girona (GRO) X X
Brussels (BRU) X X Air-side only in pier A
Brussels South Charleroi (CRL) X X
Bordeaux Mérignac (BOD) X X Air-side only in low-cost terminal Billi
Dallas Forth Worth (DFW) X Airdev Research Project
Frankfurt am Main (FRA) X X Airdev Research Project, included a visit to airport city 
project and The Squaire, air-side only in terminal 1
Frankfurt Hahn (HHN) X X
Geneva International (GVA) X X
Katowice International (KTW) X X Air-side only in terminal B
Krakow (KRK) X X Air-side arrivals only
Lisbon Portela (LIS) X X
Madrid Barajas (MAD) X X
Milan Bergamo (BGY) X X Visit granted access to restricted areas land-side
Munich (MUC) X X Visit granted access to restricted areas air-side
Paris Beauvais (BVA) X X Air-side only in terminal 2
Paris Orly (ORY) X X
Pisa (PSA) X X Air-side arrivals only
Porto (OPO) X X
Rome Ciampino (CIA) X X
Vancouver International (YVR) X Airdev Research Project
Venice Marco Polo (VCE) X X
Warsaw Modlin (WMI) X X
Wroclaw Copernicus (WRO) X X
Zurich (ZRH) X X
The  integrated  framework  constitutes  a  conceptual  model  that  builds  upon  and
extends our previous work on the subject  (Jimenez et al.,  2013a). To validate this new
approach  the  dissertation  includes  the  application  of  the  framework  in  a  case  study
defined for the Lelystad Airport in the Netherlands. Lelystad is the largest general aviation
airport in the Netherlands and is owned by Schiphol Group, owners of the Amsterdam
Schiphol Airport. To support the strategy of Amsterdam Schiphol as a world-class hub, the
Group wants to redevelop Lelystad as a commercial airport.
The strategic planning for Lelystad is in fact an interesting opportunity to apply the
proposed framework.  The  airport  would  need to  change  its  infrastructure  in  order  to
accommodate larger aircraft and passenger processing, and would therefore require an
associated strategy to attract  non-hub related traffic.  In addition, the converted airport
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would  operate  in  a  very  competitive  environment  and  would  require  a  differentiated
position within the Amsterdam Multi-Airport System in order to be attractive for both
airlines and passengers. That said, the case study cannot be viewed as a comprehensive
representation of the entire planning process, but rather as a brief example of how the
framework can be applied.
iii) Quantitative research methods
In this research, qualitative methods are combined with a detailed analysis of two
samples of airports using quantitative methods. An empirical study was performed on a
first sample of European airports. Considering the ascendency of LCCs is key for the recent
changes in the airport industry, the first task for the quantitative analysis was to identify
LCCs operating in Europe in 2013. Chapter 4 details this process that led to the selection of
20 airlines matching the value proposition of LCCs.
The next step was to identify the destinations served by these airlines in Europe. We
used Innovata's Schedule Reference Service database (IATA, n.d.) that contains schedules
information for the large majority of the world airlines. In this task we used aggregated
data for 2013 on the capacity offered by all the airlines (low-cost and others) at European
airports, in terms of seats per carrier.
Overall,  in 2013 the 20  LCCs identified offered scheduled services to 401 different
airports  in  41  European  countries  (see  chapter  4 for  details).  In  order  to  select  a
representative sample of airports to study in more detail, we identified the destinations
served  by  the  six  largest  LCCs  (Ryanair,  easyJet,  Norwegian,  Vueling,  Wizzair  and
Germanwings2).  To  be  included  in  the  sample,  airports  had  to  satisfy  any  of  the  two
following basic criteria:
1. be a base for any of the six airlines;
2. be a destination for at least three of them.
We  also  considered  14  additional  airports  due  to  their  low-cost  facilities,  high
proportion of low-cost traffic, or for being recently emerging airports. The first sample
contains 171 airports.
In the analysis of this first sample we determined the level of importance of the low-
cost  segment  at  each  airport  according to  the  capacity  deployed by  LCCs,  in  terms  of
available  seats  in  2013,  as  per  Innovata  SRS  database  (IATA,  n.d.).  In  particular,  we
developed  two  main  indices  to  measure  the  relative  importance  of  LCCs  in  European
airports. One is the market share (i.e. the capacity share in terms of available seats) of LCCs
2 Pegasus, which is also among the largest, is not included because most of its passengers and airports are
within the Asian part of Turkey.
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at each airport in the sample. The other is a ranking that compares the capacity of LCCs in
each airport with the total capacity deployed by LCCs in all European airports (always in
terms of available seats), normalised  with respect to the airport with the largest absolute
number of LCC available seats (which in 2013 was Barcelona El Prat – BCN). Chapter  5
describes the process and the rationale for these measures.
We then built a database by collecting empirical data on over 30 different variables
that convey information on crucial airport processes and resources, organised in various
parameters:  identification,  size,  organisational  structure,  location,  infrastructure,
congestion,  managerial  strategies,  route  network,  financial  conditions,  and  operational
conditions. The main sources of information were the airport annual reports and websites,
but  also  an  extensive  review  of  industry  reports  and  documents,  academic  papers,
specialised trade press (namely CAPA Centre for Aviation, anna.aero, ACI Europe's Airport
Business,  International  Airport  Review  and  Air  Transport  News),  and  other  on-line
resources (mainly Geographic Information Systems).
A  different  approach  for  data  collection  and  analysis  was  required  for  aircraft
turnaround times (one of  the key operational  parameters).  According to the literature
review  (see  chapter  2)  aircraft  turnaround  time  seems  to  be  a  critical  aspect  of  the
business model for LCCs and may influence the airports they use. However, there is little
information on how the turnaround practices differ between airlines in a larger scale (i.e.
how do they vary for different airlines at different airports over a considerable period of
time).  Indeed,  gathering  significant  and  comparable  turnaround  time  data  at  several
airports  is  rather  complex.  As  we  found  no  empirical  information,  particularly  in  the
European  context,  we  resorted  to  aircraft  tracking  technologies  as  suggested  by  Budd
(2012).
For the sake of simplicity in data collection, but also as a way to reflect the confidence
airlines have on airport performance, we considered scheduled turnaround times. In this
sense, a scheduled turnaround (see Figure 1) goes from the aircraft arrival to its departure
as expressed in the airline timetables (in contrast, a technical turnaround extends between
aircraft “in-block” and “off-block”, during which the tires are literally blocked at the stand).
We used historical data from the aircraft tracking website Planefinder.net (Pinkfroot, n.d.)
to identify the rotations performed by tracked aeroplanes during one month (September
2013). Then we computed scheduled turnaround times based on departure and arrival
times  for  the  routes  that  were  part  of  the  same  rotations  according  to  the  aircraft
registration number.
For comparison purposes, we computed the turnarounds performed by 14 European
airlines:  seven  Full-Service  Carriers  (FSC)  –  Air  Berlin,  Air  France,  British  Airways,
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Lufthansa,  Iberia,  KLM  and Turkish  Airlines;  and  seven  LCCs  –  easyJet,  Germanwings,
Norwegian, Pegasus, Ryanair, Vueling and Wizz Air. To control for aircraft size and stage
length, we have only included the rotations performed with aircraft from the Airbus A320
and Boeing 737 families. In total, we identified over 139 000 individual turnaround times
in order to compare results by airline and airport.
In chapter 5 we analyse measures for the relative importance of LCCs in association
with  each  variable  in  our  database  according  to  the  parameters  they  represent.  This
information  forms  the  basis  to  characterise  the  airports  in  the  sample  by  identifying
common attributes and marked differences among them.
The measures of relative importance of LCCs also provide some guidance to describe
the extent to which an airport can be considered 'low cost' or not. We use this information
to select a second sample of airports to perform a dynamic longitudinal analysis in order to
identify relevant trends in the evolution of these airports and the extent to which those
trends  can  be  generalised.  As  most  of  the  airports  with  the  largest  offer  of  low-cost
capacity  belong to  Multi-Airport  Systems  (MAS),  we  included all  the  airports  in  every
relevant MAS to analyse their evolution and mutual influences.
Chapter 6 presents this dynamic analysis for 42 airports, with 38 of them being part
of  Multi-Airport  Systems  with  a  significant  participation  of  low-cost  traffic:  Alicante,
Amsterdam,  Barcelona,  Brussels,  Copenhagen,  Glasgow,  Istanbul,  London,  Manchester,
Milan, Oslo, Paris and Rome. The airports of Malaga, Dublin, Madrid and Palma de Mallorca
complete the selection due to their relevance for European low-cost  traffic.  Again,  this
analysis is primarily based on airline capacity (seats) data from Innovata database  (IATA,
n.d.) aggregated for the years 2004, 2008, 2012 and 2013. However, for Spanish airports
(Barcelona MAS, Madrid, Alicante MAS, Malaga and Palma de Mallorca) we preferred to use
11
Figure 1: Graphical definition of a scheduled turnaround, as opposed to the actual technical turnaround,
in between two successive flights of the same aircraft.
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data  provided  by  AENA  Aeropuertos,  the  airport  operator,  in  terms of  passengers  per
airline for the years 2005 to 2013 (AENA, 2014).
The  qualitative  analysis,  in  particular  the  interviews  and field  visits,  support  this
quantitative dynamic approach in proposing a conceptual model to depict the evolution of
airports concerning the consolidation of the low-cost segment.
1.2 Dissertation structure
This dissertation is organised in eight chapters that follow the logic thread suggested
by the proposed methodology in order to tackle the research questions. Figure 2 shows the
structure of the main chapters and the dominant methodological approaches.
Chapter  1 introduces  the subject  of  the dissertation and covers the elements that
frame this  research.  Chapter  2 summarises  the most  relevant  aspects  of  the literature
review and thus identifies the gaps in the current state of the art that this projects aims at
contributing to close.
Chapter 3 describes the current context of the airport industry and presents the main
aspects to consider in the development of a competitive strategy. This section identifies the
12
Figure 2: Schematic structure of the body of the dissertation.
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most  relevant  stakeholders  involved  in  airport  development  and  operation.  Then  it
contributes to a redefinition of the airport customers and the airport product and, based
on  these  aspects,  to  a  categorisation  for  different  approaches  to  the  airport  business.
Finally, it presents an analysis on competition between airports.
Chapter  4 reviews the most relevant aspects of low-cost carriers, particularly those
that  influence  the  analysis  of  the  impact  the  business  model  of  these  airlines  has  on
airports. A brief review of the evolution of LCCs around the world leads to a more detailed
appraisal  of  the  situation  in  Europe.  Finally,  the  airports  that  LCCs  use  in  Europe  are
identified, as an input for the following chapter.
Then, chapter 5 analyses in detail the characteristics of the European airports used by
LCCs. Based on a sample derived from the destinations served by all LCCs in Europe in
2013 we then propose a way to measure the relevance of LCCs in the airports, followed by
a  characterisation  of  the airports  in  the sample  and an  analysis  of  the  capabilities  or
attributes that 'low cost airports' may provide.
Chapter  6 presents a dynamic assessment on the evolution of the most interesting
airports derived from the analysis in the previous chapter. Such assessment is based on the
development of low-cost traffic at a second sample of European airports. The chapter ends
by proposing a conceptual model that represents the main trends in the evolution of LCCs
in airport systems.
Chapter  7 introduces  an  innovative  framework  to  complement  airport  strategic
planning. It  builds upon the findings of the previous chapters to structure a conceptual
framework that integrates the different airport stakeholders in defining a strategic focus.
The  chapter  presents  the  framework  itself,  referred  as  the  [New]  Airport  Business
Network, and defends flexibility for airport design and adaptability in its business strategy.
Finally,  a case study on the Lelystad Airport in the Netherlands serves to illustrate the
applicability of the framework.
The final chapter (8) summarises the research results, the main contributions of the
dissertation and the key findings of the entire analysis. It also presents ideas for future
developments based on this research.
1.3 Publications
During  the  development  of  this  doctoral  project,  two  papers  were  published  in
indexed peer-reviewed journals  (Jimenez et  al.,  2013a,  2012),  along with several  other
publications  in  peer-reviewed  conference  proceedings  (Jimenez  et  al.,  2014b,  2013b,
2011). The first journal paper  (Jimenez et al., 2012) provided much of the motivation to
focus the dissertation on the relationship between airports and LCCs, whilst it served as an
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exploration  of  alternative  research  methods.  This  paper,  which  partially  feeds  the
discussion on airport competition in chapter  3, presented a specific case of airports in
Portugal.
The second journal paper  (Jimenez et al., 2013a), forms a large part of chapter  3 in
this dissertation because it provides a sound understanding of the airport business in the
current context. However, the section dedicated to the airport stakeholders, presented also
in chapter 3, constitutes an updated and extended version of what is in the paper. On the
other hand, this paper also provided the inspiration and initial framework to develop the
work presented in chapter 7, which also presents a complete reformulation of “the airport
business network” that originally appeared in the paper (hence the name of the section in
chapter 7: “the [New] Airport Business Network”).
Chapters  4 and  5 extend a  working paper that  was  discussed in a  peer-reviewed
conference  (Jimenez  et  al.,  2014a). The  final  paper  is  based  on  the  contents  of  these
chapters and is in the process of  enhancement prior to submission to a pier-reviewed
journal. The contents of chapters 6 and 7 are now being adapted to be soon submitted for
publication.
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2 State of the art
Liberalisation of the air transport market around the world has profoundly changed
the evolution trends of the aviation industry in the second half of the past century. Prior to
deregulation,  international  agreements  and  domestic  regulations  effectively  prevented
competition between airlines by defining a strict set of rules regarding carriers, routes,
frequencies,  and  even  prices.  The  regulatory  framework  also  prevented  competition
between  airports  because  the  agreements  included  provision  for  market  access  at
particular airports (Belobaba et al., 2009).
The  outcomes  of  liberalisation  often  include  lower  fares,  higher  demand,  service
concentration  for  airlines  that  use  hub-and-spoke  network  strategies,  and  service  de-
concentration thanks to low-cost carriers that favour point-to-point networks  (Bounova,
2009; GAO, 2006; Goetz and Vowles, 2009; Jimenez et al., 2012), reduced service in remote
regions  (Metrass-Mendes  and  de  Neufville,  2011;  Reynolds-Feighan,  1995;  Reynolds‐
Feighan, 1998), and increased industry instability (Goetz and Vowles, 2009).
Liberalisation also contributed to a change in airport ownership and management,
especially  during  recent  decades.  A  number  of  airports  around  the  world  have  been
privatised and many others run now as commercial firms (ACI Europe, 2010; Gillen, 2011).
A  new perspective  from  airport  management  implies  a  different  relationship  with  the
airline  customers  that  is  more  direct  and  goes  far  beyond  airport  charges.  Moreover,
different  owners  or  new  operators  may  define  wider  goals  to  target  other  type  of
customers. Thus the traditional business approach, as a public utility provider, evolved to
incorporate  the  increased relevance  of  non-aeronautical  activities  that  foster  revenues
(Jarach, 2001).
At the same time, increased competition and lower fares induced higher demand for
air travel that, in turn, increased congestion in many airports around the world. Whilst
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liberalisation  eliminated  restrictions  on  airport  access,  congestion  effectively  limits
competition in airports where access is restricted by some form of demand management
(Belobaba  et  al.,  2009).  This  creates  opportunities  for  other  airports  that  are  less
congested,  but  it  also  highlights  the  importance  of  defining  long-term  strategies  that
optimise the use of existing infrastructure.
A liberalised market created a proper environment for LCCs to emerge and favoured
their rapid expansion.  Yet  after decades of  liberalisation the academic literature is  not
conclusive on the long-term impact  of this trend for airports  (Graham, 2013).  There is
concern about the growing market power of LCCs and its implications for airports, and
there is uncertainty about the future evolution of the business models, not only for LCCs
but for traditional airlines too (European Parliament, 2007).
Liberalisation also increases uncertainty for airport planning and operations, mainly
because airlines are free to launch and close routes at will  from whatever airport they
deem convenient.  But also because more competition creates a volatile environment in
which airlines and airports are more likely to rise and fall.
In this context, our literature review focuses on four areas that are relevant for the
topic of this dissertation: airport planning, airport flexibility, airport strategies and 'low
cost airports', with a particular focus on the European context. Airport planning because
we consider the ascendency of LCCs may have influenced the way airports approach this
process. Airport flexibility because we consider it may add value to airport design in the
context of increased uncertainty. Airport strategies because we consider there is room for
improvement and for integration with infrastructure development. And 'low cost airports'
because it seems they have implemented strategies that are attractive for LCCs.
2.1 Airport planning
Airports  are  part  of  a  broader  aviation  system  that,  among  other  components,
includes  airways,  air  traffic  control,  airlines  and  the  aircraft  manufacturing  industry.
Theoretically, there could be a joint planning process for the whole aviation system, but its
high complexity and sophistication, let alone the wide variety of players in each subsystem,
makes such task very difficult in practice (Ashford et al., 2011).
Airports  are  systems  on  their  own  as  well.  Given  that  airports  cannot  operate
independently (a given commercial flight needs two distinct airports at least), there are
usually different levels of planning for airport networks (de Neufville and Odoni, 2003). A
general  form  of  airport  planning  usually  occurs  at  a  national  level  by  the  national
government or any specialised authority.  In the United States,  for instance,  the Federal
Aviation  Administration  (FAA)  elaborates  and  updates  a  National  Plan  of  Integrated
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Airport Systems (NPIAS). This plan identifies all airports that may be candidates to receive
federal  grants  for  airport  improvement  and  estimates  the  total  amount  of  funding
required. Although it is not the case for the NPIAS, national level planning normally helps
in the prioritisation of projects or the identification of critical infrastructures. Additionally,
national  plans  also  classify  the  existing  airports  in  some  way  and  allocate  resources
accordingly.
Similarly, at regional or metropolitan levels other entities may carry additional airport
planning.  At  a  local  level,  for  individual  airports,  master  plans are  the most  used and
traditional  way  of  airport  planning.  According  to  the  International  Civil  Aviation
Organisation  (ICAO)  an  airport  master  plan  “presents  the  planner’s  conception  of  the
ultimate development of a specific airport” (ICAO, 1987). According to the FAA “the goal of
a master plan is to provide the framework needed to guide future airport development
that  will  cost-effectively  satisfy  aviation  demand,  while  considering  potential
environmental and socioeconomic impacts” (FAA, 2007).
The ICAO Airport planning manual (ICAO, 1987) describes the full process of master
planning around five general steps:
1. inventory of existing conditions;
2. forecast future demand;
3. determine facility requirements (types and characteristics of runways,  taxiways,
buildings, baggage system, cargo facilities, airport access, etc.);
4. analyse different alternatives according to the requirements;
5. select the most appropriate alternative and develop a detailed airport layout plan
for that alternative.
By  carefully  following  this  process,  the  master  plan  provides  a  guide  for  the
development of physical facilities in the airport and the land use for the areas surrounding
the airport, for the determination of the environmental effects of that development, and
for  the  establishment  of  the  requirements  regarding  airport  access  through  surface
transport  modes  (Ashford et  al.,  2011).  Hence master plans are  specifically  concerned
about the physical development (i.e. infrastructure) of the airport.
Even  though  master  plans  are  widely  used  all  around  the  world,  they  have
fundamental weakness in the sense that they do not recognise uncertainty. A master plan
assumes that a single forecast (the second step in the list above) is a full description of a
very likely future. It prepares the airport to deal with that future, but does little to prepare
it for a different scenario or to deal with the possibility that airport managers could shape
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the future by defining the characteristics of their product (de Neufville and Odoni, 2003),
as most industries do.
Proactive planning, in which airport planners and managers explicitly intend to shape
the future instead of just react to it, is a powerful alternative to master plans (de Neufville
and Odoni, 2003). Rather than simply forecasting an uncertain future traffic and designing
a  plan  to  meet  the  requirements  of  such  demand,  proactive  planning  deals  with  the
strategies to attract the desired level and characteristics of traffic. Nevertheless, this type
of planning has been barely used in the airport context, mainly because the past airport
ownership structure has favoured the role of infrastructure provision as a public service
(Belobaba et al.,  2009).  As airport privatisation and commercialisation gains relevance,
proactive  planning is  likely  to  be more  used.  However,  there is  no clear  and standard
framework to develop proactive airport plans, as it is the case for master plans.
An approach that overcomes the flaws of master planning without diverting too much
from its process and methods is the so-called dynamic strategic planning. It is strategic in
the sense of long-term thinking, not with the mind on a specific possible future but on the
path to the several futures that may unfold.  It  promotes thinking ahead the way chess
players  do,  recognising  the possibility  of  different  moves  and their  consequences,  and
establishing a position from which they are able to respond to the actual events as they
happen.  It  is  dynamic  in  the  sense  that  it  emphasises  flexibility.  Therefore  “airport
operators must adjust their plans and designs dynamically over time to accommodate the
variety of futures that may occur” (de Neufville and Odoni, 2003).
In a similar direction,  Kwakkel  et  al.  (2010) propose an adaptive airport  strategic
planning “that is flexible and over time can adapt to the changing conditions under which
an airport must operate”. This type of planning involves an iterative process that defines a
set  of  policies  (mainly  alterations  to  the  airport  infrastructure),  and  the  contextual
vulnerabilities  and  opportunities  that  may  affect  or  promote  the  applicability  of  such
policies. It then identifies a contingency plan (a set of actions to be launched when certain
monitored thresholds are reached), and an implementation plan (the actions to be taken
immediately).  The authors,  however,  do not  explore the applicability  of  their  model  in
practice.
From these different planning alternatives, master plans are clearly the most widely
used.  Despite  their  flaws,  master  plans  are  part  of  a  series  of  international  technical
standards  and  recommendations  emanated  from  ICAO,  the  International  Civil  Aviation
Organisation (Belobaba et al., 2009). Therefore, in many cases master plans are mandated
by  national  regulations  for  any  airport  with  significant  commercial  traffic.  Likewise,
investments  are  usually  guaranteed  only  if  they  have  been  presented  in  an  approved
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master plan. Then, the real practical challenge is to overcome the drawbacks of master-
planning with long term strategic  planning that  can be adapted to fit  the  structure of
master plans.
2.2 Airport flexibility
Flexible  design  is  becoming  a  new  paradigm  for  engineering  systems  planning
(Burghouwt, 2007).  In particular,  real  options theory (borrowed from financial options
where one has the right, but not the obligation, to exercise a given action – buy or sell – in
the future) is proving to be very valuable. “Unlike financial options, real options regard a
physical structure or system. However, the role of the option is the same; real options, like
financial options, allow investors the opportunity to purchase the right to delay expensive
or  irreversible  decisions.  [The  investors]  therefore  recognize  the  role  that  active
management can play in either minimising the damage from or taking advantage of an
uncertain future.” (Chambers, 2007)
Real options can be either “on” or “in” a project. The main difference between these
two cases is that the latter intends to change the way the project or the system is designed
in  its  technical  details,  while  the former includes  more  managerial  decisions  (such  as
deferring investments) treating the technical  functioning as a  black box  (Wang and de
Neufville, 2005). In general, there are four types of real options “on” systems:
1. the option to acquire (buy) engineering systems – the right to start a project;
2. the option to divest (sell) engineering systems – the right to shut down a project
before it gets unprofitable;
3. the option to expand the size of engineering systems – the right to easily scale up a
project to meet a larger demand;
4. the option to reduce the size of engineering systems – the right to scale down if
demand happens to be lower than expected.
Real options “in” systems, on the other hand, are in general more complex than their
“on”  counterpart  (Chambers,  2007).  Since  they  result  from  a  conscious  decision
implemented in the system's design, they require a deeper knowledge about the way the
system operates. Current research for flexible design of airports is more focused on real
options  “on”  the projects.  However,  in  other  engineering  systems real  options  “in”  the
projects have a higher value for flexible design when compared to the rigid versions for the
same systems (de Neufville and Scholtes, 2011). Indeed, the topic of real options in flexible
designs is relatively novel in the literature.
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In the airport context, Burghouwt (2007) distinguishes between ex ante and ex post
flexibility. “Ex ante flexibility refers to actions taken now which allow the organization to
be flexible in the future. Ex ante flexibility has to do with anticipation (...) Ex post flexibility
refers  to  actions  that  are  adjustments  to  change  now,  which  are  possible  because  of
decisions taken in the past.”
The idea of a flexible design is to incorporate the ability to adjust easily to different
scenarios. In order to do so, de Neufville  (2008) defines three basic steps for a flexible
design process for airports:
1. Recognition of the range of uncertainty: identify all the possible future outcomes of
the system, from the least favourable to the most advantageous. Normally, this can
be stated in terms of future demand (passengers and cargo, for example).
2. Definition  of  flexible  design  opportunities:  determine  the  technical
implementations that enable the adjustments in the system. I.e.  the physical  or
managerial characteristics that will, for example, allow the airport to reconfigure
its facilities to meet different technical or market developments.
3. Analysis of the development strategies: select the 'inaugural' airport plan. I.e. the
initial configuration that provides the best starting point for future changes; and
the strategies to exploit opportunities.
Since master plans dominate airport planning, flexible designs for airports have not
been common  (de Neufville,  2008).  Yet,  some forms of flexibility have been studied or
implemented to some extent. One of these forms, associated to the real option to defer an
investment,  is  the  staged  deployment  of  facilities.  For  airports,  capacity  is  regularly
incremented in  lump,  discrete,  amounts and at  a  significant  cost.  Hence,  the  more the
investment can be postponed, whilst  providing a reasonable level  of  service,  the better
(considering  the  value  of  money  in  time).  Such  investments  may  include  additional
passengers  or  cargo  buildings,  additional  runways,  full  length  taxiways,  or  new apron
areas (Chambers, 2007).
Land banking is another type of flexibility used in the airport context, but it is also an
important requirement for implementing other types of flexibility. Land banking consists
of  reserving  space  to  develop  future  configurations  or  expansions.  Land  banking  is
normally  used  in  two  situations:  when  a  new  airport  (the  second  of  a  large  city,  for
instance) is foreseeable some time in the near future; or when an existing airport needs to
be expanded (eventually most airports need it) to meet demand growth. In both cases the
actual need for construction is not certain, so it usually pays off to reserve the land when it
is easier and cheaper to acquire (de Neufville, 1990).
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When it comes to flexibility “in” airport systems (the two situations above are more
related to real options “on” systems because they do not affect the actual design), examples
are scarcer.  In general,  shared-use space and modular buildings are becoming common
practices in modern airports. Shared-use space refers to the fact that some activities inside
an airport can share the same space. Hence, the total space needed is less than the sum of
the space required for the individual activities  (de Neufville and Belin,  2002).  Modular
buildings involves for example the use of non-load-bearing walls to separate activities that
are required to occur independently. The most common case is that of the “swing gates”
that  can  be  used  for  domestic  (no  passport  control)  or  international  (with  passport
control) traffic in accordance with traffic peaks (de Neufville and Odoni, 2003).
Butters  (2010) identifies  more  detailed  cases  of  flexible  design  “in”  airports.  He
argues  that  a  master  plan  can  implement  flexibility  by  taking  into  account  different
development  scenarios.  For  building  design,  large  uninterrupted  space  clearly  favours
adaptability to different uses.  In this sense,  the inner layout should be designed at the
latest to allow for unforeseen changes in market or regulation. Structural core elements
and utilities should not be concurrent with main processes, such as security or check-in, to
provide  room  for  growth.  Airports  with  high  seasonality  can  implement  passenger
buildings with piers or wings that can be completely shut-down during the low-traffic
season.
In  a  survey  of  19  airports  around  the  world  (Magalhães  et  al.,  2013), airport
representatives identified the flexible implementations that their airports feature, from a
previously defined list. Common answers included available land for expansions (i.e. land
banking), utilization of available land for non-aeronautical activities, changing design and
layout  of  retail  areas,  swing  gates,  and  available  space  in  the  passenger  buildings.
Magalhães et al. (2013) also distinguish between flexibility at strategic (e.g. land banking),
tactical (e.g. movable walls) and operational (e.g. swing gates) levels.
Yet flexibility is not only about identifying and deploying flexible options “on” or “in”
the system design. It is also important to secure the right to use flexibility when it becomes
necessary, otherwise it looses value (de Neufville and Scholtes, 2011). Another important
aspect  of  flexible  design  is  that  it  changes  the  perspective  towards  uncertainty.  Thus
flexibility can be also seen as an opportunity to profit  from different  conditions (or to
avoid loses) and not only as a mechanism to deal with risk or something inherently bad.
It  is  also  important  to  recognise  that  decision  makers  may  implicitly  consider
uncertainty and consequently adapt their plans,  even if  there is no explicit  mention to
flexibility in the process. The key aspect here is that there may be opportunities for future
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adaptations  that  are  probably  not  specified  in  advance,  but  that  could  be  triggered  if
changes in external factors require them to be made.
2.3 Airport strategies
Existing literature on airport planning focuses more frequently on the development of
physical facilities alone than on the relationship between infrastructure development and
airport business strategy. Often, the development of a business strategy is considered as a
task  of  the  airport  marketing  department,  usually  when  facilities  are  already  in  place
(Graham, 2003). But in the current context, airport operators should develop strategies to
enhance their competitive position with the same fervour as they plan for infrastructure
improvements.
As Barret  (2000) suggests, before market liberalisation the world of non-competing
airlines  was  mirrored  by  a  world  of  non-competing  airports.  In  deregulated  markets
airports are subject to a competitive pressure, partly because airlines are free to choose
where  to  fly.  Moreover,  the  changes  in  airport  organisational  structure  towards
privatisation and commercialisation, further contributed to the emergence of competition
between airports (Starkie, 2002).
Traditional studies on airport competition focus on the competition for passengers
within the catchment area, especially in the case of several airports in a metropolitan area,
as Lian and Ronnevik (2011) summarise. Starkie  (2008) analysed the case of the airport
industry in the UK with a broader scope, Forsyth et al.  (2010) compiled a selection of
studies that discuss several aspects of airport competition with more detail, and a recent
report  (Copenhagen  Economics,  2012) presented  evidence  for  airport  competition  in
Europe.  Yet,  in  order  to  define  successful  strategies  for  airports,  it  is  important  to
understand not only their competitive environment but also the way airports relate to
their multiple stakeholders to align their strategies.
An airport typically provides a wide range of services through different agents. Thus
the business environment in an airport is, in fact, the interaction between highly diverse
actors. From an operational perspective, Schaar and Sherry (2010) presented a model that
attempts to describe the interrelationships between the airport stakeholders in terms of
their responsibilities and needs. Their model (see Figure 3 in the next chapter), however, is
based on common practices in the airport industry in the United States that do not apply
worldwide (in particular regarding airport ownership, regulation and provision of capital
for  infrastructure  development).  In  addition,  the  model  becomes  too  complex  for  the
analysis of the airport operator role in defining the characteristics of the airport business,
mainly because it divides the planning process among several stakeholders.
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From  a  marketing  perspective,  Jarach  (2001) introduced  the  notion  of  an  “air
transport pipeline” as a model that describes the business relations in a network of actors
around  the  airport.  These  actors  complement  each  other  in  order  to  bundle  service
packages  to  final  consumers.  Although  it  allows  an  analysis  considering  multiple
customers and airport competition, this model is probably too simplified for developing
strategies within the wider scope of airport business nowadays.
Also from a marketing point of view, Tretheway and Kincaid (2010) used the “classic
paradigm of the 'four Ps of marketing'” to elaborate on “strategies that airports can utilise
to compete with other airports”. The authors discussed different dimensions of the airport
Product to suggest strategies regarding Price (direct fees and facilitation of airline cost
reductions),  Promotion  (marketing,  naming  and  branding),  and  Physical  distribution
(airport positioning on computer reservation systems, on their websites and with travel
agents). However, there is no formal model to analyse the process of strategy creation.
Graham  (2010) performed a competitive analysis for the airport industry based on
Porter’s five forces framework (threats of new entrants and substitutes,  the bargaining
power of buyers and suppliers, and the rivalry within the industry). One limitation of this
model is that, in the airport context, there are several customers that act as buyers and
suppliers  at  the same time.  This  notwithstanding,  the  author described strategies  that
some airports have used in line with Porter's generic framework (Porter, 1979).
Frank  (2011) developed  a  conceptual  framework  in  an  attempt  to  describe  the
business model of airports. By applying the framework to three airports, she concluded
that airport business models are highly dependant on the context in which the airport
operates.  Kalakou and Macario  (2013) applied  and extended Osterwalder  and Pigneur
(2010) business model canvas to the airport industry. They also found much diversity in
the business models of 20 airports. However, the canvas was used more to describe the
current business model of airports than to aid in the formulation of future strategies.
We may therefore conclude that, despite the growing body of literature in the area,
there is still a missing link between the physical development and the business strategy of
an  airport.  Moreover,  there  is  no  clear  definition  of  a  systematic  process  for  strategy
formulation that is applicable to the particular context of the airport industry.
2.4 'Low cost airports'
The  continuous  growth  of  LCCs  during  the  last  decades  motivated  a  number  of
research  studies  on  the  implications  of  this  trend  for  airports.  However,  there  is  no
consensual definition of what a 'low cost airport' may be. De Neufville (2008) states “that
the ascendency of low-cost airlines entails an increased importance and expansion of low-
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cost airports and airport facilities”, in such a way that LCCs catalyse the development of
low-cost airports.
That is an important point because it means that it was the expansion of LCCs that
triggered the emergence of 'low cost airports' and 'low cost facilities', and not vice versa. It
also explains why most studies assume that a 'low cost airport' is one that is used by LCCs
to  a  large extent,  or  one that  somehow resembles  another  that  has  been traditionally
considered as a 'low cost airport' because it accompanied the noticeable expansion of an
LCC (as it is the case of Luton and easyJet in London, for instance).
To Jarach  (2001) 'low-cost' is one of five different market positioning that airports
may adopt to improve weaknesses in a highly competitive environment. In this sense, a
'low cost airport' is one that “aims to attract low-cost operators and thus re-engineers its
whole production chain as to minimise cost and thus prices to airline operators”. Then he
cites London Stansted, London Luton and Dallas Love Field as examples of this low-cost,
market-driven approach.
De Neufville  (2008) explores some characteristics  of 'low cost  airports',  which,  as
LCCs,  “emphasize  economy  through  operational  efficiency  and  minimal  frills”.  In  this
regard, low-cost airports may include three elements:
1. They  avoid  monumental  buildings  by  signature  architects.  Instead,  they  favour
simple  designs.  Grandiose  buildings  with  bespoke  design  are  normally  more
expensive and difficult to build, mainly because the whole structure tends to be a
unique project with few standard elements.
2. The passenger buildings of 'low cost airports' have lower levels of service, which in
practical terms translates to less space per person. The increased efficiency and
higher performance standards of LCCs reduces dwell time and increases annual
capacity per square metre, such that the interior spaces of the buildings can be
used more intensively.
3. Retail and commercial space is limited in 'low cost airports'. De Neufville  (2008)
argues  that  building  and  operating  retail  areas  is  expensive  and  cumbersome,
hence “the economic rationale for building airport terminals as shopping arcades is
not clear”.
Sabar  (2009) analysed 'low-cost  terminals'  (LCT),  which  do not  necessarily  imply
they are implemented as 'low cost airports'. In this sense, an LCT is “an airport terminal
that has been developed with low capital investment cost”. LCTs offer limited facilities due
to space restrictions and favour simplified and efficient services. LCTs key customers are
LCCs and charter airlines attracted by lower charges (passenger service fees) and quick
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turnaround times. The author distinguishes two types of LCTs – converted and newly-built
– and lists some typical characteristics, including: basic terminal facilities, avoidance of air
bridges,  limited  retail  and  catering,  single  storey  terminals,  no  executive  or  business
lounges, usually (but not always) only road access and coach services to nearest cities or
towns, and short taxiing distances to and from terminal building.
Segregated 'low cost terminals' may provide an opportunity for airports to grow in
the low-cost segment  (Njoya and Niemeier, 2011), but they have also been criticised for
duplicating expensive facilities that are required regardless of the market focus (such as
security,  passport  control  and  baggage  handling),  for  cannibalising  traffic  from  other
terminals, or for lacking the ability to easily expand (Blackman, 2011; Njoya and Niemeier,
2011; Toh, 2013). Also, Hanaoka and Saraswati  (2011) argue that the efficiency gains at
LCTs  “seem  to  be  driven  largely  by  the  location  of  the  terminal,  rather  than  its
configuration”.
A recent analysis  (Kalakou and Macario, 2013) of the business models for different
airport  categories found that 'low cost airports'  do not follow a unique model.  Yet the
authors  highlighted  that  in  this  category  “the  majority  of  the  airports  does  not  pay
attention to the development of retail  activities”.  They studied Milan Bergamo, Brussels
Charleroi,  Rome  Ciampino,  London  Luton,  Liverpool  and London  Gatwick  as  'low cost
airports'. However, airports like Milan Bergamo, Brussels Charleroi and London Gatwick
have expanded space for retail stores and food courts in recent years. Overall, the authors
concluded that  the volume  and type of  traffic  have  a  strong influence  on the airports
business model. It would be interesting to analyse whether the opposite interaction also
occurs (i.e. whether the business strategy influences traffic types and volumes).
Conversely, a report from the European Low Fares Airline Association (ELFAA, 2004),
naturally  not an unbiased source,  stressed that 'low cost airports' concentrate on non-
aeronautical revenues and thus increase terminal shopping area. They argued that in a
liberalised  context  “airports  are  no  longer  able  to  dictate  the  price  and conditions  to
airlines” and thus not able to pass on their inefficiencies to airlines and subsequently to
passengers.  As a consequence they highlighted that  “the main difference now between
traditional and low cost airports is that the latter no longer consider aeronautical charges
to be their main source of income”.
ELFAA  (2004) also  supported  the  view  that  LCCs  favoured  the  development  of
previously loss-making secondary airports into major international airports serving large
metropolitan areas. This encouraged other airports to make the transition and compete to
offer low cost,  efficient facilities to the growing number of LCCs.  However,  they do not
describe how should those “low cost, efficient facilities” be like.
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The reports also highlighted that the trend in Europe mirrors the situation in the US
where “airports like Chicago Midway, Baltimore International and Oakland enabled [LCCs]
to provide competition to the network carriers (...) and also led to competition between
the airports. For example, Southwest has been able to provide strong competition to the
likes of American Airlines on the Chicago to Las Vegas route without having to deal with
American’s  dominance  at  Chicago  O’Hare  Airport,  where  it  would  have  been  virtually
impossible to have obtained sufficient slots in order to be a viable competitor.”
Besides the study of 'low-cost airports' or terminals as differentiated facilities with
their own business practices and characteristics,  the impact that LCCs have on airports
have  also  been  a  matter  of  research.  Graham  (2013) reviewed  60  papers  on  the
relationship between airports and LCCs and concluded that “the academic literature is far
less clear and conclusive about the overall impacts of LCC operations at airports and the
extent to which airports benefit from LCCs, particularly in the long-term, and this suggests
that  more  studies  are  needed.”  Moreover,  the  review argued “that  the  LCC’s  choice  of
airport is very much determined by its operating model, although through time a wide
variation of models have evolved which has complicated the situation.”
Barret (2004) identified seven factors for airports to be attractive for LCCs based on
an interview with Ryanair's CEO. At the time of the interview (January 2003) Ryanair was
carrying  15.7  million  passengers  per  year  using  56  aircraft  and  only  two  bases  in
continental  Europe (Charleroi  and Hahn).  But  by  2013 the airline  carried 81.4 million
passengers with over 305 aircraft operating from 61 bases across Europe and Morocco.
Thus the current importance of those original factors is debatable, even for an airline that
has  until  recently  largely  adhered  to  its  original  model  (Alamdari  and  Fagan,  2005;
Klophaus et al., 2012).
Warnock-Smith and Potter (2005) surveyed 8 LCCs operating in the UK to analyse and
rank 15 “airport choice factors”. These and other similar studies (Francis et al., 2004, 2003;
Gillen and Lall,  2004) provide important insights but do not detail whether or how the
airports implement those factors.
It appears to be consensual that LCCs have high aircraft utilisation thanks to quick
turnaround  times  on  the  ground  (Graham,  2013).  In  fact,  LCCs  in  general  are  able  to
execute quicker turnarounds than traditional 'legacy' carriers, which are limited by their
hub-and-spoke strategies when scheduling flights. Learmount  (2002) raised the issue of
turnaround times for  LCCs  in  an interview with Ryanair's  CEO.  Gillen and Lall  (2004)
studied in more detail the case of Southwest on a given day at Albany Airport and, more in
general, the organisational aspects of Southwest's business strategy in comparison with
that of Ryanair and easyJet. They found that, controlling for aircraft size, Southwest turns
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their  planes  quicker  than  the  other  airlines  operating  at  Albany.  Despite  these
contributions,  there is  little  information on how exactly do turnaround practices differ
between  airlines  at  a  larger  scale  and,  more  importantly,  how  exactly  do  they  differ
between airports (even for the same carrier).
It  is  also commonly  agreed that  LCCs used to prefer 'secondary'  airports  (Barbot,
2006; de Neufville, 2008; Dobruszkes, 2013, 2006; Zhang et al., 2008). However Abda et al.
(2012) found  that,  in  the  USA,  the  market  shares  of  LCCs  were  bigger  at  the  largest
primary airports, “contrary to the common perception that LCCs avoid primary airports
and direct  competition with the [Full  Service Carriers]”  (Graham, 2013).  This indicates
that LCCs are becoming increasingly dominant in some markets (in particular the intra-
USA and intra-European markets) and, as they keep growing, they move to the primary
airports. In fact, the recent evolution of the networks of LCCs in Europe (Dobruszkes, 2013,
2009, 2006) suggests similar developments as the business models of the airlines evolve.
2.5 Summary
This  literature review shows the lack of  a  comprehensive framework for strategic
planning  in  airport  systems  that  integrates  infrastructure  development  with  business
strategy. Except for proactive planning – which is scarcely used in the airport context –
long term  airport  planning approaches  assume their  objective  is  solely  to  provide the
required  infrastructure  to  support  a  given  level  of  demand  (some  claim  that  level  is
deterministic, others more correctly assume it is stochastic and variable). The definition of
the ways in which that infrastructure could be offered to the different customers is very
often  let  for  subsequent  phases,  usually  when  the  airport  has  already  been  built  or
expanded.
Furthermore, a sense of low uncertainty coming from a regulated era in the airline
industry  seems  to  be  imprinted  on  airport  master-planning.  Arguably,  liberalisation,
airport competition, business complexity and the rise of LCCs have made the airports more
exposed  to  uncertainty.  Therefore  it  is  critical  to  evaluate  opportunities  to  implement
flexibility that may provide value to the airport infrastructure and its business strategy.
Finally,  a  poor understanding of  the impact  of  the growth of  LCCs in the aviation
markets, particularly in Europe, generates confusion as to what are the best strategies to
pursue in what concerns airport planning. A narrow and incomplete vision on the matter
may lead to investments in airport developments that are not able to attract the expected
levels of demand, if used at all, or that are much more expensive to build and operate than
they should – in a context in which airlines and passengers are more and more price-
conscious.
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3 The airport business in the current context
Airports  were  traditionally  considered  monopolistic  utility  providers  with  little
potential  to  develop  market  opportunities  (Graham,  2003).  Yet  the  liberalisation  of
aviation  markets  introduced  new  dynamics  that  increased  complexity  in  the  airport
industry. The emergence of competition between airports (Copenhagen Economics, 2012;
Forsyth  et  al.,  2010;  Starkie,  2008,  2002) and  the  transition  in  ownership  towards
privatisation or commercialisation3 (de Neufville and Odoni,  2003; Donnet et al.,  2011)
require a different perspective in airport management. Such a perspective should embrace
the opportunities created by the existence of a variety of customers for the airport product
(Doganis, 1992).
This chapter aims at explaining the complexity of the airport business nowadays. To
accomplish this goal, it identifies the different stakeholders that play a role in defining the
elements of the airport business. Then it presents the different customers of the airport
product, and a redefinition of the airport product itself as a combination of several service
packages. Based on the interaction between the stakeholders and the customers, mediated
by the airport product, it explores several approaches to the airport business. Finally, it
provides a comprehensive, broad scope review of airport competition.
3.1 Stakeholders in the airport industry
Well  beyond  the  original  role  as  infrastructure  provider,  now  a  typical  airport
provides, through a number of different agents, a wide range of facilities, activities and
services.  Moreover,  the  level  of  involvement  of  the owner or  operator  in  providing  all
services varies a lot from airport to airport. Thus the business environment in an airport is
3 Privatisation implies transferring some ownership rights (management control and residual income,  but
rarely property ownership), fully or in part, from government entities to private investors. Commercialisation
involves a change in management attitude (increased orientation to profits and efficiency),  even under full
government ownership (de Neufville and Odoni, 2003).
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composed  by  a  highly  diverse  interaction  between  disparate  actors.  Indeed,  Macario
(2008) highlights the need to shift the airport management logic towards a more business-
oriented  activity  that  requires  a  complex  interaction  between  agents  with  diversified
interests.
These agents are the relevant stakeholders that influence or are influenced by airport
operations. In order to identify them, first we define the airport management team, which
represents “the airport  as  a firm”  (Jarach,  2001),  as  the core element  in  a  network  of
stakeholders that are responsible for delivering the “airport product” (see section 3.3). The
definition of the airport as a firm, as opposed to the airport as a public utility, reflects the
market-driven management logic that is required in the current competitive context  to
ensure the sustainability of airports.
In the document review that guides this analysis we found that Swedavia, the Swedish
airport  operator,  presents  a  very  simple  but  comprehensive  classification  of  their
stakeholders:  “our most important stakeholders are our owner,  passengers,  employees,
society and our partners” (Swedavia, 2013). From a pure academic perspective, Schaar and
Sherry  (2010) present one of the most comprehensive analysis of airport stakeholders
(see  Figure 3). Yet their approach is exclusively related to airport operations in the USA
and thus limited to particular arrangements that do not apply worldwide.
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Figure 3: Relationships between airport stakeholders, from Schaar and Sherry (2010).
We take these proposals as a starting point to characterise groups of stakeholders
according to their level of involvement in defining the airport product. Thus we focus more
on the actors that influence airport operations than on those that are influenced by the
airport. Nevertheless, given the extensive economic and environmental impact of airports,
the stakeholders that are affected by airport operations are increasingly considered for
airport planning.
To help classifying the stakeholders, we consider then three generic groups: airport,
partners  and  society.  The  degree  to  which  the  different  stakeholders  are  involved  in
defining airport operations increases as they get closer to the “airport” group, as Figure 4
shows. The following sub-sections describe in detail the stakeholders in each group.
3.1.1 Airport
i) Airport management
The  airport  management  team  is  in  charge  of  defining  the  specific  strategy  and
development  alternatives  for  an  airport.  The  management  may  be  autonomous  and
independent for one airport site, but it also may be subject to the managerial guidance of a
larger group. The latter case is clear when several airports are operated by a governmental
agency, authority or company, such as AENA (that manages 47 public airports in Spain),
the Hellenic Aviation Authority (that operates public airports in Greece, except for Athens
International)  or  the Port  Authority  of  New York  and New Jersey  (that,  besides  other
transport infrastructure, operates 6 airports in the New York area, including three major
airports for New York City); or by an airport group such as Vinci or Aéroports de Paris.
The degree of  centralisation within these organisations may significantly limit  the
scope of the activities of the local management team, or may be crucial for distributing
investments across the airports in the group or agency (Bel and Fageda, 2009). However,
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Figure 4: Schematic representation of airport stakeholders, including customers.
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even when limited in its autonomy, we consider the local airport management team has at
least  two  main  tasks:  defining  and  controlling  tactical  day-to-day  operations,  and
communicating and explaining strategic concerns to central management.
ii) Airport owners
The airport management team is liable before the actual owners of the airport or the
airport group. Depending on the ownership structure of the airport, the owners may be
individual  shareholders,  branches  of  local,  regional  or  national  governments,  private
companies,  chambers  of  commerce,  or  a  combination of  several  of  these entities  (ACI
Europe, 2010; de Neufville and Odoni,  2003; Gillen,  2011). Irrespective of their nature,
airport  owners can set general goals that the management team must follow, either in
terms  of  public  service,  environmental  objectives,  trade  facilitation,  self-sufficiency,
profitability  or  a  combination of  multiple  criteria.  In  addition,  airport  owners  support
capital investments that determine the physical development of an airport.
As mentioned before, the same airport owners may hold interests in several airports
(or other type of companies). We consider other  subsidiaries of the airport owners – in
case they exist – may influence their position over a particular airport strategy, but the
degree of influence may vary from case to case. Therefore in this work we do not consider
them directly as airport stakeholders.
iii) Employees
Employees ultimately execute the intended strategy of airport management. But as
airport services are provided by several different agents, not all of them part of the airport
operator,  “the  employee  category  includes  both  direct  employees  of  the  airports
organization as  well  as  employees  of  companies  operating at  the airport”  (Schaar and
Sherry, 2010). Employees are also essential to deliver the quality of service that the airport
and the airlines expect to deliver to their customers.  Moreover,  employees may as well
drastically impact airport operations, for instance in the case of a strike.
3.1.2 Partners
i) Airlines
Airlines, including commercial airlines (scheduled and charter, passengers and cargo)
and executive and general aviation, are in the core of the airport business. However, the
traditional perception of airlines merely as the main airport customer is being challenged.
In  the  current  context,  the  relationship  between  the  airport  and  the  airlines  must  be
directed towards  a  real  partnership.  This  implies  a better understanding of  the actual
requirements of airlines in terms of infrastructure and operations. Airports should adapt
to serve the diverse business models of different carriers and alliances.
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In addition, a closer cooperation between airports and airlines is a key factor for the
success  of  the  airport  business,  partially  because  besides  aeronautical  fees,  airlines
provide customers for the non-aeronautical services of the airport. Moreover, an airport
may  influence  the  carrier  decisions  regarding  network  expansion,  and  market  new
destinations together to attract more users.
ii) Aeronautical business units
The aeronautical business units comprise a series of agents that provide services to
the airlines, and to the airport, that are essential for aviation-related activities (such as
meteorological  services,  communications,  baggage  handling,  passenger  handling,  cargo
and mail handling, aircraft cleaning, fuel provision, aircraft maintenance, in-flight catering,
airport  security  and fire  fighting,  internal  transportation,  and general  safety  services).
Some of these services may be provided by the airport itself, but they are often delivered
by third-party providers (Doganis, 1992).
Airlines  can  contract  the  services  of  the  aeronautical  business  units  (outsourced
handlers, for instance), they can perform some of the related activities by themselves or
they can buy them from other airlines. The airport must ensure airlines have access to
competitive  services  and  a  sufficiently  attractive  business  environment  for  the
aeronautical units, while fulfilling all applicable regulations.
iii) Non-aeronautical business units
Like  its  aeronautical  counterpart,  the  non-aeronautical  business  units  are  not
necessarily  part  of  the  airport  company,  but  they  provide  essential  services  that
complement the airport product with non-aviation activities. Among others, the tenants
and concessionaires of retail shopping, food and beverage services, parking or car rental
are  part  of  these  business  units,  as  well  as  the  providers  of  security,  cleaning  and
maintenance services for the terminals and other airport buildings, or surface transport
operators. Normally the airport and the non-aeronautical business units share the goal of
increasing passenger and visitor volumes or level of expenditure.
iv) Air Navigation Service Provider
An efficient system for air traffic management (ATM) ensures a safe, economic and
reliable service for air transport users.  At the airport level it  is  essential to coordinate
ground  and  terminal  control,  but  with  the  implementation  of  Airport  Collaborative
Decision Making (A-CDM) it is important to keep close interaction with ATM during the
entire  phases  of  a  flight,  as  well  as  with stakeholders  in  the departure  or destination
airport at the other end of the leg (Eurocontrol, 2012). Usually, the Air Navigation Service
Provider  (ANSP)  is  a  government  agency  or  a  state-owned  company,  but  other
arrangements  such as  multi-lateral  organisations  (Eurocontrol,  2014) or Public-Private
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Partnerships (NATS, 2014) exist. This means that the relationship between ANSPs, airport
operators and other stakeholders may also lead to a more business oriented, rather than
solely operational, approach.
v) Suppliers (aviation value chain)
Suppliers of the four previous groups of stakeholders (such as airframe and engine
manufacturers) also play a role in the airport business. However, we do not consider them
directly  in our analysis.  Instead (as  Figure 4 suggests)  they are  related to  each of  the
airport  partners and thus connect the airport  with the rest  of  the aviation value chain
(Tretheway and Markhvida, 2013).
3.1.3 Society
i) Regulators
Despite liberalisation of the air transport market, regulation still plays an important
role in an industry where safety and security are a primary goal.  Besides,  bilateral Air
Service Agreements still abound for international markets, most states hold restrictions to
airline ownership by foreigners, some airports with congested facilities have controlled
access  to  slots,  others  are  bound  by  curfews  or  other  artificial  limitations  to  airport
capacity (Belobaba et al., 2009). Moreover, as privatisation and commercialisation extends,
airports are increasingly subject to economic regulation, allegedly, to control their market
power (Czerny, 2006; Starkie, 2002).
Regulators  do  influence  airport  operations  and  airport  strategies  by  providing
positive or negative incentives, with impacts in terms of efficiency, and thus we can view
them as relevant stakeholders. Usually, regulators are part of some government branch or
agency, but as they have a very specific task, we consider them independently. However, in
the light of direct airport-airline commercial agreements, regulation may play a lighter role
(Bush and Starkie, 2013; Starkie, 2012).
ii) Government (local, regional, national)
Different forms and levels of government may be involved with airport operations by
an active participation of local, regional, national or even supra-national authorities (as in
the case of Basel-Mulhouse-Freiburg EuroAirport). Governments (at all levels) may hold or
share ownership of a given airport, but in this case they are included within the  airport
owners group of stakeholders described before. On the other hand, governments should
follow  the  objectives  of  the  communities  they  represent,  trying  both  to  maximise  the
positive  effects  and to  minimise the negative  effects  of  airport  operations  (Schaar  and
Sherry, 2010).
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The relationship between the airport and the government is normally associated with
the role of the airport as a promoter of employment, tourism and trade opportunities. The
airport may act as a facilitator to establish common goals for infrastructure development
and sustainable growth. This is key because,  besides directly investing in improving or
expanding the airport, different government agencies may as well provide (or cooperate
with the airport in the provision of) incentives for air services.
Conversely,  in  representation  of  public  interest  and  of  the  concerns  of  local
communities,  governments  must  ensure  that  the  negative  impacts  of  airport  activity,
particularly  noise  and  contamination,  remain  within  controllable  limits.  Moreover,
governments  and airports  should work together  to  ensure  that  airport  expansion and
development does not conflict with wider land use policies.
iii) Economic agents (as users and as promoters)
By  economic  agents  we  mean  local  (in  the  sense  of  within  the  airport's  area  of
influence) businesses,  organisations and institutions,  both for-profit  and non-for-profit,
that derive some value from airport activities. Following Schaar and Sherry  (2010), who
refer to “business, commerce, tourism, arts, sports, and education organizations”, some of
these  economic  agents  are  direct  airport  users  (business  travellers,  dispatchers  or
receivers of air cargo, etc.), whilst others are indirect users as a result of their customers
(e.g. tourists) travelling through the airport.
Moreover, as airports “drive and support economic activity in several different ways”
(Schaar and Sherry, 2010), we also include here economic agents that act as promoters of
airport activity. Trade associations, tourism boards and development associations are the
sort of institutions that would support airport operations and, like governments, they may
as  well  provide  (or  cooperate  with  the  airport  in  the  provision  of)  incentives  for  air
services.
iv) Non-Governmental Organisations
Other  stakeholders  that  need  to  have  a  voice  in  defining  airport  strategies  are
aviation-related Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO). In general terms, NGOs can be
divided in those that are 'pro-aviation' and those that are 'anti-aviation' to some extent.
Both  may  lobby  their  interests  directly  with  the  airport  or  with  government
representatives  and both can promote or affect  airport  activities.  On the 'pro'  side we
include  industry-specific  associations  such  as  Airports  Council  International  (ACI),  the
International  Air  Transportation  Association  (IATA)  and,  with  a  narrower  scope,  the
European Low Fare Airlines Association (ELFAA). On the 'against' side there are mainly
environmental  or  advocacy  groups  such  as  the  International  Council  on  Clean
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Transportation  (ICCT),  AirportWatch,  the  Aviation  Environment  Federation  and  many
other local groups.
v) Residents
As Schaar and Sherry (2010) suggest “residents near the airport can be considered a
particularly  significant  subset  of  the  overall  group  of  communities  affected  by  airport
operations”. In fact, residents suffer adverse effects, such as noise, air pollution or even
traffic congestion, on a daily basis. As such, there should be permanent communication
between the airport management and local residents to understand their concerns and
alleviate them as much as possible, and, at the same time, to communicate the potential
benefits of the airport or of some specific actions. This is even more important because
residents can be also employees, retired employees, and even customers of the airport.
Indeed,  one last  group of  airport  stakeholders  is  formed by the customers  of  the
airport product (see Figure 4). But as they are key to generate revenues for the airport and,
in general, they make the airport business happen, we consider them separately in the next
section.
3.2 Airport customers
Over  the  last  decades  airports  have  in  general  evolved  from  public  utilities  to
commercial enterprises. As infrastructure providers, airports face airline opposition and
regulation constraints to increases in aeronautical charges, and government pressure to
become financially self-sufficient  (Doganis, 1992). As commercially-oriented enterprises,
airports realised the potential of new sources of income in non-aviation activities (Jarach,
2001).  Within this context,  the perception of who are really  the airport  customers has
evolved too.
Airports  allow  the  interchange  between  air  and  surface  transport  by  providing
aeronautical facilities and services to airlines, which in turn, sell seats to passengers and
cargo space to shippers. They also take advantage of the passenger throughput to offer a
variety  of  non-aeronautical  services  that  have  become  more  and  more  important  for
airport  operators  (European  Commission,  2002).  The  traditional  business  as  public
utilities  evolved towards  a  steady increase of  non-aeronautical  activities  that,  in  some
cases, represent a higher income than aeronautical revenues, especially in Europe, North
America and Asia (Graham, 2003). Now multiple stakeholders interact to make the airport
a multi-service provider firm. Therefore an airport-airline-passenger chain is no longer
valid, in general, to define its customers.
Indeed,  defining  the  airport  customers  is  an  ambiguous  task  that  reveals  some
conflicts of interest. Airport operators are interested in offering a good level of service to
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airlines and passengers by providing quick and easy access to aircraft. But they also want
passengers to spend more time – and money – by enjoying the non-aeronautical services
of the airport (Francis et al., 2003). Accordingly we take into account the multiple interests
that diverse consumers share to propose a classification of customers in three groups, as in
Table 3. Not all airports will have all customers in the three groups, but the classification is
comprehensive enough to include all potential customers.
Table 3: The most relevant customers for the airport product classified in three groups.
Aviation trade Individuals Commercial trade
Commercial airlines (cargo and 
passenger, scheduled and charter)
General aviation
Travel agents
Tour operators
Outbound travellers (passengers)
Transfer travellers (passengers)
Inbound travellers (passengers)
Visitors
Local residents
Employees
Tenants and concessionaires
Local and global businesses and 
organisations
Other airports
[Non-user stakeholders]
3.2.1 Aviation trade
The  aviation  trade  group  includes  the  customers  directly  interested  in  using  the
airport as a gateway to provide air traffic. Their focus lies on the air-side facilities and
aeronautical services that the airport and other suppliers provide; although they may be
interested  in  land-side  developments  too,  such  as  offices  or  warehouses.  This  group
includes  commercial  airlines  that  transport  cargo  (including  freight  integrators),
passengers or both,  with scheduled or charter services;  general  aviation users such as
corporate/executive aviation, air taxis, flight instruction, aircraft rental, aerial applications,
aerial observation and leisure flights (Schaar and Sherry, 2010); and travel agents and tour
operators that contract the services of charter and scheduled airlines.
It is important to notice that, as explained before, some of these clients are also key
stakeholders  in  the  production  side  of  the  airport  business,  especially  airlines.  In  the
previous  section  they  were  considered  as  vital  in  the  supply  of  some  of  the  airport
products, such as seats for passengers and space for cargo shippers (see section  3.3 for
more details), and here they are viewed as key buyers of other airport products, such as
infrastructure and aeronautical services.
3.2.2 Individuals
Individuals  are  customers that  do not  represent  any organisation with a business
perspective,  i.e.  they act on their own behalf.  Their main interest is to have a pleasant
“stay” at the airport while they travel, shop or work there. Here we distinguish travellers
(passengers) and non-travellers because their expectations and requirements differ, and
because many people access an airport without any intention to take a flight.
As  for  the  passengers,  we  consider  outbound,  transfer  and inbound travellers,  to
whom the airport may offer differentiated products and services. The non-travellers are
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visitors  (including  those  who come  to  meet  and  greet  travellers),  local  residents  and
employees  (including  those  who  work  for  the  airport  itself,  for  airlines  and  for  the
companies established in or around the airport). These individuals may also profit from
surface commuting connections or from extended opening hours at retail shops.
3.2.3 Commercial trade
The commercial trade group includes those customers whose main focus lies on the
land-side  developments  of  the  airport.  They  are  normally  not  interested  in  the
aeronautical  services,  but  rather  in  the  opportunities  presented  by  the  individuals
throughput. This group includes tenants and concessionaires (of retail stores, car rentals
and hotels, for instance); local and global business and organisations enticed by logistics
facilities or by the ease of connectivity provided by the airport. Moreover, given that the
airport business is global (as the next section discusses), other airports are also potential
customers of consultancy or managerial services.
Finally, we also consider in this broad group some of the non-user stakeholders that
were mentioned in the previous section which, although not directly interested in buying
the airport services, may be crucial to provide funds and public support to the airport.
These  non-user  stakeholders  include  the  economic  agents  and government  entities  or
institutions  whose  interest  is  mainly  driven  by  the  positive  impacts  produced  by  the
airport. To them airports may sell the benefits they can obtain from the airport activity.
3.3 Airport product
The relationship between the airport stakeholders and its customers is mediated by
the  airport product.  According to Jarach  (2001) the “airport  as  a firm” concept can be
achieved “through the implementation of more complex forms of service packages in order
to satisfy evolving needs of enriched audiences”. In fact, practice shows that airports can
successfully bundle their portfolio of activities and products into service packages targeted
at particular groups of customers. Moreover, these packages are the result of conscious
interactions between the airport firm and other stakeholders in the airport business.
To frame their revenue structure, airports are usually constrained to one of two types
of  regulation:  single  till,  when  all  types  of  revenue  are  considered to  set  aeronautical
charges; and dual till, when only aeronautical revenues are used. Even though the single till
approach  to  airport  regulation  is  widely  used  (CAA,  2000;  Czerny,  2006),  evidence
suggests  that  airports  are  increasingly  focusing  on  commercial  activities  to  increase
revenues and profits, and that such focus may be even greater as the pressure to control
aeronautical revenues grow (Graham, 2009).
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in this work we have defined six service packages that integrate the airport product.
The first two packages – infrastructure and aeronautical services, and transport network –
are  directly  related  to  aeronautical  revenues,  and  the  other  four  to  non-aeronautical
revenues. This setting highlights the possibilities of increasing income from non-aviation
activities, as an increase in aeronautical fees normally faces opposition from airlines and
regulators.  Conversely,  non-aeronautical  revenues  can  be  obtained  from  previously
unexplored opportunities and less regulated markets.
3.3.1 Infrastructure and aeronautical services
This is  the basic  product  of an airport,  i.e.  what  makes it  an airport.  This  service
package includes the physical and technological infrastructure, along with the necessary
human operators, that allow planes and their content (passengers, cargo and mail) to land
and take-off,  as well  as being handled on the ground, safely and efficiently.  That is,  the
runway and taxiways system, the air traffic management system, the platforms, aprons or
ramps,  and  all  associated  aeronautical  services  (fuelling,  handling,  catering,  cleaning,
inspection or maintenance, fire-fighting and emergency, etc.). In addition, it includes all the
buildings that are required to process passengers, cargo and/or mail, and their associated
services (baggage/cargo/mail handling systems, safety and security, cleaning, functional
activities like check-in, boarding, etc.).
The specific type and characteristics of the infrastructure varies a lot and depends
substantially on the scale, the strategy, and types of traffic served at the airport. A small
airport  dedicated  exclusively  to  general  aviation  may  not  need  buildings  to  process
passengers, cargo or mail, for instance.
3.3.2 Transport network (air and surface)
The second service package bundles the destinations that can be reached by air from
the airport with the connectivity it offers on the ground. In order to provide an integrated
air-surface transport  network,  it  may be necessary to provide additional  infrastructure
and services for passengers and cargo to transfer efficiently and seamlessly.
According  to  the  scale  and  the  strategy  of  the  airport,  this  service  package  may
include access roads, railways, bike paths or walkways, as well as parking lots and stops or
stations for public transit. Some airports may provide specific products or services such as
shuttles, dedicated desks or rooms to facilitate passenger and baggage transfer between
the modes. They can also encourage airlines to increase their route networks with specific
strategies (e.g. incentives for route development).
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3.3.3 Retail and non-aeronautical services
Airports may offer retail (e.g. duty free stores, souvenirs, food and beverages, books
and magazines,  supermarkets, travel-related products,  fashion goods,  and so forth) and
complementary  non-aeronautical  services  (e.g.  car  parking  and  car  rental)  taking
advantage of the throughput created by the aeronautical services.  This package can be
expanded according to the airport possibilities, in such a way that passenger buildings may
become actual shopping malls.
3.3.4 Activities and events
Airports can implement a fourth type of service package (activities and events), in
order  to  entertain  passengers  or  to  attract  visitors,  and  to  satisfy  the  needs  of  other
customers in the individuals customer group (e.g. local inhabitants or employees of the
airport and the companies settled in or around it). These services can range from airport
tours,  to  concerts  and  sport  events,  to  art  and  commercial  exhibitions,  to  business
meetings and congresses.
3.3.5 Real estate development
The airport may, itself or through business partners, provide real estate development
of the land surrounding the airport. This package is actually a natural extension of the
previous  one  and includes  all  sorts  of  projects  in  the airport  vicinities  to  explore  the
opportunities created by the airport. Possibilities abound: from logistic parks, hotels, office
buildings and convention centres;  to medical  centres for quick surgeries and academic
clusters  for  top  management  graduate  schools  (as  in  The  Circle  of  Zurich  airport);  or
research centres for high-mobility scientists (as in Frankfurt airport city); or even other
developments such as the photovoltaic park for electricity generation in Athens airport.
Some  airports  have  land-side  development  departments  inside  their  organizational
structure,  whilst  others  opt  for  creating  separated  companies  or  joint  ventures  with
property developers.
3.3.6 Consultancy and managerial services
In the process of developing all these service packages, the airports gain expertise and
know-how  in  several  areas,  and  accumulate  valuable  technical  and  human  resources.
Therefore,  another  type  of  service  package  includes  the  consultancy  and  managerial
services that the airport firm offers to other airports or actors within the airport industry.
Not all airports implement the entire set of service packages. However,  no current
evidence suggests that it is impossible for any airport to implement all of them, except for
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the lack of available physical space that limits the scale of some of the packages (especially
real  estate  development).  In  fact,  all  packages  are  scalable  and  may  be  implemented
according to the particular characteristics of each airport and its surrounding area.
3.4 Approaches to the airport business
The extent  to which an airport  implements the service packages described in the
previous section indicates the business approach their managers pursue. A rather small
airport that offers only its infrastructure and associated aeronautical services will surely
adopt a public utility provider strategic focus. This may be the case of airports specialised
in serving particular niches,  such as general aviation, pilot training,  aerial services (e.g.
aerial footage or topography), rescue services, and sport or leisure activities; or airports in
less  developed  or  remote  regions  that  lack  enough  resources  or  traffic  to  implement
additional services.
As airports gain relevance in their catchment areas, an increased connectivity with
surface  transport  emerges  as  passenger  and  cargo  traffic  increases.  Then  the  airport
becomes  a  multi-modal  interface that  offers  air  services  for  public  access.  Services
provided by commercial airlines are essential at this point, since the attractiveness of the
airport  is  strongly  linked  to  its  destinations.  In  this  approach  airlines  are  the  most
important customers.
When  traffic  increases  significantly,  airports  are  more  likely  to  engage  in  a
commercially-oriented approach. In this case, non-aeronautical revenues are important for
the airport to guarantee higher income levels, and to depend less on the variability of air
traffic.
If operators realise that airports attract different types of customers, and that they
can  actively  influence  the  preference  of  those  customers,  a  more  consumer-oriented
strategic  focus  is  achieved.  At  this  level,  the  airport  can implement  the “activities  and
events” type of service package in order to satisfy the varying needs of the users.
Depending on the space available, or the ability of the airport to acquire surrounding
land or partner with its tenants, the business approach turns into the development of the
airport city concept. Although this is normally associated to large airports, Peneda et al.
(2011) suggest that this concept is rather scalable and applicable to smaller airports too.
Finally,  airports can be a truly  global business.  These airports bid for management
contracts or acquisition of other airports,  and provide consultancy on airport planning,
construction or operation.
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In a concrete airport, the different types of packages could possibly be implemented
sequentially, in order to move from one business approach to the next one, as  Figure 5
shows. Airports may identify the service packages they wish to implement and the degree
to which they are required according to their strategy, available space and infrastructure,
and  bear  in  mind  that  these  packages  are  produced  in  conjunction  with  other
stakeholders.  Similarly,  there  must  be  a  connection  between  the  packages  and  the
customer groups in order to facilitate the formulation of competitive strategies.
The analysis presented in Chapter 7 tackles these issues after empirical evidence has
been described in the other chapters. So far this chapter has covered important elements
of the airport business in the current context, but before attempting to analyse competitive
strategies  it  is  crucial  to  understand  the  competitive  environment  that  airports  face
nowadays.
3.5 Airport competition
The airport  business entered a competitive environment that  was practically  non-
existing  a  few  decades  ago.  Before  liberalisation,  the  world  of  non-competing  airlines
(regulated by the Chicago convention of 1944) was mirrored by a world of non-competing
airports (Barret, 2000). Airports now face competitive pressure from the airlines’ freedom
to  choose  any  airport  to  operate  in  (de  Neufville  and  Odoni,  2003;  Graham,  2003).
Liberalisation  also  favoured  ownership  changes  towards  privatisation  or
commercialisation  that  further  contributed  to  the  increase  in  competition  between
42
Figure 5: The airport product as six service packages and associated approaches to the airport business
according to the packages that the airport implements.
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airports (Starkie, 2002). The emerging, new operational context forced airports to be more
focused on costs and commercial revenue, and on the need to attract and retain airlines
(Bush, 2010) and other customers.
There  are  seven  possible  areas  of  competition between  airports  according to  the
academic literature and to the industry practice,  as  Table 4 describes.  Although not all
airports  compete  in  all  areas  simultaneously,  we  collected  evidence  to  support  their
existence as the following sections describe.
Table 4: Possible areas of competition between airports.
Area of competition Summary
Provision of services to airlines By attracting airlines to use the airport as a hub, a traffic node, an 
airline station or an airline base
Traffic: Outbound (catchment area) By network of destinations and surface connectivity, availability of 
low fares, and convenience for the users
Traffic: Transfer By lack of congestion, convenience for the users and low-cost self-
help hubbing
Traffic: Inbound (destination) By tourism attraction and supplementary services and activities in 
the airport or its hinterland
Global competition By bidding for management of other airports, terminals or retail 
areas, and as consultants
Competition for funding By attracting favourable grants, tax reductions and subsidies or 
incentives
Competition with other modes High speed rail, private cars, long distance coaches and cruise ships
3.5.1 Provision of services to airlines
Traditionally airports have been considered as competitors in two situations: when
their  catchment  areas  overlap,  and  when  large  hubs  compete  for  transfer  traffic  (de
Neufville  and Odoni,  2003;  Forsyth et  al.,  2010;  Lian and Rønnevik,  2011).  Under this
perspective, competition is strictly dependent on the network strategies adopted by the
airlines. Therefore airports strive to provide services to the airlines in order to assure their
presence (Morrel, 2010).
Airlines  can  be  established  at  a  given  airport  with  different  kinds  of  operations.
Burghouwt  (2007) defines  the  role  of  the airports  within  an  airline  network  in  three
categories:  hubs,  traffic  nodes,  and  airline  stations.  Each  category  requires  different
characteristics that the airport operator must identify and accordingly provide the right
infrastructure and services.
Regardless of the type of operations, airports can also serve as a permanent position
for one or more airlines’ aircraft and become an airline base. A base provides an airport
the opportunity to generate additional revenues associated to aircraft and crew services,
and brings more visibility and economic benefits (e.g.  employment generation).  In fact,
Copenhagen  Economics  (2012) considers  bases  are  similar  to  hubs  in  what  concerns
airport competition.
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The base concept gains relevance for low-cost carriers, but it is different from a hub in
the sense that LCCs normally do not operate coordinated schedules. However, bases are
not restricted to this type of carrier, nor are they used exclusively by passenger airlines.
Freight  integrators  deserve  particular  attention,  since  they  are  becoming  increasingly
important in total air traffic (European Commission, 2003).
To illustrate how airports compete in this aspect, we provide some examples, by no
means comprehensive, but easily replicated elsewhere. For an airline hub, Munich Airport
attracted Lufthansa to create their second major hub there instead of a second terminal at
Frankfurt Airport  (de Neufville, 2008). For an airline traffic node, TAP Portugal currently
handles  most  of  their  operations  in  Lisbon,  but  their  services  could  be  significantly
reduced if  the airline is sold to another carrier operating large hubs elsewhere.  For an
airline station, an Asian airline introducing a new service to Europe evaluates multiple
airports, either in terms of local market, connection opportunities with other airlines in
the same alliance, or both (Morrel, 2010). For an airline base, easyJet “selected Lisbon over
a number of other European cities because of its market potential” (easyJet, 2010).
The steady growth of LCCs has had a particular effect on airport competition. LCCs
catalysed the development of 'low-cost airports',  and forced legacy airports to compete
back. As de Neufville (2008) explains “many legacy airports have lost their previous virtual
monopolies. This fact has to motivate their management to build facilities that will be more
competitive with low-cost airports”.
Attracting  and retaining  airlines  is  crucial  for  airports  because  these  airlines  will
strive to compete with the services offered by other carriers in other airports. If airports
are considered mere infrastructure providers, the burden of competition may fall entirely
on the airlines’ side and there is little scope for airports to compete beyond this particular
area. If, however, the footloose character of airlines (especially, but not limited to, LCCs)
and  the  active  role  that  airports  play  beyond  utility  provision  are  taken  into  account
(Copenhagen Economics, 2012), the role of airports in competition is strong and diverse as
the following sections explain.
This  is  not  to  say  airports  are  not  able  to  exert  some  market  power,  especially
regarding legacy network carriers  who  are  captive  to  their  home base.  Some  of  these
airlines have invested heavily to develop and operate a hub at their main airport, to which
they  are  also  restricted  by  bilateral  agreements  for  some  international  services.
Consequently, network carriers more strongly depend on their own home market and have
fewer incentives to switch between airports.
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3.5.2 Passenger demand in the catchment area
The catchment area of an airport is the geographical location of most of the existing
or potential demand. This rather dynamic concept varies with the type of services offered
by the airport and the particular characteristics of the passengers (e.g. long-haul leisure
flights have a larger catchment area than short-haul business trips). The specific ways in
which airports compete for demand within their catchment areas reflect these dynamics,
since passengers and journeys are not homogeneous.
First, airports compete in terms of network provision. On the air side, they compete to
offer the most desired destinations. Thus closely located airports compete more strongly
for passengers travelling to comparable destinations. On the land side, competition occurs
because a good connection with the surface transport network makes an airport accessible
from longer distances, widening its catchment area. Porto airport, in Northern Portugal,
illustrates  both  aspects.  Porto  offers  a  larger  set  of  direct  destinations  than  Vigo  (a
neighbour airport in Spain), and is accessible via motorways, light rail and buses, while
Vigo is only reachable by car and bus.
Second, airports compete for passengers willing to have access to low fares. Airports
that attract LCCs gain a competitive advantage in the sense that these airlines can offer
remarkably lower prices for their flights (Malighetti et al., 2009), expanding the catchment
area  by  attracting  price-conscious  passengers.  For  instance,  airports  such  as  Brussels
South Charleroi, Paris Beauvais and Frankfurt Hahn compete with surrounding airports,
thanks to the extensive service and low fares of LCCs.
Finally,  airports  sharing  similar  catchment  areas  compete  for  outbound traffic  by
providing a more convenient service to some passengers. Airports that are closer to the
place of residence or work for some passengers are more convenient for them. Similarly,
airports with more non-stop services allow travellers to bypass hubs,  delivering higher
quality in terms of travel time; or airports with more frequent service may adjust better to
the desired schedule for some passengers.  Likewise,  small  airports  offer short walking
distances and thus quick access and exit from curb to aircraft. They are also an alternative
for passengers that wish to stay away from the confusion of large airports. Other airports
offer products that are more convenient for business travellers, such as a central location, a
speedy  check-in  process  or  the  availability  of  lounge  areas.  Airport  convenience  may
attract to London Southend passengers that want to avoid the hassle of larger airports; or
may take them to Luton or Stansted depending on which one is closer to where they live.
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3.5.3 Transfer traffic
Attracting transfer traffic at large hubs is widely recognised as a form of competition
between airports (Copenhagen Economics, 2012; de Neufville and Odoni, 2003; Forsyth et
al.,  2010;  Starkie,  2002).  This  is  especially  true for airports  with airlines  that  use hub
strategies. Therefore, it is crucial for those airports to provide space and capacity for the
network airline(s) to use infrastructure that facilitates their transfer processes. The rapid
growth of  Emirates  and Dubai  International  Airport  in competition with the European
airlines and hubs (e.g. London/Heathrow, Amsterdam, Frankfurt, Paris/Charles de Gaulle)
illustrates this trend (CAPA Centre for Aviation, 2010).
Although in this case, as mentioned before, the burden of competition rests largely on
the airlines, airports can also attract passengers that want to choose their preferred point
of connection. Travellers may be attracted by the loyalty program of their favourite airline
or alliance, thus using the airports in its network. Alternatively, a given airport may offer a
wider network with better opportunities to connect to more destinations. The particular
characteristics  of  an  airport  may  also  enhance  its  competitiveness:  by  a  location  that
minimises detours; an efficient design that minimises connecting time; or shopping and
leisure facilities that increase the desirability of longer layovers (as the swimming pool in
the transit area of Terminal 1 at Singapore Changi Airport).
Additionally,  LCCs  allow  smaller  airports  to  compete  for  medium-haul  transfer
passengers using self-help hubbing (Burghouwt, 2007). Airports with a stronger focus on
LCCs and a conveniently central location effectively offer connection opportunities, as in
the  case  of  Brussels  Charleroi,  Paris  Beauvais,  Frankfurt  Hahn  or  Rome  Ciampino  for
passengers travelling between Eastern and Western Europe. Although Reynolds-Feighan
and  McLay  (2006) claim  that  such  transfers  are  impractical;  Malighetti  et  al.  (2008)
provide evidence that suggests the potential of such interconnections, and Franke (2004)
argues that legacy airlines may reduce the complexity of their hub models following the
example of LCCs practices.
The  point  is  that,  since  such  connections  are  based  on  point-to-point  services,
passengers are not penalised if they transfer to a different carrier; airlines may not provide
compensation and special arrangements for missed connections, and airports do not have
to deploy expensive and complex transfer facilities. Moreover, given that transfers are not
ensured by the airlines, passengers have an incentive to increase their connecting time, so
that airports can profit to increase non-aeronautical revenues.
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3.5.4 Inbound demand
Another  form  of  airport  competition  that  is  barely  discussed  is  destination
competition  (Tretheway and Kincaid,  2010).  It is  related to the possibility to appeal to
passengers or other users solely by the attractiveness of the surrounding environment (the
hinterland) or by the characteristics of the airport itself. This happens in airports with a
large share of inbound traffic, which are normally located near tourist destinations.
For  instance,  Faro  Airport  in  Portugal  describes  itself  as  “a  competitor  of  all  the
airports that serve tourist destinations which compete with the Algarve” (ANA, 2007). The
attractiveness of the hinterland is a key factor that is particularly challenging, since the
airport operator has little or null control over what the region has to offer.
Nevertheless, airports have higher control of their land side development in order to
promote the airport itself as a destination. Some airports offer supplementary services or
activities  that  range  from hotels  and convention centres  to  concerts,  sport  events  and
airport tours. Other airports actively develop real estate projects to diversify the land use,
far beyond a  land-air  modal  interchange.  Amsterdam Schiphol  airport  city  and airport
corridor, Frankfurt airport city and The Circle project at Zurich airport are some examples
of such activities (Macario, 2008).
3.5.5 Global competition
Nowadays there is a well-established process of globalisation for the airport industry,
substantially increased with airport privatisation, but not limited to private companies (de
Neufville and Odoni, 2003; Graham, 2003). This led airports to compete at a global scale:
airport companies can compete to buy, or get the concession of, other airports; they can
compete  with  their  consultancy  services  in  areas  such  as  engineering,  economics  or
construction;  they can  operate  retail  facilities  in  other  airports;  and,  they can operate
terminal buildings in other airports.
Graham  (2003) provides  a  number  of  examples  in  which  airport  companies  (e.g.
Aéroports de Paris, Schiphol Group, Fraport) have interests in airports around the globe.
The sample is not restricted to companies previously related with the airport business. In
fact,  many  property  developers,  construction  companies,  financial  investors  and  other
transport companies also have large shares in airports. Not surprisingly, airlines also have
interest  in  airport  operations,  as  easyJet  unsuccessfully  trying  to  buy  London/Luton
airport,  Ryanair  proposing the construction  of  its  own low-cost  passenger  building  at
Dublin,  or Lufthansa successfully  partnering with Munich  Airport  to  build Terminal  2.
Indeed, in Australia and the United States the relationship between airlines and airports is
47
more  direct,  for  carriers  can  lease  terminals  from  the  airports  through  long-term
contracts.
3.5.6 Competition for funding
Airports may also compete to obtain funds to develop expansions or upgrades, aiming
at achieving more competitive positions. Funds can be in the form of grants with special
conditions (low interest  rates  or long repayment  periods),  tax reductions  or subsidies
(where  allowed  by  regulators).  These  funds  can  come  from  governmental  or  private
institutions  interested  in  airport  activity  as  a  means  to  foster  economic  development,
tourism and employment in the airport’s hinterland. Additionally, some governments may
be keen to invest in regional airports in order to reduce the pressure of congestion or
environmental constraints in major airports (Davison et al., 2010).
In fact, Bel and Fageda (2009) showed how the Spanish airports competed to attract
public expenditure. According to their analysis, between 1994 and 2003 Madrid/Barajas
received 60% of the total investments made by AENA, with the remaining 40% invested in
the other 46 airports managed by the Spanish company.
Additionally, privatisation of airports creates new opportunities to raise funds in such
a  way  that  “remove(s)  airports  from  a  position  where  they  compete  for  public
expenditure” (Davison et al., 2010). On the other hand, airports that are not privatised (in
the sense that local, regional or national forms of government maintain the ownership),
but that have been delivered as a concession to private operators, are likely to raise private
funds more easily to gain competitiveness.
3.5.7 Competition with other modes
Previous sections focused on competition between airports. Yet competition between
air transport and other modes may also have a strong impact on airports (Tretheway and
Kincaid,  2010).  The  expansion  of  high  speed  rail  networks  in  Europe  has  proven  an
effective way of competition with air transport. In France, domestic air traffic declined 7%
between 2000 and 2007 mostly  due to the growth of  the TGV network  (International
Transport Forum, 2009). Unlike airports, train stations are normally better located and
provide  a  more  efficient  boarding  process  that  increases  passenger  throughput  and
decreases wasted time.
The European Union promotes the substitution of air services for high speed rail to
reduce congestion and limit CO2 emissions from aviation  (European Commission, 2001).
Yet there is a clear potential in exploring the complementarity between both modes as
cooperation between airlines and rail companies may prove quite beneficial for all parties
(Givoni  and Banister,  2007).  Competition also  occurs  between  air  transport  and other
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modes, such as private cars and long distance buses;  and cooperation with local coach
companies can also be explored.
Moreover, besides other modes of transportation, airports may also compete inside
their  hinterlands  with  local  providers  of  retail,  food  and  beverages  (Tretheway  and
Kincaid, 2010). This is increasingly the case of larger airports that have become more like
shopping malls to profit from the dwelling time of passengers, especially those waiting for
their planes air-side.
3.6 Summary
The liberalisation of the air transport market clearly introduced new dynamics in the
airport  industry.  In recent  decades,  airports  evolved from infrastructure providers in a
monopolistic context, to commercially oriented enterprises in a competitive environment.
The existence of competition between airports, as argued in this chapter, challenges the
idea of airports as monopolies.
For some of the areas of competition it is clear that the relationship between airports
and airlines is becoming increasingly important for the success of the airport business.
This hinders a strict separation of the role of airports and that of the airlines in airport
competition. Instead, airports should cooperate with all relevant actors,  as identified in
this chapter, to enhance their performance and their position in the market.
This  chapter  highlighted  the  opportunities  created  by  the  current  context  in  the
airport  industry.  It  followed  the perspective  of  an  airport  as  a  multi-service  firm  that
interacts with a network of stakeholders to deliver a set of service packages to different
groups of customers.
The next chapter discusses in more detail one of those new dynamics that impact the
airport  industry  and  that  has  been  in  the  core  of  the  most  dramatic  changes:  the
emergence and ascendency of Low-Cost Carriers. In line with the rest of the dissertation,
the focus  of  the discussion  remains  on the implications  of  these dynamics  for  airport
development and airport strategy.
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4 Low-Cost Carriers
Although  Low-Cost  Carriers  have  proliferated  in  deregulated  environments,  their
history can be traced back to pre-deregulation times in the United States. Pacific Southwest
Airlines (PSA), a carrier flying within California since 1949 (and merged into US Airways in
1988), was the first to provide low fares for regular flights. It also provided much of the
inspiration for the corporate culture and operations of Southwest Airlines in Texas, that
started intra-state flights in 1971. Both companies remained intra-state operators until
market deregulation in 1978. PSA started expansion out of California at the end of 1978
and Southwest out of Texas in 1981.
Southwest is widely credited as the initiator of the 'low-cost model'  (Alamdari and
Fagan, 2005; Zhang et al., 2008) and the inspiration for other LCCs, particularly in Europe
(ELFAA,  2004).  The legal  struggles  that  preceded Southwest  operations in  Dallas  Love
Field Airport gave them a sort of maverick spirit, making Southwest a special airline. Then,
when they had to sell an aircraft (in a fleet of four) and keep operating the same schedules,
Southwest created a rather legendary '10 minute turnaround' that translated into high
aircraft utilisation and operational efficiency (Sartain, 1998). These two elements seem to
be rooted in the 'low-cost model' ever since.
Besides the domestic US market, low-cost ventures started on the other side of the
Atlantic as well. Inspired by charter operations, Laker Airways pioneered low-cost long-
haul services, mainly from the UK. Laker Airways started operations in 1966 and in 1977,
after legal battles with the Civil Aviation Authority, started the  Skytrain  service between
London and New York (Flight International, 1977). The service implemented cost-saving
measures, such as more restrictive limits for free baggage to reduce overall weight, that
allowed the airline  to  offer  low-fare,  no-frills  transatlantic  flights.  Laker  Airways  went
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bankrupt  in  early  1982,  but  its  victories  over  regulators  and incumbent  IATA  carriers
remained, and it also paved the way for later low-fare, no-frills services.
Given  the  initial  limitations  imposed  by  regulations  to  these  pioneering  LCCs,
liberalisation of the air transport market provided the proper environment for new LCCs
to emerge and expand rapidly  (ELFAA, 2004). Liberalisation trends started with the US
domestic market in 1978, then Canada in 1988, Australia in 1990 and Europe between
1987 and 1997.  In every case LCCs gained prominence,  especially  Southwest,  now the
largest domestic airline in the US; WestJet, currently the second largest carrier in Canada;
Virgin Blue (later re-branded Virgin Australia and shifted to a more traditional model),
Australia's second largest airline nowadays; and Ryanair, now the largest intra-European
airline (Tretheway, 2004).
Around the world, many LCC models have been tried with different levels of success.
Some  low-cost  airlines  evolved  from  previous  Full-Service  Carriers  (FSC),  regional  or
charter  airlines;  others  started  from  scratch  as  LCCs;  some  of  the  latter  scaled  up  to
become FSCs or 'hybrid'  carriers;  many others have gone bankrupt  (Dobruszkes,  2013,
2006).  This  chapter  presents  a  review  of  LCCs  worldwide  and  then  focuses  on  the
European context to analyse the most relevant aspects concerning the airports they use.
4.1 Elements of the LCC business model
There is not a single LCC business model (Gillen and Lall, 2004). And therefore, there
is  no  unique  definition  of  a  low-cost  carrier,  with  several  other  terms  being  used  to
describe the general concept  (Tretheway, 2004). Nonetheless, the term 'low-cost carrier'
suggests these airlines are, in an economic sense, lower cost producers (of available seat
kilometres – ASK – or miles – ASM, for instance) than their competitors and this can be
assumed as a definition (de Neufville, 2008). The problem with this definition is that, apart
from the US airlines, detailed data on airline costs of production (unit costs per ASK) are
not readily available.
To  overcome  these difficulties,  a  natural  approach  consists  in  identifying  a  set  of
elements that best describe the actual business models for LCCs, and then identify carriers
that  somehow  fit  those  elements  (Alamdari  and  Fagan,  2005;  Daft  and  Albers,  2013;
Dobruszkes,  2006;  Klophaus et  al.,  2012; Mason and Morrison,  2008).  Although recent
market developments towards hybrid or refined business models somehow hinder airline
categorisation  (CAPA Centre  for  Aviation,  2013a;  Klophaus  et  al.,  2012),  this  approach
provides reasonable confidence to select carriers that are usually regarded as LCCs.
The elements that constitute the business model for LCCs are frequently studied in
the case of Southwest as a starting point. According to Doganis (2001; cited by Zhang et al.,
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2008) the Southwest model includes the following key features: “low, simple, unrestricted
fares in a point-to-point network with no interlining; direct, ticket-less sales; single-class
cabin with high-density, no seat assignment, no meals (snack and light beverages only);
high frequency; very good punctuality; single type of aircraft with high utilization (over
11 hours a day); short sectors (city pairs with distance below 800 km); use of secondary or
uncongested  airports  and 15–20 minutes  turnarounds;  controlled  growth  (target  10%
year  on  year,  maximum  15%);  competitive  wages,  profit-sharing  since  1973,  high
productivity.”
Gillen and Lall (2004) argue that the business model of Southwest is not based solely
on  operational  efficiency,  that  organisational  culture  and  simplicity  provide  a  better
competitive advantage instead, and that this setting is not generic hence more difficult to
imitate.  Alamdari  and  Fagan  (2005) studied  the  evolution  of  several  elements  of  the
'original low-cost model' (inspired by Southwest) for 10 LCCs in the US and Europe. The
elements include product features related to network and tickets (routing,  connections,
through-fares,  one-way  fares),  service  (in-flight  frills,  seat  assignment,  single-class
configuration, frequent flyer program, cargo), distribution (travel agents, on-line booking,
code shares);  and operational  features related to fleet commonality,  aircraft  utilization,
stage length and airport selection and target markets. They concluded that most of the
airlines have drifted from the original model, including Southwest.
Table 5: Advantages of the 'low-cost model' over traditional airlines according to ELFAA (2004).
'Low-cost model' 'Traditional airlines model' Low-cost advantages
Operate from mostly secondary, 
underutilised, regional airports
Operate from mostly primary 
international hub airports
Lower airport charges, faster turnaround 
times, less air traffic control-related 
delays
Fast turnarounds (25 min.) Slow turnarounds due to use of 
congested hub airports
Better fleet utilisation
Direct point-to-point flights, no 
transfers, short-haul routes
Mix of long, medium and short 
haul routes with transfers 
(“connecting flights”)
Lower complexity, higher capacity 
utilisation
Standardised fleet (only one 
aircraft type), higher seating 
density
Various aircraft types, low seating 
density
Cheaper aircraft financing;
Lower maintenance and training costs;
Simpler swapping around of flight and 
maintenance staff;
Higher capacity utilisation
Distribution primarily through 
direct channels (internet, call 
centres)
Most tickets sold via travel 
agencies (high GDS costs, travel 
agent commissions, etc.)
Lower distribution costs, lower 
complexity
No “frills”, extras paid for (e.g. 
catering, excess baggage)
Entertainment programs, express 
check-in, VIP lounges, paper 
tickets, business class, “free” 
catering
Lower ancillary costs, less complexity;
Additional revenues
Highly incentivised work force 
(variable proportion of salary up 
to 40%)
High basic salaries (variable 
proportion less than 10 %)
High employee productivity
When it  comes to the airlines  themselves  defining their  own business model,  the
European Low Fares Airline Association highlighted (ELFAA, 2004) some of the advantages
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of the 'low-cost model' in comparison to the model of traditional airlines, as Table 5 shows.
ELFAA refers  to their  members as low fare  airlines  perhaps to highlight  what  is  more
attractive for their customers. However, low fares may be offered by any carrier, yet only
those with a low-cost base can sustain them profitably (Tretheway, 2004).
Furthermore, as presented above, the specific models are subject to evolution over
time,  and diversity  among different  carriers.  For  instance,  since  the  publication of  the
report (ELFAA, 2004) some airlines have left the ELFAA association because they changed
their own models and, arguably, they are not LCCs any more (e.g. Air Berlin), many others
have gone bankrupt and new ones have joined. Indeed, despite certain commonalities in
their business or operational strategies, LCCs come in many different flavours and specific
models
4.2 LCCs around the world
4.2.1 LCCs in the Americas
The evolution of LCCs in the Americas has been completely different in North America
and in Latin America. As described before, to a large extent the low-cost model was born in
the US and extended to Canada, and then to Mexico and Brazil, and much more recently to
Colombia, the three largest aviation markets in Latin America (CAPA Centre for Aviation,
2013b). Nevertheless, most countries in the Americas, especially Central America and the
Caribbean, are served by foreign LCCs, mainly from the US.
The phenomenon of low-cost airlines started when deregulation in the US allowed
'regional' LCCs to explore markets across the country, as Southwest did since the 1980's.
However, they only gained wide popularity and experienced rapid growth since the late
1990's  (Abda  et  al.,  2012).  At  this  time  many  other  airlines  populated  the  low-cost
landscape in the US, such as airTran, Frontier, and later JetBlue, and others had been tried
like  the  original  People  Express.  Since  2004 Southwest  has  been  the  largest  domestic
operator in the US confirming the ascendency of LCCs in the country.
Facing strong competition from LCCs, most traditional FSCs in North America went
through restructuring and mergers. This trend is producing the convergence of costs, fares
and, to some extent, business models of the different types of airlines (Abda et al., 2012;
Goetz  and  Vowles,  2009;  Tsoukalas  et  al.,  2008).  For  the  low-cost  segment  this
convergence induced a re-differentiation between the traditional approach, represented by
Southwest, an up-scale LCC model represented by airlines like JetBlue or Virgin America,
and the emergence of (rather conversion to) ultra-LCCs like Spirit, Allegiant and Frontier
that have less frills included in the basic price of the ticket.
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The development in Canada has been similar and now WestJet dominates the low-cost
segment and is the second largest airline in the country. The major FSCs went bankrupt
and merged, and then went bankrupt again. Curiously, WestJet is rather alone in the low-
cost segment, with other airlines following an approach that resembles more of charter or
regional carriers. Also, and despite a long standing open skies agreement between the two
countries, none of the major US LCCs fly to Canada hence most of the low-cost services
between Canada and the USA are offered by WestJet. US LCCs, on the other hand, have
preferred  to  expand  towards  the  Caribbean,  Central  America  and  the  North  of  South
America.
In  Mexico  the  expansion  of  LCCs  started  in  the  past  decade  following  market
liberalisation. As elsewhere, it involved rapid growth of start-up LCCs and the bankruptcy
of FSCs, including the second largest (Mexicana), as well as some of the initial LCCs. The
remaining LCCs accounted for 57% of the domestic market share in 2012. Interjet adopted
a more hybrid model, whilst Volaris and Viva Aerobus remained more tied to a traditional
'no-frills'  service.  The  international  market  is,  however,  dominated  by  foreign  carriers
(CAPA Centre for Aviation, 2013c).
In Brazil LCCs started with the turn of the century with the rapid expansion of GOL
(de Neufville, 2008; Evangelho et al., 2005) that bought the demised flag carrier Varig and
then another LCC, Webjet. GOL grew to become Latin America's largest LCC and competes
head to head with TAM to be the largest domestic carrier. Azul remains the only other LCC
in Brazil and will join GOL in operating international services but with a stronger focus on
long-haul routes. Both GOL and Azul follow a hybrid model, with more expression in Azul,
founded by the same founder of JetBlue in the US (CAPA Centre for Aviation, 2014a). The
Brazilian airline industry witnessed significant  consolidation in the previous years and
there are remarkably few players, particularly LCCs, for a country that features the fourth
largest domestic market in the world.
The only other country in the region where local LCCs have emerged is Colombia and
the model is currently being tried as the only airline, Viva Colombia, started operations by
mid-2012. Although the domestic and international markets are markedly dominated by
the flag carrier Avianca, Viva Colombia has achieved a 10% market share during its first
two years  of  operation and will  start  international  services  in  2014  (CAPA Centre  for
Aviation,  2014b).  This  LCC  follows  a  more  traditional  low-cost  model.  International
services to Colombia are also widely provided by foreign LCCs, mainly from the US.
4.2.2 LCCs in Asia-Pacific
Although some domestic markets have been liberalised since 1995 (the Philippines,
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Australia), regulatory constraints hindered
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the development of LCCs in the Asia-Pacific region (Murakami, 2011; Zhang et al., 2008).
To overcome these constraints a set of acquisitions, mergers, joint-ventures, affiliations,
subsidiaries and similar corporate figures have supported the creation of a large number
of  LCCs  in  this  part  of  the  world,  with  more  start-ups  announced  (CAPA  Centre  for
Aviation,  2014c;  Gross  and  Lueck,  2011).  The  most  established  and  largest  of  these
carriers are linked to the liberalised markets: Cebu Pacific Air from the Philippines, Lion
Air from Indonesia, Air Asia from Malaysia, Jetstar Airways from Australia (subsidiary of
FSC Quantas), Tigerair from Singapore and Nok Air (subsidiary of FSC Thai Airways) from
Thailand.
The  geographical  characteristics  of  the  region  provided  a  good  ground  for  the
emergence, on a larger scale, of long-haul low-cost carriers. In fact, some of the Asia-Pacific
LCCs (e.g. Air Asia X and Scoot) are dedicated exclusively to long-haul markets and have a
fleet of only wide-body aircraft. Despite this development, there is still more potential for
LCC growth in domestic markets,  particularly in North Asia  (CAPA Centre for Aviation,
2014c), provided regulation allows it.
Zhang et al. (2008) pointed out that, besides regulation, another factor that may have
limited  the  initial  expansion  of  LCCs  in  Asia  was  the  lack  of  underutilised  secondary
airports, as opposed to Europe and North America. Nevertheless, this led to the creation of
'low-cost terminals' in some airports, such as Kuala Lumpur International and Singapore
Changi International. Changi's terminal was, however, torn down in favour of a more up-
scale building; whilst at Kuala Lumpur the 'low-cost terminal' suffered the same fate and
was replaced in 2014 by a new “low-cost” passenger building – KLIA2 – that costed 1.25
billion US dollars (Toh, 2013).
4.2.3 LCCs in Africa
Except for the market between North African countries and Europe and the Middle
East, the low-cost segment in Africa is still in an incipient state (E.H., 2013). In Northern
Africa the segment is dominated by European airlines and subsidiaries of Air Arabia (Air
Arabia Maroc and Air Arabia Egypt). For the rest of the continent, fewer experiences have
taken off mainly in South Africa, Kenya and Tanzania  (CAPA Centre for Aviation, 2012),
with Kulula.com,  a subsidiary  of  Comair (which operates flights  for British Airways  in
South Africa) being the most established one.
4.2.4 LCCs in the Middle East
The  Middle  East  usually  gets  more  attention  in  the  aviation  arena  for  their  Full-
Service Carriers, often dubbed the Middle-East Big 3: Emirates, Qatar Airways and Etihad
(ANNA.aero, 2011a; CAPA Centre for Aviation, 2010). The low-cost segment follows two
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main lines: European LCCs serving destinations in the area, mainly in Israel, Lebanon and
the United Arab Emirates (UAE); and local LCCs from the region which, in many cases, have
been established by governmental decree.
Air Arabia was established in 2003 and is the oldest of the LCCs in the Middle East. As
mentioned before, it has subsidiaries in Morocco and Egypt. Flydubai, also from the UAE as
Air Arabia, commenced operations from Dubai International Airports in 2009 with a more
up-scale product. Flynas, from Saudi Arabia, has a similar scale and also a more refined
product. Jazeera airways is a smaller LCC from Kuwait. And UP is a new venture from El Al
to compete with LCCs in trips to Europe.  Besides  Air  Arabia,  all  other carriers offer a
business class product (or Economy Class Plus in the case of UP) which is not so common
in most of the LCCs around the world.
4.3 Evolution of LCCs in Europe
One of the main outcomes of liberalisation in the European aviation market was the
emergence  and  rapid  expansion  of  LCCs  (Jimenez  et  al.,  2012).  Perhaps  the  most
representative examples are Ryanair, founded in 1985 as an FSC but restructured in 1991
as a 'pure LCC' to take advantage of deregulation in the Ireland – UK market; and easyJet,
started from scratch as an LCC in 1995 to profit from widespread liberalisation in Europe.
Today they are the two largest LCCs and among the largest European airlines.
Naturally,  the  low-cost  segment  is  much  more  diversified  nowadays  and  include
airlines with different value propositions. After an initial stage of growth focused in the
British and Irish markets, LCCs have grown to prominence all across Europe and some of
them have become truly pan-European carriers, as opposed to the legacy flag carriers form
the different countries. Indeed, by May 2013 the market share of LCCs in Europe was about
38% in terms of seats offered, up from less than 10% in May 2004 (OAG, 2013).
We used information from Dobruszkes (2013, 2009), the European Low Fares Airline
Association  (ELFAA),  and  the  airlines  and  other  industry  specific  websites  to  identify
airlines operating in Europe in 2013 that qualify as LCCs. According to the discussion in
section 4.1, we analysed the following elements in the value proposition of these airlines:
1. Whether they follow a point to point network strategy.
2. The extent to which they perform connections in flights from the same carrier or
with flights offered by a different carrier.
3. Whether they enter into code-share agreements with other carriers.
4. Whether they use a single aircraft type (or aircraft family) within their fleet.
5. Whether they offer a single cabin configuration (all economy) on board the aircraft.
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6. Whether they offer seat assignment for all passengers (i.e. all passengers have a
seat number before boarding, regardless of having paid or not for it).
7. The extent to which they implement frequent flyer programs.
8. The extent to which they use only main airports.
9. Whether they have bases outside their country of registration (to evaluate their
pan-European nature).
10. The extent to which they implement fares families  (i.e.  bundled fares) in ticket
sales.
11. Whether they are members of the European Low Fares Airline Association.
In addition we also categorised airlines according to their ownership structure and
origin  as  independent  LCCs,  FSC  subsidiaries,  regional  LCC,  charter/LCC  or  charter
subsidiaries.  By  these  considerations,  we  identified  20  airlines  that  were  operating  in
Europe in 2013 (including non-European carriers) with a model that can be regarded as
low-cost, as Figure 6 summarises.
From  Figure  6 it  is  clear  that  only  a  few  characteristics  are  common  among  the
carriers:
1. The  use  of  single  cabin  configurations.  In  fact,  only  Iberia  Express  provides  a
traditional  business  class  and  all  the  other  airlines  operate  an  all-economy
58
Figure 6: LCCs operating in Europe in 2013 and some characteristics of their value propositions.
configuration. Other exceptions are the long-haul operation that Norwegian started
in  mid-2013,  which  includes  a  premium  economy  class;  and also  the premium
economy class that Monarch offers in some of its charter long-haul flights. In both
cases the aircraft with this cabin configuration are few compared to the total fleet
size.
2. The assignment of seats. By 2013 most European LCCs pre-assigned seats for their
passengers (Ryanair assigns seats since early 2014 too). This is a strong deviation
form the original 'Southwest model' in which unallocated seating aims at speeding
up the boarding process.  EasyJet  argues allocated seating helped improve their
revenues (easyJet, 2013) and other European LCCs may pursue the same goal.
3. The exclusive operation of point to point flights. This element is shared to a lower
extent  because  Norwegian,  Vueling  (which  only  turned  a  fully-owned  FSC
subsidiary in April 2013), Germanwings, Flybe, Iberia Express and Air Arabia use
their major bases as simplified hubs for connecting flights (other FSC subsidiaries
also connect to their parent companies when possible).
4. The use of a single aircraft type. A considerable number of airlines, especially the
largest ones, operate aircraft from a single family, generally from the Airbus A320
or the Boeing 737 families.  Yet they may use different variants within the same
family (e.g. A319 and A320 for easyJet). Notably, Norwegian uses different aircraft
because it selected the Boeing 787 for their long-haul operations. Whilst most of
the other carriers not using a single aircraft type are either regional LCCs that must
accommodate  to  varied  levels  of  demand within  their  network  (e.g.  Flybe  and
Sverigeflyg) or descendants of charter operations with some larger aircraft  (e.g.
Monarch and Jet2.com).
Perhaps  surprisingly,  a  large  number  of  the  LCCs  operating  in  Europe  use  main
airports for most of their operations (Chapter  5 details this and other issues concerning
airports). A considerable number of the companies has implemented fares families where
some of the frills (boarding priority, checked baggage or food) are bundled with the ticket
price in different offerings (for instance,  flight only,  flight plus bag,  flight plus bag plus
catering). Interestingly, several companies implement different ways to award the loyalty
of frequent flyers, although not always on a traditional miles-based program.
Also, some of these carriers (Ryanair, easyJet, Norwegian, Vueling, Wizz Air, Volotea
and Belle Air) have set bases outside their main countries of registration to take advantage
of  full  liberalisation  in  Europe  and  optimise  aircraft  and  crew  utilisation.  Others,  like
Transavia  and  Flybe  only  reflect  the  bi-national  nature  of  their  companies  so  that
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Transavia France has bases in France and Transavia Holland in the Netherlands, and Flybe
is limited to the UK, except for Helsinki as a base for Flybe Nordic.
There is no detailed public data to investigate the cost structure of all the airlines. Yet
secondary information reveals (CAPA Centre for Aviation, 2013d), as Figure 7 shows, that
most of the LCCs identified (controlling for sector length) effectively have lower unit costs
than  their  legacy  counterparts.  Moreover,  it  is  possible  to  distinguish  some  groups:
Ryanair, Wizz Air and Pegasus have the lowest unit cost (i.e. they can be defined as ultra
LCCs); Transavia, Monarch and Jet2.com have similar unit costs and sector lengths, related
to their charter networks; easyJet, Vueling, Norwegian and Germanwings have higher unit
costs that reflect  their more hybrid strategies;  and Flybe has higher costs due to their
choice of shorter routes as a regional LCC.
4.3.1 The origins of European LCCs
As LCCs have different specific business models their behaviour is correspondingly
different. Some of those differences impact their decisions on which airports or airport
infrastructure  to  use.  The  way  LCCs  originated  provides  convenient  insights  for  this
purpose.
First, there are the "originals", airlines deliberately organised around the 'low-cost'
theme (such as easyJet, Ryanair4 or Norwegian5). Second, there are descendants of charter
airlines  –  confronted  with  decreasing  market  shares  as  the  “originals”  expanded
(European  Parliament,  2007) –  that  inherited  an  operational  and  network  structure
(Monarch,  Jet2.com  or  SmartWings  for  instance).  Third,  there  are  spin-offs  of  the
4 Although Ryanair started as FSC in 1985,  it  was one of the first to explore the LCC model in Europe as
liberalisation unfolded during the 1990's.
5 Norwegian Air Shuttle started as a regional carrier back in 1993, but re-branded as Norwegian in 2002
following a pure LCC model.
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Figure 7: Unit costs per available seat kilometre (CASK) and average sector length for some European
airlines in 2012. Source: CAPA Centre for Aviation (2013d).
traditional, legacy carriers that were set to compete with the “originals” on a similar cost-
base  (GO,  Buzz  and  Clickair  in  the  past,  or  Germanwings  and  Iberia  Express  more
recently).
Table 6 presents an origin-based classification of the 20 LCCs analysed, even if some
of  them do not  fit  completely  in  these groups6.  Moreover,  there  are  differences  in  the
business models of airlines within the groups. Yet,  in general lines, the airlines in each
group share some common points, especially regarding their choice of airports.
Table 6: LCCs operating in Europe in 2013 classified according to their origins.
Originals Charter descendants Legacy subsidiaries
From scratch:
easyJet [U2]: since 1995
Wizz Air [W6]: since 2004
Blue Air [0B]: since 2004
Volotea [V7]: since 2012
WOW Air [X9]: since 2012
Air Arabia [G9]: not European, since 
2003
Belle Air [LZ]: since 2005, went 
bankrupt in November 2013
Converted:
Ryanair [FR]: from 1991, former FSC
Norwegian [DY]: from 2002, former 
regional
Flybe [BE]: from 2002, former 
regional
Sverigeflyg [DC]: from 2001, also 
regional
Jet2.com [LS]: from 2003, formerly 
Channel Express
Monarch [ZB]: from 2004, only 
Scheduled flights (86% of total 
passengers in 2012)
SmartWings [QS]: from 2004 as a 
brand from Travel Service charter
Pegasus [PC]: from 2005
From scratch:
Iberia Express [I2]: started in-house in
2012
Acquisitions:
Vueling [VY]: from 2009 through a 
merger with Iberia-owned Clickair, 
and from 2013 through a takeover 
from IAG
Transavia [HV]: Transavia Holland is in
KLM hands since 1991 (100% since 
2003), converted to LCC in 2005 from 
charter; Transavia France started as 
wholly owned subsidiary of Air 
France-KLM, and as LCC, in 2007
Germanwings [4U]: from 2009 as 
wholly owned subsidiary of Lufthansa
Air One [AP]: merged with Alitalia in 
2009 and converted to LCC in 2010
The earlier "originals" chose to capture market at secondary airports (e.g. easyJet at
Luton, then Liverpool; Ryanair at Stansted, then Charleroi, and so on) and then, once they
gained recognition, expanded according to their specific strategies (e.g.  for easyJet that
meant price-conscious passengers at main airports; for Ryanair smaller regional airports
at first). Other start-ups decided to catch on the trend in their particular markets (e.g. Wizz
Air and Blue Air in Eastern Europe or Norwegian in Scandinavia) and follow a similar
choice (small regional airports first and then expand following market opportunities).
This is different from FSC spin-offs and charter-descendants. For the most part, their
origin is rooted in a change of management focus but they had an existing network and
operations or available slots to backup the new strategy. Accordingly, these LCCs started
service  from  the  same  airports  as  their  parents  or  predecessors.  For  the  charter
descendants this usually meant sticking to leisure destinations. Whilst legacy subsidiaries
usually had to start from the main airports of their national flag parents, although with
some  variations  in  the  cases  where  the  FSC  acquired  initially  independent  LCCs
(particularly Vueling and Germanwings).
6 Transavia,  for  instance,  is  a  wholly  owned subsidiary  of  Air  France-KLM,  but  Transavia  Holland  comes
originally from, and still performs some, charter operations.
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A relevant point here is that the groups represent a dynamic evolution: "originals"
become  large and take market  from  charters  and FSCs,  who respond by transforming
themselves  or  by  creating  spin-offs.  In  the  USA  these  dynamics  are  producing  the
convergence of costs,  fares and business models  (Abda et  al.,  2012;  Goetz and Vowles,
2009; Tsoukalas et al., 2008).
In Europe, such convergence might be in sight  (Daft and Albers, 2013) but not only
from the transformation of traditional airlines. LCCs – including the “originals” – are also
refining their product to attract segments that are less price sensitive because,  as they
mature, their unit costs (labour in particular) tend to increase. As Christensen et al. (2001)
explain, across industries “the path to greater revenue is upmarket migration”.
As  former  new  entrants  go  upmarket,  the  bottom  empties  enough  to  encourage
“disruptive innovations” of new entrepreneurs. In the USA this resulted in the emergence
of  so-called  ultra-LCCs  like  Allegiant  and  Spirit,  both  transformed  from  charters
(Rosenstein,  2013).  Arguably,  European  companies  like  Ryanair,  Wizz  Air  and Pegasus
already apply the ultra-LCC model, hence there is less room to stimulate new markets with
even lower fares. Or perhaps they can do it at major airports that were previously not part
of their networks (as Ryanair in Rome/Fiumicino, Lisbon or Brussels/Zaventem).
4.4 European destinations of LCCs
In 2013, the 20 LCCs identified (see  Figure 6) offered scheduled regular services to
401 different airports in 41 European countries, including the Asian part of some states
that  straddle  the border  between  the continents.  Figure 8 shows  that  four  of  the five
largest European aviation markets in terms of passengers according to Eurostat7 (United
Kingdom, France, Italy and Spain) have the largest number of airports served by LCCs. The
second largest market, Germany, appears in 7th place with 24 airports. Turkey gets to the
6th place thanks to several airports  in the Asian part served at least by Pegasus.  Other
countries with a significant number of islands or other remote regions (Sweden, Greece,
Norway and Finland) complete the top 10.
Over two thirds of the 401 airports were served by only one (159), two (73) or three
(43) LCCs. As Figure 9 shows, Pegasus was the LCC serving most airports as the exclusive
LCC operator, 32 in total, but that included 24 airports in the Asian part of Turkey, and a
couple  in  Georgia  and  Russia.  Ryanair  followed  with  30  airports  across  Europe,
particularly  in  France.  Three  other  airlines  with  a  strong  focus  on  specific  regions
completed the top 5:  Flybe (almost  all  in  the United Kingdom or Finland),  Norwegian
7 In 2012 as per “Air transport of passengers” table from Eurostat statistics databases.
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(although Norwegian is one of the pan-European carriers, it is the sole LCC operator in
many Scandinavian airports) and Sverigeflyg (all but one in Sweden).
Conversely,  other airports were particularly attractive for a large number of  LCCs.
Figure 10 shows 37 airports that served as a destination for at least 8 LCCs simultaneously
during 2013. Barcelona El Prat (BCN) alone had 16 different LCCs. EasyJet was present in
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Figure 8: Number of airports served by LCCs in Europe in 2013 by country.
Figure 9: Number of European airports in which the airline shown was the only LCC with scheduled
regular services in 2013. Source: Innovata SRS.
all 37 airports, followed closely by Norwegian, Vueling, Germanwings and Transavia. Most
of these airports were located either in Italy or Spain.
As for the airlines, most of them tend to have very prolific networks covering a large
number of destinations (in Europe alone), as Figure 11 shows. Ryanair alone served 178
different  airports  in  2013,  followed  by  easyJet  with  a  network  of  128  airports,  and
Norgewian  with  111.  The  smallest  LCCs,  WOW  Air  and  Iberia  Express  (both  recently
created),  offered  only  11  and  19  destinations  respectively.  Although  Volotea,  another
recent start-up already had 47 airports in its network. In any case, most of the airlines
(except  for Belle Air  that  went  bankrupt)  increased the number of  destinations in the
months following the data collection process.
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Figure 11: Number of airports served regularly by each LCC in Europe in 2013. Source: Innovata SRS.
Figure 10: European airports that were served by 8 or more LCCs in 2013. Source: Innovata SRS.
4.5 Summary
Air transport market liberalisation has been in the core of the ascendency of the low-
cost  segment  worldwide,  with  LCCs  gaining  considerable  expression,  although  with
varying degrees.  Especially  in  North America,  Europe and Southeast  Asia  the low-cost
segment shows some signs of a mature market. In the US in particular the cost-base of
most airlines tends to converge and the growth rates of most LCCs follow industry levels.
This notwithstanding, new specific models continue to appear and procure market share.
Irrespective  of  how  airline  business  models  continue  to  evolve,  airports  should
monitor and be ready to accommodate future changes in those models. If the expansion of
LCCs provides any lesson to airports it is that their development should be flexible enough
to cope with the uncertain future. The next chapter analyses in detail a sample of the very
large number of airports LCCs use in Europe, and discusses how LCCs have impacted both
secondary and main airports.
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5 Characterisation of 'low cost airports' in 
Europe
Low-Cost  Carriers  (LCC)  continue  to  grow  and  diversify  after  two  decades  of
liberalisation  in  the  European  aviation  market.  Yet  the  academic  literature  is  not
conclusive on the long-term impact of this trend for airports  (Graham, 2013).  Figure 12
shows the 50 largest airports in Europe, in 2013,  according to the capacity (departing
available seats) provided by the 20 LCCs identified in the previous chapter. These would in
principle be the most representative airports for low-cost services in Europe, yet at first
sight most of them are not the airports that usually appear in the literature as 'low-cost'
(see section 2.4). In fact only a few of these top 50 (London Stansted (STN), London Luton
(LTN), Milan Bergamo (BGY), Brussels Charleroi (CRL), Rome Ciampino (CIA), Liverpool
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Figure 12: 50 European airports with the most LCC offer in 2013, along with capacity provided by non-
LCCs. Source: Innovata SRS.
(LPL), Paris Beauvais (BVA), Barcelona Girona (GRO) and Leeds Bradford (LBA)), would be
naturally recognised as 'low-cost'.
As the previous chapter reports, LCCs in Europe use such a diverse range of airports
that the very own notion of a ‘low cost airport’ is fuzzy and challenging, in particular as
‘legacy’ airlines and airports compete in a maturing market. However, looking at the top
airports served by LCCs is not sufficient. This chapter takes a detailed look at a sample of
very different European airports in order to characterise them, and to attempt to identify a
set of characteristics airports should have to attract LCCs.
5.1 Sample selection
In order to select a representative sample of airports to study in more detail, we have
first identified the destinations served by the six largest LCCs operating in Europe in 2013,
in terms of total annual passengers for 2012. These carriers, sorted by descending number
of passengers, were: Ryanair, easyJet, Norwegian, Vueling, Wizzair and Germanwings (see
Figure 6). Pegasus, which was in fact the fifth largest by total passengers, was not included
in this list because over 60% of its passengers use domestic services within the Asian part
of  Turkey,  to/from where  most  of  its  international  destinations are  also  served  (CAPA
Centre  for  Aviation,  2013e).  This  notwithstanding,  the  sample  includes  the  two  main
airports in the Asian side of Turkey (Istanbul Sabiha Gokcen and Antalya), as well as most
of the European destinations of Pegasus, because they have met other criteria selection.
From  the  destinations  of  these  carriers,  airports  had  to  satisfy  any  of  two  basic
criteria to be included in the sample:
1. be a base for any of the six airlines;
2. be a destination for at least three of them.
We also considered 14 additional airports due to their implementation of low-cost
facilities, high proportion of low-cost traffic (in absolute or relative terms), or for being
recently  emerging airports  (opened in  2012 or 2013,  or with traffic  growth well  over
100% in that period). The baseline sample contains 171 airports as listed in Table 7.
Table 7: Summary of airports in the baseline sample.
IATA 
Code
Airport Country Passengers (2012) Passengers (2013) LCC seats share
(2013)
ACE Lanzarote ES 5,169,386 5,334,598 42%
AGP Malaga ES 12,582,191 12,922,403 67%
AHO Alghero IT 1,518,216 1,563,908 87%
ALC Alicante ES 8,855,441 9,638,860 75%
AMS Amsterdam NL 51,035,590 52,569,250 16%
ARN Stockholm Arlanda SE 19,674,456 20,673,810 28%
ATH Athens GR 12,866,689 12,460,440 6%
AYT Antalya TR 24,993,667 27,003,712 20%
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IATA 
Code
Airport Country Passengers (2012) Passengers (2013) LCC seats share
(2013)
BCN Barcelona ES 35,145,176 35,210,735 63%
BDS Brindisi IT 2,097,847 1,992,722 65%
BEG Belgrade RS 3,364,059 3,543,194 17%
BES Brest FR 1,070,461 1,003,836 23%
BFS Belfast GB 4,313,521 4,023,089 92%
BGO Bergen NO 5,744,770 6,213,960 39%
BGY Milan Bergamo IT 8,888,293 8,964,376 97%
BHX Birmingham GB 8,918,896 9,118,579 52%
BIO Bilbao ES 4,171,092 3,800,789 45%
BIQ Biarritz FR 1,084,339 1,098,079 36%
BLL Billund DK 2,734,807 2,829,507 45%
BLQ Bologna IT 5,952,396 6,193,783 47%
BOD Bordeaux FR 4,433,347 4,624,812 31%
BOH Bournemouth GB 691,372 661,343 74%
BOO Bodo NO 1,729,991 1,669,191 19%
BRE Bremen DE 2,447,039 2,612,627 45%
BRI Bari IT 3,777,427 3,599,910 67%
BRS Bristol GB 5,917,679 6,129,904 77%
BRU Brussels Zaventem BE 18,971,332 19,133,222 9%
BUD Budapest HU 8,504,020 8,520,880 52%
BVA Paris Beauvais FR 3,862,562 3,952,908 98%
CAG Cagliari IT 3,586,677 3,587,907 64%
CDG Paris Charles de Gaulle FR 61,611,934 62,052,917 8%
CFU Kerkyra GR 1,913,478 2,106,343 36%
CGN Cologne-Bonn DE 9,280,082 9,077,346 57%
CHQ Chania (Crete) GR 1,836,965 2,109,078 51%
CIA Rome Ciampino IT 4,465,830 4,749,251 100%
CLJ Cluj Napoca RO 602,813 1,036,438 68%
CPH Copenhagen Kastrup DK 23,336,187 24,067,030 25%
CRL Brussels Charleroi BE 6,514,383 6,777,389 91%
CTA Catania IT 6,242,851 6,400,127 34%
DBV Dubrovnik HR 1,480,470 1,522,629 35%
DRS Dresden DE 1,886,425 1,754,139 24%
DTM Dortmund DE 1,902,133 1,924,386 90%
DUB Dublin IE 19,090,954 20,166,783 39%
DUS Duesseldorf DE 20,833,246 21,228,226 4%
EDI Edinburgh GB 9,196,078 9,776,951 62%
EFL Kefalonia GR 377,996 429,770 36%
EIN Eindhoven NL 2,977,643 3,396,853 100%
EMA East Midlands GB 4,073,228 4,331,073 78%
FAO Faro PT 5,673,093 5,981,468 76%
FCO Rome Fiumicino IT 36,980,309 36,166,345 17%
FKB Karlsruhe Baden-Baden DE 1,287,382 1,059,227 63%
FLR Florence IT 1,842,017 1,983,268 21%
FUE Fuerteventura ES 4,399,183 4,259,341 25%
GDN Gdansk PL 2,905,710 2,870,321 64%
GLA Glasgow GB 7,153,229 7,360,186 50%
GNB Grenoble FR 314,183 313,499 88%
GOT Goteborg SE 4,857,608 4,998,526 13%
GRO Barcelona Girona ES 2,844,682 2,736,868 98%
GVA Geneva CH 13,899,424 14,436,151 37%
HAJ Hannover DE 5,287,831 5,234,909 19%
HAM Hamburg DE 13,697,402 13,502,553 13%
HAU Haugesund NO 664,475 701,326 51%
HEL Helsinki FI 14,858,215 15,279,043 15%
HER Irakleion GR 5,076,329 5,791,999 23%
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IATA 
Code
Airport Country Passengers (2012) Passengers (2013) LCC seats share
(2013)
HHN Frankfurt Hahn DE 2,790,961 2,667,402 100%
IBZ Ibiza ES 5,555,071 5,726,851 64%
IEV Kiev Zhulhany UA 862,000 1,838,393 42%
JMK Mikonos GR 500,907 583,465 37%
JTR Santorini GR 762,365 897,830 22%
KEF Reykjavik Keflavik IS 2,380,218 2,751,743 16%
KGS Kos GR 1,797,391 2,028,250 31%
KRK Krakow PL 3,438,758 3,647,616 64%
KTW Katowice PL 2,550,848 2,544,198 80%
KUN Kaunas LT 829,827 695,509 97%
LBA Leeds Bradford GB 2,972,720 3,314,923 83%
LCA Larnaca CY 5,166,224 4,944,384 13%
LCG La Coruna ES 845,452 839,837 42%
LEI Almeria ES 749,712 705,552 46%
LGW London Gatwick GB 34,236,247 35,462,233 58%
LIL Lille FR 1,397,602 1,661,741 41%
LIS Lisbon PT 15,301,191 16,010,440 15%
LPA Gran Canaria ES 9,892,288 9,770,253 29%
LPL Liverpool GB 4,459,389 4,186,733 100%
LTN London Luton GB 9,618,548 9,698,802 94%
LUZ Lublin PL 5,371 189,699 95%
LYS Lyon FR 8,451,039 8,562,298 23%
MAD Madrid Barajas ES 45,195,014 39,729,027 18%
MAH Menorca ES 2,545,944 2,565,466 53%
MAN Manchester Intl GB 19,675,505 20,687,423 44%
MJV Murcia San Javier ES 1,181,490 1,140,447 91%
MLA Malta MT 3,630,416 4,036,566 40%
MLH Basel Mulhouse (Euroairport) FR 5,353,892 5,862,455 57%
MMX Copenhagen Malmo SE 2,104,746 2,124,682 42%
MPL Montpellier FR 1,288,301 1,422,792 30%
MRS Marseille FR 8,297,538 8,265,038 22%
MST Maastricht NL 331,542 452,193 100%
MUC Munich DE 38,362,432 38,672,644 3%
MXP Milan Malpensa IT 18,524,812 17,955,075 44%
NAP Naples IT 5,791,789 5,444,422 42%
NCE Nice FR 11,189,775 11,554,251 32%
NCL Newcastle GB 4,358,887 4,415,797 48%
NRN Dusseldorf Weeze (Niederrhein) DE 2,208,429 2,487,843 99%
NTE Nantes FR 3,520,587 3,930,849 43%
NUE Nuremberg DE 3,597,136 3,309,629 11%
NYO Stockholm Skavsta SE 2,317,589 2,165,040 100%
OLB Olbia IT 1,866,540 1,999,618 31%
OPO Porto PT 6,050,330 6,372,535 54%
ORK Cork IE 2,340,141 2,258,005 41%
ORY Paris Orly FR 27,232,263 28,274,154 24%
OSL Oslo NO 22,079,081 22,956,544 40%
OTP Bucharest Otopeni RO 7,120,024 7,643,467 28%
OVD Asturias Oviedo ES 1,309,640 1,039,409 48%
PEG Perugia IT 197,885 215,550 100%
PFO Paphos CY 2,242,797 2,161,236 57%
PIK Glasgow Prestwick GB 1,067,243 1,145,561 100%
PMF Parma IT 176,209 196,820 97%
PMI Palma de Mallorca ES 22,666,682 22,768,082 39%
PMO Palermo IT 4,605,684 4,349,672 50%
POZ Poznan PL 1,595,856 1,355,330 62%
PRG Prague CZ 10,807,890 10,974,196 27%
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IATA 
Code
Airport Country Passengers (2012) Passengers (2013) LCC seats share
(2013)
PRN Pristina RS 1,527,134 1,628,678 47%
PSA Pisa IT 4,487,900 4,479,690 88%
PSR Pescara IT 560,471 548,257 88%
PUY Pula HR 367,445 354,111 45%
REU Barcelona Reus ES 937,446 971,166 77%
RHO Rhodes GR 3,815,939 4,200,779 20%
RIX Riga LV 4,767,764 4,794,019 22%
RJK Rijeka HR 72,762 139,296 84%
RYG Oslo Rygge (Moss) NO 1,732,039 1,897,523 98%
SAW Istanbul Sabiha Gokcen TR 14,686,052 18,641,842 71%
SCQ Santiago De Compostela ES 2,194,611 2,073,055 72%
SEN London Southend GB 617,556 969,950 92%
SKG Thessaloniki GR 4,177,231 4,239,200 24%
SKP Skopje MK 835,527 984,407 44%
SNN Shannon IE 1,394,781 1,400,032 38%
SOF Sofia BG 3,150,681 3,504,320 25%
SPU Split HR 1,425,224 1,581,734 45%
STN London Stansted GB 17,469,709 17,857,523 97%
STR Stuttgart DE 9,720,877 9,577,551 37%
SUF Lamezia Terme IT 2,207,526 2,184,102 54%
SVG Stavanger Sola NO 4,392,679 4,668,403 31%
SVQ Sevilla ES 4,287,488 3,687,727 78%
SXF Berlin Schoenefeld DE 7,097,277 6,727,306 79%
SZG Salzburg AT 1,666,487 1,662,834 20%
SZZ Szczecin PL 356,006 347,744 69%
TFS Tenerife Sur ES 8,530,817 8,701,983 47%
TGM Tirgu Mures RO 300,427 363,387 97%
TLL Tallinn EE 2,206,290 1,958,801 23%
TLS Toulouse FR 7,555,351 7,567,634 24%
TMP Tampere FI 570,739 466,671 54%
TPS Trapani IT 1,577,476 1,878,557 94%
TRD Trondheim NO 4,160,162 4,311,328 39%
TRF Oslo Torp (Sandefjord) NO 1,705,762 1,848,603 66%
TRN Turin IT 3,516,406 3,160,287 25%
TSF Venice Treviso IT 2,240,280 2,175,396 100%
TSR Timisoara RO 1,035,929 750,056 41%
TXL Berlin Tegel DE 18,163,955 19,591,838 7%
VCE Venice Marco Polo IT 8,177,081 8,403,790 41%
VIE Vienna Intl AT 22,165,794 21,999,926 5%
VLC Valencia ES 4,752,020 4,599,990 59%
VNO Vilnius LT 2,208,098 2,666,865 48%
VRN Verona IT 3,182,574 2,719,815 24%
WAW Warsaw Chopin PL 9,585,532 10,655,633 20%
WMI Warsaw Modlin PL 897,612 343,565 100%
WRO Wroclaw PL 1,996,552 1,920,179 61%
XCR Paris Vatry FR 87,745 101,727 85%
XRY Jerez De La Frontera ES 913,301 811,504 19%
ZAD Zadar HR 371,256 472,572 70%
ZAG Zagreb HR 2,342,309 2,292,892 8%
ZRH Zurich CH 24,802,466 24,865,138 3%
ZTH Zakinthos GR 871,310 1,004,257 22%
For various reasons we have explicitly opted not to adopt an analysis of the internal
cost structure of the airports as a way of identifying those that are 'low-cost'.  First, the
literature review shows (see section 2.4) that it was the expansion of LCCs that triggered
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the  emergence  of  'low-cost  airports'  and  'low-cost  facilities',  not  vice  versa,  thus  we
analysed the airports that LCCs actually use. Also, the fact that airport costs are driven not
only by the level of traffic but also by compliance with strict regulations – mainly on safety
and security aspects,  irrespective of airport  size  (ACI Europe, 2013; Adler et al.,  2013;
ELFAA, 2004) – hinders an objective or useful comparison between airports that are very
different  in scale.  Finally,  the difficulty in gathering objective  and comparable  financial
information for a large set of airports (Graham, 2005) makes the analysis of the associated
indicators very difficult.
Accordingly, the baseline sample simply represents the airports that LCCs actually use
not taking into account any specific physical or financial characteristic. Hence, to analyse
and compare the airports in the sample, we collected empirical data about 36 different
variables that convey information on crucial airport processes and resources, organised in
various parameters (see Table 8).
Table 8: Description of the 36 variables analysed for the European airports in the baseline sample.
Type of parameter Variable Description
Airport identification IATA Code 3 letter IATA airport code
Airport identification Name Airport common name
Airport identification City Main city served by the airport
Airport identification MAS City Main city in the metropolitan (or regional) area served by the Multi-
Airport System, in case the airport is part of one, otherwise it is the 
same as “City” above
Airport identification Country Two letter code for the country in which the airport is located
Airport size Pax 2012 Number of total passengers (incoming, outgoing and transit) handled 
at the airport in 2012 according to (extended) European Airport 
Traffic Trends Database (ANNA.aero, 2013a)
Airport size Pax 2013 Number of total passengers (incoming, outgoing and transit) handled 
at the airport in 2013 according to (extended) European Airport 
Traffic Trends Database (ANNA.aero, 2014)
Relative importance of 
LCCs at the airport
LCC Share (2011) Market share of low-cost carriers, in terms of total annual passengers,
in 2011 (not available for all airports, not in terms of passengers for 
some airports, not accounting for all LCCs for some airports)
Relative importance of 
LCCs at the airport
LCC Share (2013) 
or 'LCC share'
Market share of low-cost carriers, in terms of total annual scheduled 
available seats, according to schedules data in 2013 from Innovata 
SRS database (IATA, n.d.)
Relative importance of 
LCCs at the airport
LCC served Number of LCCs that used the airport in 2013 (out of the 20 LCCs 
identified)
Relative importance of 
LCCs at the airport
Top 6 LCC served Number of LCCs that used the airport in 2013 (out of the six largest)
Relative importance of 
LCCs at the airport
Based Top 6 LCC Number of LCCs that used the airport as a base in 2013 (out of the six
largest LCCs)
Relative importance of 
LCCs at the airport
LCC pax proxy Estimated number of passengers using LCCs at each airport in 2013 
(LCC pax proxy = Pax 2013 * LCC Share (2013))
Note: As LCCs tend to have higher load factors and seating density 
this number is more likely to be under- than over-estimated
Relative importance of 
LCCs at the airport
LCC Share EU 
(2013)
Capacity share of LCCs operating at the airport in relation to the total 
number of available departing seats offered by LCCs at all European 
airports (not only those in the sample) in 2013
Relative importance of 
LCCs at the airport
LCC EU rank 
(2013) or 'LCC EU 
rank'
Normalisation of LCC Share EU (2013) between 0 an 1, where 1 
corresponds to the share of low-cost seats provided at Barcelona 
(BCN), the airport with the most LCC seats in 2013
LCC EU rank = LCC Share EU  / (BCN LCC Share EU)
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Type of parameter Variable Description
Airport organisational 
structure
Ownership Ownership and operational structure according to ACI Europe (2010):
Public – Operator as part of administration
Public – Corporatised operator
Mixed – Public majority
Mixed – Private majority
Private – Fully privatised and corporatised
Note: “Public” means government-owned
Airport organisational 
structure
Airport group Indicates whether the airport owner or operator owns or operates 
additional airports elsewhere:
Individual airports
Airport companies with shared interest but independent operation
Fully integrated airport group
Airport geographical 
location conditions
MAS Indicates whether the airport is part of a Multi-Airport System (MAS):
Airport is not part of a MAS
Airport is part of a “regional” MAS, i.e. alternative significant airports 
(over 500 000 annual passengers) exist near the (non-metropolitan) 
regions they serve
Airport is part of a “metropolitan” MAS (Bonnefoy, 2008)
Airport geographical 
location conditions
Location The airport's location within the region it serves according to 
Dobruszkes (2006), as summarised by Graham (2013):
City main
City secondary
Regional near city
Tourist zone
Remote regional
Airport infrastructure Passenger 
buildings
The total number of independent passenger buildings (terminals) in 
use
Airport infrastructure LCT Indicates whether the airport markets a passenger building (or part of
it) specifically as a 'low-cost terminal'
Airport infrastructure Jet bridges Indicates whether the airport provides any contact stands with jet 
bridges (jetway or boarding bridge)
Airport infrastructure Runways Total number of active runways
Airport infrastructure Ground transport An array that describes public transport alternatives available for 
ground access to the airport:
0: No; 1: Yes; in the following order {local bus, coach, 
metro/tramway/light rail, heavy rail, high speed rail}
Airport congestion Slot control level A proxy for the level of (airside) congestion at the airport, it indicates 
the IATA slot coordination level:
Level 1: Non-Coordinated Airport = Uncongested
Level 2: Schedules Facilitated Airport = Moderately busy airport 
(especially during peak seasons/times)
Level 3: Coordinated Airport = Congested airport
Airport managerial 
strategies
Airline incentives Indicates whether the airport has any formal scheme of incentives or 
special discounts to airlines (e.g. for route development)
Airport managerial 
strategies
The route shop Indicates whether the airport publishes route development 
opportunities on therouteshop.com
Airport managerial 
strategies
Strategy Indicates whether there is a formal, public and documented 
definition of the airport strategy
Airport route network Long haul Indicates whether the airport offers scheduled long haul (e.g. 
intercontinental) destinations
Airport route network Non-stop 
destinations
Total number of direct non-stop destinations available at the airport 
(most recent available figure)
Airport route network Largest carrier 
LCC?
Indicates whether the largest carrier at the airport (in terms of 
available seats) is one of the 20 identified LCCs
Airport financial 
conditions
Non-aero 
revenues
Share of non-aeronautical revenues in the total airport revenues for 
the last year available (not available for all the airports, in some cases
of airport groups the value is only available for the entire group)
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Type of parameter Variable Description
Airport financial 
conditions
Profitable Indicates whether the airport has a positive net profit result for the 
most recent calendar/fiscal year available (not available for all the 
airports, in some cases of airport groups the value is only available for
the entire group)
Airport operational 
conditions
Average 
turnaround time 
(min) - LCCs
The time it takes LCCs (Ryanair, easyJet, Norwegian, Vueling, Wizzair, 
Germanwings and Pegasus) on average to turnaround their aircraft 
(only from Airbus A320 and Boeing 737 families) at the airport (not 
available for all the airports)
Airport operational 
conditions
Average 
turnaround time 
(min) - FSCs
The time it takes FSCs (Air France, Air Berlin, British Airways, 
Lufthansa, Iberia, KLM and Turkish Airlines) on average to turnaround 
their aircraft (only from Airbus A320 and Boeing 737 families) at the 
airport (not available for all the airports)
Airport operational 
conditions
Average 
turnaround time 
(min)
The time it takes the airlines sampled (Ryanair, easyJet, Norwegian, 
Vueling, Wizzair, Germanwings, Pegasus, Air France, Air Berlin, British 
Airways, Lufthansa, Iberia, KLM and Turkish Airlines) on average to 
turnaround their aircraft (only from Airbus A320 and Boeing 737 
families) at the airport (not available for all the airports)
We argue that  some of  these variables determine the importance of  LCCs in each
airport and thus the extent to which an airport can be described as 'low cost' (see next
section).  The  other  (complementary)  variables  facilitate  the  identification  of  certain
attributes interesting to characterise the airports.
5.2 Measuring the importance of LCCs in European airports
LCCs in Europe have extensive networks and some airports serve a large number of
LCCs  (see  section  4.4).  However,  these  numbers  alone  do  not  completely  explain  the
relevance  of  LCCs  for  each  airport.  Some  European  LCCs  (see  Figure  6)  have  also
established a  considerable  number of  'bases'  in  airports  well  beyond their  country  of
registration (even in Northern Africa). A 'base' is an airport where the carrier permanently
bases aircraft  and crew who return by the end of the day's rotations  (CAPA Centre for
Aviation,  2013f).  At  the beginning of  2013,  the six largest  LCCs had 127 bases at  105
different airports8 (in Europe). Ryanair alone accounted for 55 bases in Europe, well ahead
of easyJet, second in number of bases with 23.
Bases offer the carriers operational  flexibility and cost savings for routine aircraft
maintenance and repair, and also play an important role in crew recruitment. Bases also
give the airlines significant bargaining power against airports because they induce new
routes, passengers traffic, and other economic benefits for the hinterland. This justifies the
use of bases as one of our selection criteria to define the sample. We considered that an
airport that is able to become an airline base may have more of the characteristics that
make it attractive to LCCs.
Although it appears to be relevant for a 'low cost airport' to have a based LCC, this
may not be an essential feature. 66 of the airports in the sample were not designated bases
8 Some airlines added more bases in 2013 that were not available at the time of data collection.
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(for any of the 6 largest LCCs) at the time of data collection. Paris Beauvais, for instance,
handled nearly 4 million passengers in 2013 without any based aircraft. Similarly, London
Luton is the second largest airport for Wizz Air in terms of seats, but the airline does not
use it as a base. Therefore we consider bases alone cannot explain the importance of LCCs
for European airports, hence we propose more indicators for this purpose.
To analyse the level  of  consolidation of low-cost services in each airport,  we have
measured the capacity deployed by LCCs in comparison with the total capacity available at
the  airport  in  2013.  That  is,  the  proportion  of  total  annual  seats  available  on  the
departures  of  the 20 LCCs identified,  out  of  the total  seats  for all  the  airlines  at  each
airport. This variable ('LCC Share (2013)' in  Table 8, and referred in short as 'LCC share'
from now on), reflects the market share of LCCs in each airport market.
To analyse how airports compare with each other at European level, we computed the
share of every airport in the low-cost segment in Europe. This variable ('LCC Share EU
(2013)' in Table 8) corresponds to the proportion of seats offered by LCCs at each airport
in relation to the total number of seats offered by LCCs in all European airports (not only
those included in the sample) in 2013. To compare more easily with the previous variable
('LCC share') we created a rank by normalising 'LCC share EU (2013)' with respect to the
airport  with  the highest  number of  available  LCC seats,  which  in  2013 was Barcelona
(BCN). The resulting variable ('LCC EU rank (2013)' in Table 8 and shortened to 'LCC EU
rank' from now on) ranges from 0 to 1, where 1 corresponds to the share of low-cost seats
provided at Barcelona El Prat Airport (BCN) out of the total low-cost seats available in
Europe for 2013.
5.2.1 Quartiles to define how 'low cost' airports are
The  variables  'LCC  share'  and  'LCC  EU  rank'  respectively  describe  the  market
penetration of LCCs at an airport and the significance of an airport at European level for
low-cost  services.  Quartiles  are  useful  to  characterise  the  distribution  of  the  sample
according to these measures, as  Table 9 explains. Airports above the upper quartile (i.e.
those in the top 25% of data) for 'LCC share' (72.7%) have significant LCC consolidation.
Airports above the upper quartile for 'LCC EU rank' (0.141) are more significant in terms
of European low-cost traffic. Conversely, airports below the lower quartiles (i.e. the bottom
25% of data, equal to 25.4% and 0.027 for 'LCC share' and 'LCC EU rank', respectively) are
less relevant for low-cost traffic.
Figure 13 shows the 171 airports in the sample plotted against 'LCC share' and 'LCC
EU rank' variables. 15 airports are above the upper quartiles for both variables (shaded
area): London Stansted (STN), London Luton (LTN), Milan Bergamo (BGY), Alicante (ALC),
Brussels  Charleroi (CRL),  Berlin Schönefeld (SXF),  Rome Ciampino (CIA),  Bristol  (BRS),
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Faro (FAO), Liverpool (LPL), Pisa (PSA), Paris Beauvais (BVA), Belfast International (BFS),
Eindhoven (EIN), and East Midlands (EMA). Taking only these variables into account, these
airports can be regarded as “the most low cost” ones.
Table 9: Quartiles to determine the relative importance of LCCs in airports.
Variable Quartile Value Meaning
LCC share [2013] Upper (Q3) 72.7% Airports above this level have significant LCC consolidation
LCC share [2013] Lower (Q1) 25.4% Airports below this level have low LCC market penetration
LCC EU rank [2013] Upper (Q3) 0.141 Airports above this level are significant in terms of European low-
cost traffic
LCC EU rank [2013] Lower (Q1) 0.027 Airports below this level are not significant for low-cost traffic at 
European level
However,  there are 6 airports in which LCCs have a low market  penetration ('LCC
share' below the lower quartile), yet contribute significantly to European low cost traffic
('LCC EU rank'  above the upper quartile):  Amsterdam Schiphol  (AMS),  Madrid Barajas
(MAD), Paris Orly (ORY), Rome Fiumicino (FCO), Copenhagen (CPH), and Paris Charles de
Gaulle (CDG). Moreover, the two airports that rank the highest at European level for low-
cost capacity – Barcelona (BCN) and London Gatwick (LGW) – are both below the upper
quartile in terms of 'LCC share'.  Despite LCCs not being as consolidated here as in the
“most low cost airports”, they play an important role in the network of the airlines.
Finally, we have also estimated the number of passengers using LCCs at each airport
in 2013 ('LCC Pax Proxy (2013)') by multiplying the total number of passengers by the
market share of LCCs ('LCC share'). The result does not translate directly into passengers
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Figure 13: Relative importance of LCCs at sampled airports (market shares as of 2013).
because the market share is expressed in seats, but as LCCs tend to use aircraft with dense
seat configurations and high load factors, this number is more likely to be under- than
over-estimated. This proxy is used only to visualise, in orders of magnitude, the relative
importance of LCCs at the airports in comparison with airport size variables.
Around 30% of the airports in the sample handled over 70% of the estimated low-
cost  passengers  in  2013.  This  is  in  line  with  usual  concentration  patterns  in  airport
networks where the largest airports tend to handle most of the traffic (according to Suau-
Sanchez  and  Burghouwt  (2011),  in  2008  the  five  largest  airports  in  the  five  largest
European aviation markets offered each well above 50% of seat capacity). Moreover, this
observation  is  also  consistent  with  a  de-concentration  effect,  particularly  at  intra-
European level,  attributed to the growth of LCCs  (Suau-Sanchez,  2013); hence low-cost
traffic should be more evenly distributed across a larger number of airports.
5.3 Characteristics of European 'low cost airports'
This  section  characterises  the  airports  in  the  baseline  sample  according  to  the
parameters mentioned above (see Table 8). Besides presenting the main findings for each
parameter,  it  relates the variables with the relative importance of  LCCs in the airports
('LCC Share' and 'LCC EU rank') in order to assess their potential impact on the degree of
consolidation of LCCs.
The 171 airports in the baseline sample are distributed across 32 countries. Yet 93
are  located  in  the  five  largest  European  aviation  markets  (United  Kingdom,  Germany,
Spain, France and Italy). The sample includes airports of different scales, from Paris/Vatry
which handled 101,727 passengers in 2013 to Paris/De Gaulle (CDG) with over 62 million
passengers the same year. The smallest 25% airports handled 1.66 million passenger or
less in 2013, whilst the largest 25% received 8.46 million or more.
5.3.1 Organisational structure
The  organisational  structure  of  the  airports  was  analysed  using  two  variables:
'Ownership' and 'Airport group'.
i) Ownership
The  ownership  and operational  structure  that  ACI  Europe  (2010) summarised as
follows (notice that “public” means “government-owned” in this context):
 1. Public ownership of airport operator
 1.1. Public airport operator as part of the administration: “An airport operator is
considered part  of  the administration if  the  airport  operator is  functionally
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dependent on the national and/or regional/local administration (e.g. Ministry
of Transport, Regional and/or City Councils).”
 1.2. Corporatised  public  airport  operator:  “A  corporatised  public  airport
operator is an independently acting economic entity, structured according to
and complying with normal commercial law, whose shares are wholly owned
by public authorities [at least 98% of shares] of the country where the airport
is located.”
 2. Mixed  public-private  ownership  of  airport  operator:  “A  mixed  public-private
ownership  of  an  airport  operator  involves  an  independently  acting  economic
entity, structured according to and complying with normal commercial law, whose
shares are owned by a combination of public authorities of the country where the
airport is located and private investor(s).”
 2.1. Public sector owning a majority share in the airport operator 
 2.2. Private sector owning a majority share in the airport operator: “investments
by public authorities or a public-private airport operator from country A in an
airport  operator  in  country  B  will  be  considered  as  fully  private,  as  the
investment  constitutes  an  economic  activity  without  specific  governmental
purpose in country B.”
 3. Private ownership of airport operator
 3.1. Fully privatised airport operator: “Private ownership of an airport operator
involves  a  commercial  company  wholly  owned  by  private  investors  and/or
other  corporatised  entities  wholly  or  partially  owned  by  public  authorities
from a country or region other than the one where the airport  operator is
located.”
Most airports in the sample (94 out of 171) are owned by the government but run as
corporatised  entities  abiding  to  commercial  and  fiscal  discipline,  i.e.  they  have  a
corporatised public  operator.  22 airports  are  fully  privatised and other 19 have mixed
ownership  with  the  private  sector  holding  a  majority  stake.  Figure  14 shows  the
ownership  types  of  sampled  airports  plotted  against  the  relative  importance  of  LCCs.
Although there is no clear correlation between the ownership variable and the relevance of
LCCs,  it  is  interesting to notice that most airports  in which the operator is part of the
government  administration  have  relatively  low  LCC  penetration  and  are  not  very
significant in the European low-cost segment.
This  group  includes  9  Greek  airports  (owned  by  the  central  government)  and,
assuming Basel (MLH) as French for its location, 5 French airports (owned by regional or
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local administrations). Within this group, only in Paris Vatry (XCR) do LCCs have a market
share that is above the upper quartile of 'LCC share', but this specific airport has not been
able to significantly attract airlines, being therefore the lowest ranked in European terms.
On the other hand, only Basel (MLH) stands above the upper quartile for 'LCC EU rank',
with LCCs accounting for 57% of the capacity offered.
Fully privatised airports stand more prominently above the upper quartile, either for
'LCC share' or for 'LCC EU rank'. In fact, only 7 of the 22 airports are below both quartiles.
Public airports with corporatised operators and airports with mixed ownership are rather
distributed along this landscape (see Figure 14). This might suggest that private airports
are more likely to consider LCCs as partners, or that airports that are operated within the
government administration either lack autonomy to approach LCCs individually,  or  are
subject to broader political goals.
ii) Airport group
We have analysed whether an airport is part of a group in the sense that the owner
(or  one  of  the  majority  owners)  or  operator  owns  or  operates  additional  airports
elsewhere, according to three cases:
1. individual airports;
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Figure 14: Ownership of sampled airports and the relevance of LCCs.
2. companies with shared interest but independent operation;
3. fully integrated group.
88 airports from the sample are part of a fully integrated group. This figure includes,
among others, 22 Spanish airports operated by AENA and 10 Greek airports controlled by
the Hellenic Civil Aviation Authority – HCAA9. 55 airports are individual entities, and the
rest are part of companies that have interests in other airports but operate independently.
Figure 15 shows the airports in the sample according to this variable.
Again, there is no clear correlation between the importance of LCCs and the existence
of airport groups. Yet it is interesting that 17 out of the 20 top ranked airports for low-cost
services at European level (all above the upper quartile for 'LCC EU rank') are part of a
fully integrated group company.
5.3.2 Geographical location
Two variables are associated with the geographical location of the airports: 'MAS' and
'Location'.
9 AENA is  a  corporatised operator and the HCAA operates  within government administration (in the use
defined above).  However,  each of  these organisations  is  fully  integrated,  as  they  are managed as  a  single
organisation.
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Figure 15: Sampled airports as part of an airport group and the relevance of LCCs.
i) Multi-Airport Systems (MAS)
The 'MAS' variable indicates whether the airport is part of a Multi-Airport System
(MAS) in a metropolitan area according to the criteria defined by Bonnefoy  (2008). This
definition  was  extended  to  include  the  cases  in  which  alternative  significant  airports
(those  with  more  than  500,000  annual  passengers)  exist  near  the  (non-metropolitan)
regions they serve.
56 airports in the sample belong to metropolitan MAS, 40 of which are either above
the upper quartile for 'LCC EU rank' or above the upper quartile for 'LCC Share' (see Figure
16). Other 29 airports belong to a regional MAS, i.e. there is an alternative airport nearby.
In fact, almost all but one of the 15 airports that score above both quartiles belong to a
MAS (11 of them in a metropolitan area).
As  the  literature  highlights  (see  section  2.4)  secondary  airports  in  Multi-Airport
Systems provided an opportunity for start-up LCCs to capture traffic. But in the current
stage of LCC evolution even the major airports are not missing the opportunity to attract
LCCs. As a matter of fact, in most of the largest European MAS the primary airports served
more low-cost traffic than the secondary ones in 2013, as Figure 17 shows. Out of the 20
MAS  shown  in  the  figure,  only  in  the  cases  of  Milan,  Istanbul,  Brussels,  Berlin,  and
Frankfurt, the secondary airports (Bergamo (BGY), Sabiha Gokcen (SAW), Charleroi (CRL),
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Figure 16: Multi-Airport Systems in sampled airports and the relative importance of LCCs.
Schönefeld  (SXF)  and  Hahn  (HHN),  respectively)  handled  more  LCC  traffic  than  the
primary ones.
Paris is an interesting case: Orly (ORY) led on LCC traffic, but Charles de Gaulle (CDG),
the largest airport in the MAS, and Beauvais (BVA) did not lag far behind (traffic at Vatry
(XCR) is still negligible for the MAS). In London, low-cost traffic at Heathrow (LHR) was
even lower than at recently converted Southend (SEN), but Gatwick (LGW) handled more
LCC passengers than Stansted (STN) and Luton (LTN) each, and London City (LCY) had no
LCCs at all (although Flybe is planning to start operations there by the end of 2014).
ii) Location
The 'Location' variable describes the type of location within the region served by the
airport, according to Dobruszkes (2006) and summarised by Graham (2013) as:
1. City main: “medium or large traditional airports”;
2. City secondary: “secondary urban airports of large cities”;
3. Regional near city: “regional airports serving a large city fairly close”;
4. Tourist zone: “traditional airports of beach tourism”;
5. Remote  regional:  “remotely  located  regional  airports  that  airlines  use  either  as
access to tourist areas or points of departure for tours.”
Figure 18 shows how the type of location of the airports in the sample is related to the
importance of LCCs. Despite the previous finding that most primary airports handle more
low-cost traffic than the other airports in the MAS, in relative terms 'city main' airports still
tend to have lower penetration of LCCs. The group of 'city main' airports includes 100
airports, 53 of which are not part of a metropolitan or regional MAS. 27 of these 'city main'
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Figure 17: Total and (estimated) low-cost passengers in the airports that are part of the 20 largest
metropolitan Multi-Airport Systems in Europe, by total low-cost passengers in the MAS.
airports contribute significantly to European low-cost traffic (above the upper quartile for
'LCC EU rank').
The  group  of  airports  in  'tourist  zones'  includes  31  airports  located  along  the
Mediterranean or the Alps,  in  zones  that  normally  have  high seasonality.  It  may seem
rather  surprising that  LCCs are  not  dominant  in most  of  these tourist  airports,  but  in
reality charters, and to a lesser extent FSCs (particularly their regional branches),  have
been able to withstand LCC competition for leisure travellers at these locations. This also
happens with many island airports in which regional or flag carriers satisfy commuting
needs for residents,  often through Public Service Obligations.  Usually,  as these airports
cannot sustain a regular market for their larger aircraft, LCCs flock for a few weeks during
summer (or winter) only.
Conversely, the consolidation of LCC traffic is more evident for 'regional near city' and
'remote regional' airports. In the first case, 12 out of 16 airports have an 'LCC share' above
the upper quartile of the sample distribution. In the second one, 10 out of 14 airports also
have significant LCC penetration. Secondary airports of large cities ('city secondary') are
evenly divided in terms of LCC market share: 5 are above the upper quartile, and 5 are
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Figure 18: Location of the sampled airports and the importance of LCCs.
below. However,  7 of these airports  are significant  at  European level  (above the upper
quartile for 'LCC EU rank').
The 15 airports that rank above both quartiles are also well distributed in the groups:
there are 3 'city main' airports (Eindhoven – EIN, Bristol – BRS – and Belfast International
– BFS), 4 'city secondary' (Rome Ciampino – CIA, Liverpool10 – LPL, London Stansted – STN
– and Berlin  Schönefeld – SXF), 3 'tourist zone' airports (Pisa – PSA, Faro – FAO – and
Alicante – ALC), and one 'remote regional' airport (Paris Beauvais – BVA).
5.3.3 Infrastructure
i) Passenger buildings
A  correlation  between  total  traffic  and the  number  of  passenger  buildings  is  not
necessarily straightforward or meaningful. This feature depends, among other factors, on
the design strategy of airport expansions. Some airports would build new “terminals” to
add capacity, whilst others would prefer to remain under one single roof. 123 airports in
the sample have a single passenger building, 31 have two and 17 have three or more.
In relation to low-cost services (see  Figure 19), only three (London Stansted – STN,
Berlin Schönefeld – SXF, and Alicante – ALC) out of the 17 airports with three or more
passenger  buildings  have  significant  LCC  consolidation  ('LCC  share'  above  the  upper
10 Liverpool  Airport  (LPL)  is  actually  halfway  between  the  main  airport  for  the  city  of  Liverpool  and  a
secondary airport for the Manchester Greater Area MAS. LPL is counted as 'city secondary' in this analysis.
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Figure 19: Number of passenger buildings in the sampled airports and the relevance of LCCs.
quartile). At Stansted three passenger buildings are satellites and accessible only air-side,
whilst common check-in, baggage reclaim, security and land-side facilities are located in a
main building with no boarding gates. Schönefeld will be replaced, in a near future, by the
new Berlin Brandenburg Airport that favours the 'under one roof' concept. And Alicante
currently operates only the newest passenger building, as the other two buildings were
closed in 2011 after the new one opened. Nevertheless, 11 of these 17 airports (including
the 3 above) significantly contribute to LCC traffic at  European level  (above the upper
quartile  for  'LCC  EU  rank').  Conversely,  out  of  43  airports  that  have  significant
consolidation of LCCs (above upper quartile for 'LCC share'), 38 have only one passenger
building.
ii) 'Low cost terminals' (LCT)
Some airports  have developed segregated facilities  that are specifically  tailored or
marketed for low-cost services. These facilities are referred in the literature as “low cost
terminals” - LCT (Hanaoka and Saraswati, 2011; Njoya and Niemeier, 2011; Sabar, 2009).
An LCT differs from an airport that has been (re)developed specifically for LCCs in the
sense that an LCT is deployed in an existing commercial airport as a somehow separated
facility.
From the airports in our sample, 14 have developed some kind of LCT as  Table 10
details. These terminals are all at the main airports for the cities they serve (i.e. they are in
the 'city main' category in section  5.3.2ii). In none of these airports the market share of
LCCs  is  above  the  upper  quartile,  and  it  is  below  50%  in  most  of  them.  This
notwithstanding, 6 of them significantly contribute to low-cost traffic at European level
('LCC EU rank' above the upper quartile).
These 6 airports belong to metropolitan MAS, and this is the case of the rest in this
group of airports with LCT. And all  6 are primary airports within their MAS. This may
suggest a specific reaction of these airports to market developments, and their willingness
to  compete  in  the  low-cost  segment  with  other  airports  in  the  MAS  by  establishing
facilities  with  different  levels  of  service,  yet  not  jeopardising  the  incumbent  'legacy'
airlines.
Indeed,  only  7  airports  developed  (or  re-developed)  their  low-cost  terminals
specifically  with  LCCs  in  mind:  Amsterdam  (AMS),  Copenhagen  (CPH),  Lyon  (LYS),
Marseille (MRS), Bordeaux (BOD), Bremen (BRE) and Tampere (TMP). And only at CPH
and BOD the facilities were built from scratch with that specific purpose. In other cases it
was rather a change of users for those particular facilities.
At Lisbon (LIS), for instance, the LCT was built as a temporary solution to provide
capacity  whilst  the  main  terminal  was  expanded  because  the  works  obstructed  some
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areas. It was used as a domestic terminal first,  and then turned into LCT when easyJet
opened a base there. Moreover, low-cost facilities at LIS, as in Rome Fiumicino (FCO), are
“only  departures”.  Arriving  passengers  are  taken  by  bus  to  non-low-cost  facilities  to
complete their trips. At FCO, the low-cost “Terminal 2” (located in the same building as
terminals  1  and  3)  provides  only  bus  gates  where  passengers  are  taken  to  remote
positions.
Table 10: European airports with 'low cost terminals' in 2013.
IATA 
Code
Airport Low Cost Terminal LCC 
share
LCC EU 
rank
AMS Amsterdam 
Schiphol
Pier H/M (Non-Schengen/Schengen) in main passenger building. 
No/few amenities past security for H/M pier. Used by easyJet, Air One, 
Flybe, Jet2.com and Norwegian. Transavia, Vueling, Pegasus, WOW Air, 
Iberia Express and Germanwings use other piers. Norwegian and Flybe 
also use other piers.
16% 0.357*
MXP Milan 
Malpensa
Terminal 2 (old passenger building). Used exclusively by easyJet. Air 
One, Flybe, Germanwings, Norwegian, Vueling, Wizz Air and WOW Air 
use Terminal 1.
44% 0.353*
CPH Copenhagen CPH Go pier connected to Terminal 3 passenger building. Used by 
easyJet and Transavia. Other LCCs, including Norwegian use other 
terminals.
25% 0.287*
FCO Rome 
Fiumicino
Terminal 2 in the same building between Terminals 1 and 3. Only 
departures. Used by easyJet, Wizz Air and Blue Air. Other LCCs, 
including Ryanair and Pegasus use Terminal 3.
17% 0.278*
CDG Paris Charles
de Gaulle
Terminal 3. Bus-gates only. Used mainly by charter airlines, Vueling, 
Smartwings, Jet2.com, WOW Air and Air One. EasyJet and Flybe use 
Terminal 2 and Germanwings uses Terminal 1.
8% 0.212*
GLA Glasgow East pier within main passenger building. Used mainly by easyJet. 50% 0.168*
LIS Lisbon Terminal 2. Only departures. Arriving passengers are taken by bus to 
arrivals in main Terminal 1. Originally intended to relieve traffic during 
expansion of Terminal 1. Used by most LCCs, mainly easyJet and 
Ryanair. Germanwings and Vueling use Terminal 1.
15% 0.108
LYS Lyon Terminal 3. Refurbished from old terminal. Used by easyJet, Air Arabia 
(Maroc) and WOW Air, other LCCs use Terminal 1.
23% 0.093
MRS Marseille Mp2. Converted from cargo terminal. Used by LCCs except Norwegian 
and Vueling.
22% 0.092
BOD Bordeaux Billi. Purpose-built passenger building. Used by easyJet and Ryanair. 
Volotea, Vueling, Flybe and Norwegian use Terminal A.
31% 0.068
BRE Bremen Terminal E. Refurbished old warehouse. Ryanair is the exclusive 
operator.
45% 0.053
SOF Sofia Terminal 1. Old terminal. Used by LCCs and charters. 25% 0.040
BEG Belgrade Terminal 1. Old terminal. Used by LCCs, except Germanwings and 
Norwegian, and charters.
17% 0.029
TMP Tampere Terminal 2. Converted from cargo terminal. Used by Ryanair. Closed for
renovations in May 2014.
54% 0.013
* Above upper quartile for LCC EU rank (0.1405)
The low cost facilities at Amsterdam (AMS), Copenhagen (CPH) and Glasgow (GLA)
are piers within existing passenger buildings. There, passengers use common facilities for
all processes prior to boarding and after de-boarding (i.e. check-in, security and baggage
claim). At Sofia (SOF) and Belgrade (BEG), LCTs are separate areas (“concourses”) within a
single passenger building.
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In many cases (see  Table 10) LCCs are not the only users of an LCT, and in several
other  cases  there  are  LCCs  using  regular  passenger  buildings  even  when  an  LCT  is
available. Vueling and Germanwings are the LCCs that most consistently do not use LCTs
when available.
iii) Jet bridges
European LCCs often use both aircraft doors (for the most common planes in their
fleets) to speed up the process of (dis)embarking passengers, and thus the turnaround. In
such cases jet  bridges (jetways or boarding bridges) are dispensable.  Warsaw's Modlin
Airport  explicitly  states  that  “the  airport's  specific  orientation  at  low-cost  airlines  is
reflected in certain components of the infrastructure,  particularly the terminal  with no
designated  business  waiting  area,  no  luxury  commercial  or  food  court  areas  and  no
jetways” (Warsaw Modlin Airport, 2012).
Our database includes information on whether an airport has or has not jet bridges,
but most airports with jet bridges also offer bus gates or direct apron access. Then it is not
possible to know if LCCs use jet bridges when they are available. Nevertheless, 71 airports
in the sample do not have jet bridges at all (the remaining 100 airports offer at least one
contact stand with a jet bridge).
The airports without jet bridges are spread across Figure 20, particularly in terms of
'LCC share', yet 8 of them score above the upper quartiles for both measures of LCC relative
importance. London Luton (LTN) is the highest ranked in this group and is able to handle
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Figure 20: Jet bridges and the importance of LCCs at sampled airports.
over  9.6  million  annual  passengers  up/down  the  stairs  to/from  the  aircraft.  Brussels
Charleroi (CRL) has grown to more than 6.7 million passengers with the same procedures.
Bristol  (BRS)  was  among  the  first  and  few  European  airports  to  offer  covered
walkways  to  access  aircraft  by  foot  in  all  weather  conditions.  In  recent  years  these
structures have been replaced by bigger buildings,  rather piers,  that  extend across the
apron.  Currently,  Bristol is  developing a terminal expansion and refurbishment that,  as
designed, will  add several jet bridges along the “walkways” that connect the passenger
building to the aircraft stands.
Conversely,  34  airports  with  jet  bridges  stand  prominently  in  low-cost  traffic  at
European level (above upper quartile for 'LCC EU rank'). But only 10 airports, out of the
100 that provide air bridges, have significant LCC penetration (above upper quartile for
'LCC share').  Arguably,  jet  bridges could increase airport-related costs or hamper quick
aircraft turnaround for LCCs.
The possible impact of this solution on turnaround time, to the best of our knowledge,
has not been studied before.  On the one hand, passengers have to negotiate stairs and
board more slowly if they walk to the aircraft. On the other hand, the simultaneous use of
two doors diminishes the conflicts between passengers who are boarding and passengers
who are placing their luggage and themselves. Also, there is no waiting time whilst the jet
bridge  engages  with  the  plane.  In  fact,  Ryanair's  fleet  includes  several  aircraft  with
incorporated stairs at the front door (Figure 21), and this may clearly decrease the time to
start disembarking and perhaps the costs in ground equipment.
In what concerns the costs, some airports charge an additional fee for the use of jet
bridges. At Porto Airport, for instance, easyJet avoids jet bridges, even when using gates
that  feature  them.  Yet  this  might  be  subject  to  the  specific  arrangement  between  the
carriers and the airports. In Bergamo, for instance, Ryanair is able to use the bridges at the
88
Figure 21: Incorporated stairs in a Ryanair Boeing 737-800 at Frankfurt Hahn.
two gates where they are available at no extra cost, as bound by the existing long-term
agreement.
Nevertheless, jet bridges were the known cause of a dispute between Alicante Airport
(operated by AENA) and Ryanair in 2011-2012. After the construction of a new terminal,
with jet bridges at all contact stands, AENA mandated their obligatory use. The airline took
the airport to court and reduced their operations there. The judge rejected Ryanair claims
but advised the airport to review its policy. In any case, Ryanair uses jet bridges at AENA's
airports in Madrid and Barcelona without problems.
Judging by the high representation of airports with jet bridges among those with most
significant LCC traffic in Europe (34 airports ranked in the top 25%), these facilities should
not be a great concern for most LCCs operating in Europe. Yet from the point of view of the
airports  that  do not  have jet  bridges (or for new airports),  implementing them would
obviously increase their capital and operating expenditures.
iv) Runways
Most airports in the sample (111) have a single runway available and only 14 have
more than 2. Clearly the impact of airport size in this variable is much stronger than the
impact of any other variable related to low-cost traffic alone.
Usually, only the largest airports can afford several runways, and legacy airlines have
been  more attached to  these airports.  No  airport  with  3 or  more  runways  (14 in  the
sample) has an LCC penetration above the upper quartile for 'LCC share'. Moreover, at 11 of
these airports the market share of LCCs is below the lower quartile (25.4%), and only in
Barcelona (BCN) and Cologne-Bonn (CGN) it is above 50%.
v) Ground transport
The accessibility of an airport may clearly enhance its competitive position (Budd et
al., 2011). As the literature suggested that LCCs would thrive in secondary airports that are
often located further away from the cities they serve, ground transportation is expected to
increase airport visibility and accessibility. In our sample we have evaluated the existence
of different alternatives for surface access using public transportation:
1. Local bus: Public transportation provided by the local transit authority in the area
where the airport is located. Usually this involves short to medium distance trips in
high capacity buses with regular stops.
2. Coach: Medium to long distance buses usually provided by the airport or private
companies for express lines to link the airport with cities that are further apart.
This includes airport shuttles with regular schedules and routes, but not private
shuttles (like hotel shuttles) or shared taxis.
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3. Metro, tramway or light rail: Rapid or semi-rapid public transportation provided by
a transit authority using rail vehicles. More common in airports located close to
medium or large cities.
4. Heavy rail: Public transportation provided by rail companies. In this group we have
included both airports with a rail station at the airport itself and those that offer
short shuttle services or transfers (often for free or included in the rail ticket) to a
nearby train station (less than 15 minutes away).
5. High  speed  rail:  High  speed  trains  services  provided  at  a  station  located  in  or
within the airport.
Figure 22 shows how the first two alternatives (i.e. those based on road access by
bus)relate  to  the importance of  LCCs.  Most  airports  provide  either  local  bus  or coach
services, irrespective of their focus on low-cost services. Most airports without local buses
serve tourist destinations or are not located near cities. Only few airports do not provide
neither buses nor coaches: Zakinthos (ZTH), Kefalonia (EFL) and Mikonos (JMK) in Greece,
and Tirgu Mures (TGM) in Romania.
However, this level of aggregation can hide some specific characteristics for particular
airports. Paris Beauvais (BVA) seems to be a good example where the success of the airport
is especially linked to surface access. The airport is located in Tillé, 3.5 km northeast of
Beauvais and 85 km north of Paris, and is accessible only by road (the nearest train station
is  in  Beauvais).  Since  the  arrival  of  Ryanair  to  the  airport,  back  in  1997,  the  airport
operator started a shuttle service to Paris.
In 2005 (last year with detailed data available), this coach service was used by 57.3%
of the 1.8 million passengers that year. As it is included in the airport accounts, in 2005 the
shuttle  accounted  for  almost  13  million  Euro  of  revenues,  or  about  49%  of  the  total
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Figure 22: Bus-based surface transportation alternatives at sampled airports and LCC importance.
revenues. Much more than the 3.5 M€ that the airport received for passenger, landing and
handling fees the same year, 1.5 M€ of which reverted to Ryanair (Chambre Regionale des
Comptes de Picardie, 2007). The Beauvais – Paris coach is still operated as a monopoly by
the airport operator and its price in 2014 is 30% higher than in 2005.
Figure  23 shows  the  railway-based  alternatives  for  surface  access  offered  by  the
airports  in  the  sample.  The  results  are  quite  different  from  those  with  the  bus-based
alternatives,  since fewer airports  are  able  to secure investment  for rail  transportation.
Following  this  line,  de  Neufville  (2006) argued  that  planners  should  pay  attention  to
airport  access  based on “rubber-tired,  high occupancy vehicles”,  especially  for  airports
with a higher focus on low-cost airlines.
Only 15 airports in the sample had a rapid or semi-rapid frequent rail service (metro,
tram or light rail). None of them had 'LCC share' above the upper quartile, but 6 of them
had significant low-cost traffic at European level ('LCC EU rank' above upper quartile). 52
airports had a rail station at the airport premises (8 of which provided high speed rail
service) or were connected by short transfers to a nearby train station. Three of these
airports (London Stansted – STN, Berlin  Schönefeld – SXF and Pisa – PSA) were actually
above the upper quartile for both 'LCC share' and 'LCC EU rank'.
Other three airports with heavy rail  services are also above the upper quartile for
'LCC share',  although  they  are  not  as  significant  at  European  level:  Glasgow Prestwick
(PIK), London Southend (SEN) and Lublin (LUZ). Prestwick is actually the only airport in
Scotland  with  a  rail  station  and  that  is  certainly  a  factor  to  enhance  its  competitive
position. Traffic there, however, peaked in 2007 and has been in decline ever since. Lublin
is  a  new airport  in  Eastern  Poland with  a  surface  railway  station at  the  centre  of  its
passenger building. Since its opening in December 2012 it has secured a number of routes
from different airlines.
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Figure 23: Railway-based surface transportation alternatives at sampled airports and LCC importance.
For Southend, the newest11 of the major airports in the London MAS, the rail station
seems to be in the core of its strategy. In fact, the station was built and is operated by the
airport owner, being also one important source of revenue. The airport promotes surface
accessibility and connectivity as its major advantages, with a dedicated rail station that is
“100 paces from the terminal” and with “up to eight trains per hour into Central London”
(London Southend Airport, n.d.).
5.3.4 Airport congestion
Airport congestion is measured indirectly through delays and capacity utilisation but
it is difficult to find consistent, comparable and readily available data for all the airports in
the sample. However, European airports are subject to IATA guidelines regarding airport
slot coordination, which is a way of managing capacity in airports where it is constrained
or limited. By this reasoning, only airports that are congested to some degree should be
subject to coordination. We use IATA’s slot coordination level as a proxy for the level of
congestion at the airports under analysis. There are three levels of slot coordination (IATA,
2013):
1. Level  1  –  non-coordinated:  “airports  where  the  capacity  of  the  airport
infrastructure is generally adequate to meet the demands of airport users at all
times.”
2. Level 2 – facilitated: “airports where there is potential for congestion during some
periods (...) which can be resolved by voluntary cooperation between airlines.”
3. Level  3  -  fully  coordinated:  “airports  where  capacity  providers  have  failed  to
develop sufficient infrastructure, or where governments have imposed conditions
that make it impossible to meet demand.”
In the sample, there are 65 airports in level 1, 36 in level 2 and 70 in level 3 (see
Figure 24). A large majority of the 43 airports above the upper quartile for 'LCC EU rank'
are either fully coordinated (29 airports in level 3) or facilitated airports (10 airports in
level 2). Paris Beauvais (BVA), Brussels Charleroi (CRL), East Midlands (EMA) and Basel
(MLH) are the only non-coordinated airports  in this group.  This  finding appears to be
counter-intuitive as congestion – in particular slot coordination – would make it  more
difficult for LCCs to enter the busier airports and would hinder high aircraft utilisation.
Nevertheless,  slot coordination is a way to manage capacity to keep congestion at
tolerable  levels  and  avoid  delays  that  disrupt  the  regular  operations  of  the  airlines.
Coordinated airports have not necessarily assigned all available slots throughout the day;
11 It began major commercial operations in the modern era in spring 2012.
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in which case there would be room for new services from LCCs, particularly during non-
peak periods.
Slot coordination is only related to the air side capacity of an airport, usually viewed
as the capacity of the runway system in aircraft movements per unit of time (often one
hour). Actual capacity in seats per hour depends on the size of the aircraft used by the
airlines. LCCs tend to use a fleet of larger aircraft with dense configurations and high load
factors, and therefore some “busy” airports may be willing to embrace LCCs in order to
grow their passenger numbers without investing in additional facilities.
Moreover,  as LCCs gain slots in coordinated airports,  coordination schemes will  in
general prevent competition from potential new entrants. This might be particularly true
in  the  cases  where  LCCs  become  the  dominant  carrier  at  airports  that  are  effectively
constrained  in  the  air  side  (such  as  London  Gatwick  and  Rome  Ciampino).  The
convergence of airline business models (see Chapter 4) plays a major role in this aspect.
LCCs going upmarket tend to look for higher yield passengers at busier airports, whilst
legacy  subsidiaries  and  charter  descendants  use  the  same  airports  where  their
parent/predecessors already owned slots.
On the other hand, 26 of the 43 airports above the upper quartile for 'LCC share' are
non-coordinated.  However,  this  figure  includes  13  airports  with  less  than  1  million
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Figure 24: IATA slot control level, as a proxy for air side congestion, and the importance of LCCs at
sampled airports.
passengers  in  2013.  Therefore,  even  though  LCCs  have  ample  market  share  at  these
airports, the airports are too small to be significant in the European low-cost segment... at
least until now. But some of them are in the market to compete and grow, like Charleroi in
Belgium, or perish, like Forli in Italy.
5.3.5 Airport managerial strategies
LCCs in Europe have significantly contributed to an increase in airport competition
(see section  3.5).  It  might thus be expected that managers take this new situation into
account in defining strategies to promote their airports to airlines. We have analysed two
strategies  associated  to  airport  marketing:  airline  incentives,  and  the  presence  of  the
airports on route network promotion websites (The Route Shop – www.therouteshop.com,
in this case). In addition we have also investigated whether airports had a formal strategy
formulation that is documented in publicly available sources.
i) Airline incentives
Airline incentive schemes have gained popularity among airport operators as a means
to  increase  demand  and  extend  their  network  of  destinations  (Malina  et  al.,  2012).
Warnock-Smith  and  Potter  (2005) showed  that  “good  aeronautical  discounts”  was  an
important factor in the LCC's choice of airports, but this practice is now widely adopted
irrespective of the airport focus on low-cost traffic  (Allroggen et al., 2013). We found 74
airports  in  our  sample  that  openly  publicise  a  formal  scheme  of  incentives  or  special
discounts to airlines (e.g. for route development), and a further 31 that agree to provide
support or rebates (directly or through third parties) “on a case-by-case basis” or “at the
discretion of the airport management”.
There is no discernible pattern among the airports that implement incentive schemes
when  considering  the  relative  importance  of  LCCs  at  the  airport.  Perhaps  the  only
commonality is geographic, as Malina et al. (2012) pointed out: most Greek airports do not
provide incentives (only Athens International Airport,  the only public-private airport in
Greece,  offers an extensive incentive program),  as  well  as  a large proportion of  Italian
airports.
Spanish  airports  (which  Malina  et  al.  (2012)  also  found  not  to  provide  incentive
programs) now offer incentives as AENA decided to implement a new program by the end
of 2013. The British airports in the sample do not publish the specific conditions of their
programs, but they have “played a key role in the introduction of formal, specific (long-
term) contracts between the airport and downstream airline customers.” (Starkie, 2008)
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ii) The Route Shop
The Route Shop is an industry-specific website that allows airports to promote their
route network opportunities (i.e. the destinations that could be served by an airport and
are currently missing from their network) mainly for airline representatives to study. 96 of
the airports in the sample publish their route development opportunities on the website.
However,  there  is  no  clear  correlation  between  this  variable  and those  related  to  the
importance of LCCs at the airport.
iii) Strategy
We have analysed whether there is a formal, public, and documented definition of the
airport’s strategy, but found only 16 such cases in the sample (11 of these airports had
more than 15 million passengers in 2013). In none of these 16 airports 'LCC share' is above
the upper quartile (London Gatwick has the higher LCC penetration – 57.8%, followed by
Milan Malpensa – 43.8%). In most cases, their process of strategy formulation does not
appear to be particularly linked to LCCs.
In the case of Gatwick (LGW) “the Company’s strategy for the airport is to transform
the passenger experience and improve efficiency for the airlines and the airport  itself,
thereby improving its competitiveness in the London airport  market”  (Gatwick Airport
Limited,  2012).  For the airlines,  the focus of the airport strategy seems to be more on
efficiency than in costs alone. Thus “understanding the airlines' goals” is crucial to help
them grow at the airport, which is one of six strategic priorities for Gatwick. Commercial
partnerships, in the form of long-term agreements with the airlines, are also crucial for
this purpose, and the LCCs appear to be better prepared to engage in such contracts. In this
sense, airlines such as easyJet or Norwegian have an strategy that aligns with the strategic
focus of the airport.  On the other hand,  the airport  strategy also aims at attaining the
preference of the passengers independent of the carrier they choose.
5.3.6 Airport route network
Three variables describe the route network of the airports in the sample: whether the
airport offers scheduled long haul (e.g. intercontinental) destinations; the total number of
direct non-stop destinations available at the airport; and whether the largest carrier at the
airport is one of the identified LCCs.
i) Long haul
Long-haul services are scarcely offered at airports with significant LCC penetration.
Only 4, out of 43 airports that scored above the upper quartile for 'LCC share', offer at most
2 low frequency long-haul flights. This confirms the stronger focus of European LCCs on
short to medium-haul routes.
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ii) Non-stop destinations
The total number of destinations is mostly related to the airport size as, if the market
exists,  destinations  will  naturally  be  made  available  (bilateral  agreements  aside).  In
general terms, 37 airports from the sample offer 100 destinations or more. 16 of these
airports are main or secondary hubs for a 'legacy' carrier (usually located in the capital of
the country of registration). Only in 2 of these 37 airports LCCs have a market share above
the upper quartile of the distribution: London Stansted (STN), the largest base of Ryanair;
and Bristol (BRS), an important base for easyJet and Ryanair. Another 6 airports have an
'LCC share' above 50%: Barcelona (BCN), the main base of Vueling; Birmingham (BHX), the
main base of Flybe; Cologne-Bonn (CGN), the main base of Germanwings; Edinburgh (EDI);
London Gatwick (LGW), the main base of easyJet; and Istanbul Sabiha Gokcen (SAW), the
main base of Pegasus.
iii) Largest carriers
Rather obviously, all the airports with an 'LCC share' above the upper quartile have an
LCC as the largest carrier (see Figure 25). Perhaps more surprisingly, from the 43 airports
where 'LCC EU rank' is above the upper quartile, 12 are not dominated by LCCs. Oslo Trop
(TRF) is the airport where LCCs have the largest market share (66%) but where an LCC is
not the single largest carrier. There, Widerøe offers 28% of the seats and Norwegian 26%,
but if  we consider the load factors,  Norwegian would lead in terms of  passengers.  As
Widerøe  operates  only  smaller  turboprops,  it  offers  almost  three  times  as  much
departures as Norwegian.
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Figure 25: Sampled airports where an LCC is the largest carrier, and the importance of LCCs.
5.3.7 Airport financial conditions
Comparing airports in financial terms is not easy. We have looked at the proportion of
aeronautical and non-aeronautical revenues, and whether the airport was profitable (in
terms of net profit).  However,  in the sample we found data regarding non-aeronautical
revenues for only 99 airports, and for 101 airports regarding net profits. For many of those
airports, the figures concern the parent airport group companies, and not the individual
airports.  Moreover,  financial  data  is  not  available  for  the  same  year  in  all  cases,  the
definition of fiscal years may also differ and, it is obviously reported in the local currency
of the airport operator.  Therefore we consider these limitations do not allow for a fair
comparison among airports, neither for an analysis of the relationship of this variable with
the variables that measure the relative importance of LCCs.
i) Non-aero revenues
There  is  a  great  difference in  the way  airports  report  “other  income”,  i.e.  income
coming  from  various  activities  or  items  (telecommunications,  energy,  consultancy,
government grants,  security or even ground handling,  just to cite some examples) that
affects the balance of aviation and non-aviation related revenues.  In any case, from the
data available, non-aeronautical revenues averaged 37%, ranging from as little as 15% in
the case of Belgrade Airport (BEG) in 2012 to 71% for Kaunas Airport (KUN) in the same
year. 11 airports reported 50% or more of their income from non-aviation activities.
ii) Profitability
As explained, the available data is not comparable and in many cases cannot be traced
back to individual airports. Nevertheless, from the sample, 82 airports reported operating
profits (most data is for 2011 or 2012) and 77 reported net profits.
5.3.8 Airport operational conditions
In what concerns operational processes at the airports, we have focused on aircraft
turnaround as literature suggests that it is key for LCCs to have a quick performance on the
ground as a way to increase aircraft utilisation and revenues (see section 2.4).
i) Turnaround time
We  computed scheduled turnaround  times  using  historical  data  from  the  aircraft
tracking website Planefinder.net (Pinkfroot,  n.d.) to identify the rotations performed by
tracked aircraft  during September 2013. Given the scope of the sample,  we focused on
turnarounds performed by 14 European airlines. Seven Full-Service Carriers, among the
largest  in  Europe:  Air  Berlin,  Air  France,  British  Airways,  Lufthansa,  Iberia,  KLM  and
Turkish Airlines. And seven Low-Cost Carriers, also among the largest in Europe: easyJet,
Germanwings, Norwegian, Pegasus, Ryanair, Vueling and Wizz Air.
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As turnaround times depend on aircraft size and these airlines have different fleets,
and different  aircraft  types  in  the  case  of  FSC  fleets,  we  included only  the  rotations12
performed with aircraft from the Airbus A320 and Boeing 737 families. In total, we were
able to identify over 139,000 individual turnaround times performed by the 14 airlines
during the whole month (see Table 11 for sample size per airline). We used the results to
compare turnaround practices between airlines and turnaround performance at most of
the airports in the sample.
Table 11: Valid turnarounds identified for each airline (out of one month of operations with A320 and
B737 type aircraft).
Airline Type Computed turnarounds
Lufthansa FSC 15,959
Air France FSC 13,203
British Airways FSC 10,706
Turkish Airlines FSC 8,096
Air Berlin FSC 8,061
KLM FSC 5,610
Iberia FSC 2,573
easyJet LCC 24,044
Ryanair LCC 23,985
Norwegian LCC 8,899
Vueling LCC 7,225
Germanwings LCC 4,396
Pegasus LCC 3,294
Wizz Air LCC 3,294
Total turnarounds 139,345
Regarding the airlines, Figure 26 shows there is a clear difference in the turnaround
times scheduled by LCCs and FSCs. The weighted average turnaround time (i.e. the average
time considering sample size) for LCCs was of 37.4 minutes (standard deviation of 17.0
min). FSCs had a weighted average time of 58.0 min (standard deviation of 19.8 min). All
LCCs were on average faster than FSCs and the standard deviations were similar, around
20 min, for all the airlines, yet easyJet was more regular (standard deviation of 15 min).
Ryanair was on average the fastest airline on the ground, followed by easyJet. Turkish and
KLM were the slowest.
The mode in Figure 26 indicates the scheduled turnaround that appears more often in
the  set  of  data  for  every  airline  (theoretically  it  is  the  value  that  is  most  likely  to  be
sampled at random). This value may also represent how confident are airlines on their
own  efficiency  and  that  of  the  airports  they  use.  Clearly  there  are  more  nuances,  for
instance the need to align the schedules within a hub-and-spoke operation (especially for
12 A rotation is the sequence of flights (legs) scheduled in a given period of time (often, but not necessarily, a
day for short-haul operations) for a particular aeroplane across the airline's destinations. For instance: in a
day's rotation a given plane may depart its base at Paris Orly shortly before 7:00 am for a flight to Gran Canaria,
then perform the flight back to Paris to depart again from the base at Orly to Lisbon and back to finish the day
at Paris Orly around 11:00 pm. That plane will be parked at Orly for the night until the start of the next day's
rotation. Following an exploratory analysis during one week, we considered different rotations if the aircraft
stayed on the ground over 120 minutes.
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FSCs), but we consider this is a good proxy. FSCs' most common turnarounds were 45 and
50 minutes, whilst for LCCs they were 25, 30 and 35 minutes.
Figure 27 shows how turnaround times are distributed for the different carriers. All
LCCs were able to perform at least 60% of their turnarounds in less than 40 min, whilst
FSCs required one hour for the same level. Interestingly, Ryanair is the only airline that
schedules most turnarounds at the mode value (67.5% of turnarounds at 25 min). EasyJet
was the most regular with 74% of its turnarounds performed between 30 and 40 min. Air
France  and  Lufthansa  had  a  very  similar  performance  and,  in  general,  FSCs  tend  to
schedule fewer turnarounds at the mode value.
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Figure 26: Average turnaround times by airline for all the rotations analysed.
Figure 27: Cumulative Distribution Function of turnaround times by airline.
As  for  the  performance  at  individual  airports,  Figure  28 shows  the  average
turnaround times for all the airlines (out of the 14 selected for turnaround analysis) that
operate in each of 168 airports in the sample13.  Airports where LCCs have higher market
share  tend to  reflect  their  quicker  turnaround times  (Figure  28 left).  However,  as  the
relevance  of  the airport  for  low-cost  services  at  European level  increases,  the  average
turnaround time tends to increase (Figure 28 right).
This  seems counter-intuitive,  but  in fact  most  of  the airports  that  rank above the
upper quartile for 'LCC EU rank' have an LCC market penetration that is below the upper
quartile for 'LCC share' (see Figure 13), i.e. at many of those airports there are FSCs that
are  likely  to  perform  slower  aircraft  turnarounds.  Moreover,  the  behaviour  of  a  given
carrier may differ depending on the airport.
Figure 29 shows the average turnaround times per carrier at some selected airports.
FSCs (left part of the figure) clearly perform slower turnarounds than LCCs (right part of
the figure) at the same airports. But they also seem able to perform quicker turnarounds
when not in their main airports. KLM, for instance, is the slowest at Amsterdam (AMS) and
Iberia (IBE) is the slowest at Madrid (MAD), but they both perform much quicker in Venice
(VCE).
LCCs also show some variability at different airports, and somehow follow a similar
pattern. Vueling (VLG) is the slowest at its home in Barcelona (BCN), even slower than
some FSCs; likewise easyJet (EZY) turns slower in Gatwick (LGW) and Luton (LTN) than in
other  airports;  as  Ryanair  (RYR)  does  in  Stansted  (STN).  This  might  be  related  with
additional  operations  being  performed  at  the  bases,  but  we  could  not  gather  enough
information  to  study  this  situation  in  more  detail.  The  infrastructure  offered  at  each
airport might also play a role in such differences. Ryanair, for instance, turns quickly at
13 There  were  no  valid  rotations  for  the  airlines  analysed  in  the  airports  of  Grenoble  (GNB)  in  France,
Timisoara (TSR) in Romania, and Zakinthos (ZTH) in Greece.
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Figure 28: Average turnaround time for the 14 airlines analysed, in 168 of the 171 airports in the sample,
and the importance of LCCs at the airport.
Barcelona Reus (REU), Venice Treviso (TSF) and Warsaw Modlin (WMI), all of them single-
runway  airports  with  simple  facilities;  but  turns  much  slower  in  Madrid  (MAD)  and
Barcelona (BCN).
Yet, beyond infrastructure, the operational strategy of the carriers seems even more
important. EasyJet (EZY), for instance, performs very quick turnarounds (29 minutes on
average) at Amsterdam Schiphol (AMS), an airport with a rather complex runway system,
and quicker than Ryanair (RYR) in Barcelona (BCN) and Madrid (MAD), where Wizz Air
(WZZ) also turns quickly compared to all the other carriers.
In  fact,  there  are  some specific  aspects  that  require  further  study  and cannot  be
approached in a comprehensive way within the scope of this work and with the available
data. For instance, the way the turnaround differs for aircraft that are based at a given
airport,  and,  more  importantly,  whether  the  actual  turnaround  times  differ  from  the
scheduled ones.
5.4 Capabilities of European 'low-cost airports'
The analysis in the previous section shows it is quite difficult and possibly irrelevant
to define a set of precise characteristics to distinguish airports that are 'low-cost' from
those  that  are  not.  The  point  is  there  is  no  single  element  that  could  be  considered
essential or indispensable for an airport to guarantee (or to prevent) low-cost services, at
least in what concerns airport infrastructure.
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Figure 29: Average turnaround time by carrier at some airports. Left - FSCs: AFR: Air France, BAW: British
Airways, BER: Air Berlin, DLH: Lufthansa, IBE: Iberia, KLM: KLM, THY: Turkish Airlines. Right – LCCs: EZY:
easyJet, GWI: Germanwings, NAX: Norwegian, PGT: Pegasus, RYR: Ryanair, VLG: Vueling, WZZ: Wizz Air.
Over 20 years have passed since the inception of the low-cost model in Europe. At this
point, airlines and airports seem able to trade off some of the original elements of their
business models to pursue growth. Indeed, the attitude of airport managers towards LCCs
is crucial for the development of current trends. The way managers execute their intended
strategy or implement business models clearly determines the way they consider airline
partners. And it is precisely in the airport-airline interaction that trade-offs are made. In
fact, this could help understand the recent moves of Ryanair in Lisbon, Rome Fiumicino
and Brussels Zaventem, airports that the airline previously had avoided.
In general terms, even though LCCs clearly dominate at some airports, many other
airports  with  lower  LCC  penetration  generate  many  more  low-cost  passengers  to  the
European aviation market. Our approach, that focused not only on the relative importance
of LCCs at individual airports, but also on the relative importance of individual airports in
the European low-cost segment, highlights this finding. This shows that, as the segment
matures  and evolves,  LCCs impact  most  major and secondary airports  in Europe.  And,
given that the market is usually larger at major airports, this impact is, for scale reasons, as
important as the impact airlines had before on smaller airports.
This  said,  the  paradigm  for  airport  planning  and  design  can  be  challenged  at  all
airports.  To  set  a  new paradigm  it  is  crucial  to  consider  the  ascendency  of  LCCs,  the
differences among them, and the way they use airports. Even if it is not possible to strictly
differentiate  'low  cost'  from  other  airports,  it  is  worth  considering  particular
developments on those airports in which LCCs are somehow consolidated.
There are 28 airports in our sample at which LCCs have a market share over 72.7%, or
above  the  upper  quartile  for  'LCC  share'  (i.e.  they  handle  almost  exclusively  low-cost
traffic); 28 other airports that appear above the upper quartile for 'LCC EU rank' (i.e. they
handle a significant majority of the European low-cost traffic); and 15 additional airports
that  score  above  both  quartiles  (i.e.  they  are  dominated by  LCCs  and have  a  relevant
participation in the low-cost segment at European level). This last group could be regarded
as “the most low cost airports” in Europe (although they are not the top 15 airports for
LCC seats offered in Europe).
If  we  match  these  groups  of  airports  with  the  LCCs  that  use  them  (in  2013),
correspondingly  grouped as  described in  Table  6 ('originals',  charter  descendants  and
legacy subsidiaries), as in Figure 30, we find interesting trends:
1. airports in the top 25% for 'LCC share' are particularly attached to the 'originals'
LCC, especially Ryanair (FR) and Wizz Air (W6);
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2. 'legacy subsidiaries' LCC are particularly attached to the airports in the top 25%
for 'LCC EU rank' (which are also amongst the largest airports in the sample), as
well as 'charter descendants';
3. airports in the top 25% for both variables are more linked to the 'originals', but
mainly to the most originals of them – Ryanair (FR),  easyJet (U2) and Wizz Air
(W6);
4. easyJet (U2) and Norwegian (DY), known for their hybridisation, serve most of the
airports in the top 25% for 'LCC EU rank', whilst Ryanair (FR) is present in only
half of them, but it serves all airports in the top 25% for 'LCC share'.
Looking at  the recent  evolution of  these  airports,  as  in  Table  12,  reveals  another
interesting perspective. Total seats offered in the 15 “most low-cost” airports (those above
the upper quartile for both variables) increased 56% between 2004 and 2013, and the
number of seats offered by LCCs grew 73% over the same period, but LCCs were already
consolidated in  these airports  by  2004 and their  market  share  grew  only  8.8  percent
points (pp). For the airports in the top 25% by 'LCC EU rank' (not including the previous
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Figure 30: LCCs (top) serving the airports ranked above the upper quartile for 'LCC share' (bottom left),
'LCC EU rank' (bottom right) and for both variables (bottom centre), in 2013.
15) the overall growth of seats offered in the same period was 24%, but the growth of LCC
seats reached 229% and the market share of LCCs rose 22.1 pp. The airports in the top
25% by 'LCC share' (again not including the first 15) experienced an overall growth rate of
70%,  also  between  2004 and 2013,  but  contrary  to  the first  group,  LCCs  were  not  as
consolidated in 2004 and their market share grew 28.7 pp.
Table 12: Evolution of LCC capacity between 2004 and 2013 in the airports above the upper quartile for
'LCC share' and 'LCC EU rank'.
Airport group Average LCC 
Share 2004
Average LCC 
Share 2013
Average growth 
(all carriers)
Average growth 
(LCCs)
15 airports above upper quartile for 
'LCC share' and 'LCC EU rank'
81.0% 89.8% 56.2% 73.2%
28 airports above upper quartile for 
'LCC EU rank'
13.3% 35.4% 23.8% 228.9%
28 airports above upper quartile for 
'LCC share'
63.5% 92.2% 70.1% 147.0%
These trends suggest some general dynamics for each group of airports, although all
airports in every group may not match the general trend14:
1. those airports in the top 25% for both variables (i.e.  the “most low cost” ones)
were  able  to  attract  LCC  growth  early  on.  Or  in  other  words,  they  were  the
'originals' (on the airport side) that shared the risk to explore the segment and
were generally rewarded with long-lasting relationships with the initial LCCs;
2. those airports in the top 25% for 'LCC EU rank' were 'legacy' airports in which, at
first, 'legacy' carriers reacted to market developments in the low-cost segment and
established the bases for their LCC subsidiaries; and then the airports themselves
reacted as  well  (also  enticed by  competition from  the airports  in  the  previous
group) by more actively attracting other LCCs, initially those with a more hybrid
proposition;
3. those airports in the top 25% for 'LCC share' are mostly smaller regional airports
that,  encouraged  by  the  first  group,  saw  an  opportunity  to  pursue  growth  by
actively catering for LCCs, particularly those most attached to the original low-cost
model.
5.4.1 Desirable attributes for a (low cost) airport
All things considered, there are three aspects that appear to be especially interesting
for airports to embrace low-cost services: to provide (or allow) quick aircraft turnaround
times; to charge low (aeronautical) fees; and to provide access to low fares for passengers.
Yet, in practical terms, these aspects are useful to any type of airline.
14 The next chapter explores and expands these dynamics in more detail with specific data for a selection of
case studies.
104
Quick aircraft turnaround helps airlines increase aircraft utilisation. Nonetheless, the
performance of the turnaround process depends on several actors with different priorities:
more importantly, the airline itself, but also the air traffic control (in all phases: en-route,
approach, tower, ground), ground agents, airport operations and even the passengers. The
role  of  the  airport,  as  the  stage  where  these  actors  meet,  is  to  encourage  a  smooth
coordination between them. Moreover, additional effort should be made to:
1. minimise aircraft waiting time by optimising resources and processes (particularly
those related to the runway system) in order to avoid hold patterns, reduce taxiing,
and guarantee gate and runway availability;
2. allow an efficient (dis)embarking process by – whenever possible and desired by
the airline allowing on-foot (dis)embarking or using transporters or jet bridges to
optimise hold queues; 
3. provide an efficient handling process when the airport is also the handler;
4. provide incentives for quick turnarounds by offering time-based discounts (lower
fees if the aircraft turns in less than 30 minutes, for instance) or extra fees (if the
turnaround takes longer than 30 minutes, for instance).
Low (aeronautical) fees ultimately help airlines keep a low cost structure. Reductions
in published airport fees is not the only way to tackle this issue. It is also possible to:
1. provide performance–based discounts through route development incentives and
discount schemes for traffic stimulation on existing routes;
2. establish common objectives and understanding regarding charges, services and
infrastructure development on specific airport-airline long-term agreements;
3. offer differentiated pricing (time- or facilities-based) and simplified fees/charges
structure.
Finally,  airports should not focus exclusively on the needs of the airlines.  It is also
important to provide access to low fares so that passengers can be attracted. In fact, many
airports already do this by exploring alternatives in order to:
1. increase the number of destinations reachable directly (non-stop) from the airport;
2. provide adequate connections with ground transportation (e.g.,  coach-air travel)
and cheap parking; 
3. enlarge the business scope of the airport,  i.e.  put back the “frills” with services
targeted at passengers;
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4. use  social  media,  and  on-line  and  off-line  marketing,  to  provide  potential
passengers with the adequate information.
5.5 Summary
The airports that LCCs use in Europe have such diverse characteristics that some of
the elements traditionally considered in the literature to identify 'low cost airports' may
not be essential for actual low-cost operations. This chapter argued that it is not practical
neither useful to sharply distinguish between two types of airports ("low cost" and "not
low cost"). Such classification is less relevant if we take into account the changing attitude
of airport management towards LCCs and the existence of flexibility to adapt to changing
requirements  and  keep  up  with  the  evolution  of  airline  business  models.  These  two
aspects are even more important in the cases where infrastructure is already built,  for
instance when LCCs move to the bigger airports.
LCCs  evolve  and  they  do  not  behave  as  they  did  when  they  were  start-ups,  and
therefore  it  may  not  be  reasonable  to  state  that  LCCs  need  only a  particular  kind  of
infrastructure. Alternatively, airports and airlines may agree on some trade-offs to explore
market  opportunities.  In  this  sense,  we  have  proposed  (in  general  terms)  three
interventions that might be desirable for airports targeting at LCCs but that are, in fact,
applicable  to  any  airport:  to  provide  (or  allow)  quick  aircraft  turnaround  times;  to
ultimately  charge  low  (aeronautical)  fees;  and  to  provide  access  to  low  fares  for
passengers. We have also described various ways to contribute for the implementation of
these ideas.
The  study  presented  in  this  chapter  was  based  on  a  transversal  analysis  for  the
situation  of  airports  and LCCs  in  2013.  A  more  dynamic  (i.e.  longitudinal)  analysis  is
crucial to better understand how airports and airlines adapt to market developments. The
next chapter presents a quantitative research on the evolution of the low-cost segment in a
set of European airports, along with a conceptual model to generalise the findings.
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6 Dynamic evolution of airports
The previous chapter provides a snapshot of the current state of European airports in
terms of  the low-cost segment.  But  a dynamic analysis  is  necessary to understand the
impact  of  LCCs  on  airports,  in  strategic  terms.  Therefore  this  chapter  presents  a
longitudinal analysis designed to identify relevant trends in the evolution of some airports,
and an attempt to generalise the results.
The analysis is primarily based on airline capacity (available seats) data,  from the
Innovata database (IATA, n.d.) aggregated for the years 2004, 2008, 2012 and 2013. In the
case of Spanish airports we have also used the data provided by AENA Aeropuertos, the
airport operator, in terms of passengers per airline for every year between 2005 to 2013
(AENA, 2014). In the case of British airports, we complemented capacity information with
passenger traffic data, aggregated at the airport level (i.e. not by carrier) between 1998
and 2013 (CAA, 2014).
6.1 Case studies
The measures of relative importance of LCCs that guided the analysis in the previous
chapter ('LCC share'  and 'LCC EU rank')  provide a starting point  for the selection of a
second sample of airports to be used in further case studies.  Table 13 shows the top 20
airports in Europe in terms of LCC seats in 2013 (i.e. those that rank the highest for 'LCC
EU rank'). In 5 of these airports the market share of LCCs is above the upper quartile of the
sample distribution ('LCC share' above 72.7%). In addition, most of these airports (16 out
of 20) belong to a Multi-Airport System (MAS) in which there is one or more airports with
a significant proportion of LCC services.
Considering  all  the  airports  in  these  Multi-Airport  Systems,  and  the  4  additional
airports that (as Table 13 shows) do not belong to a MAS, we selected a second sample that
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contains 42 airports (see Table 14). The fact that most of these airports belong to a MAS is
quite  useful  for  the  analysis  with  airports  where  LCCs  have  had  different  levels  of
consolidation during the time frame considered in the study.
Table 13: Top 20 airports in the sample by 'LCC EU rank' in 2013.
Rank Airport LCC Seats Non-LCC 
seats
LCC EU 
rank
LCC 
share
MAS Airports in the MAS with LCC share 
above the upper quartile (72.7%)
1 BCN 13,815,371 8,113,052 1.00 63% YES GRO, REU
2 LGW 11,944,131 8,726,448 0.86 58% YES STN, LTN, SEN
3 STN 10,528,169 360,262 0.76 97% YES STN, LTN, SEN
4 SAW 7,938,035 3,287,782 0.57 71% YES
5 OSL 6,318,552 9,645,007 0.46 40% YES RYG
6 MAN 5,635,331 7,160,270 0.41 44% YES LPL, LBA
7 LTN 5,470,035 322,546 0.40 94% YES STN, LTN, SEN
8 BGY 5,237,927 139,048 0.38 97% YES
9 DUB 5,082,701 7,808,861 0.37 39% NO
10 AGP 4,972,711 2,445,424 0.36 67% NO
11 AMS 4,935,170 25,583,377 0.36 16% YES EIN
12 MXP 4,882,400 6,261,598 0.35 44% YES BGY
13 PMI 4,823,954 7,588,499 0.35 39% NO
14 MAD 4,550,378 21,335,025 0.33 18% NO
15 ORY 4,267,430 13,840,985 0.31 24% YES BVA, XCR
16 ALC 4,265,473 1,391,481 0.31 75% YES* MJV
17 CPH 3,960,907 11,904,071 0.29 25% YES
18 EDI 3,889,613 2,434,101 0.28 62% YES PIK
19 FCO 3,841,415 19,241,519 0.28 17% YES CIA
20 CRL 3,832,317 395,658 0.28 91% YES
* Regional MAS
Table 14: Airports selected for detailed dynamic analysis.
IATA 
Code
Airport MAS IATA 
Code
Airport MAS
ALC Alicante (Elche) Alicante SEN Southend London
MJV Murcia San Javier Alicante STN Stansted London
AMS Schiphol Amsterdam LBA Leeds Bradford Manchester
EIN Eindhoven Amsterdam LPL Liverpool Manchester
RTM Rotterdam Amsterdam MAN Manchester (Ringway) Manchester
BCN El Prat Barcelona BGY Bergamo Milan
GRO Gerona Barcelona LIN Linate Milan
REU Reus Barcelona MXP Malpensa Milan
BRU Brussels Zaventem Brussels OSL Oslo (Gardermoen) Oslo
CRL Charleroi Brussels RYG Rygge Oslo
CPH Copenhagen (Kastrup) Copenhagen TRF Torp (Sandefjord) Oslo
MMX Malmo Copenhagen BVA Beauvais Paris
EDI Edinburgh Glasgow CDG Charles de Gaulle Paris
GLA Glasgow Intl Glasgow ORY Orly Paris
PIK Prestwick Glasgow XCR Vatry Paris
IST Ataturk Istanbul CIA Ciampino Rome
SAW Sabiha Gokcen Istanbul FCO Fiumicino Rome
LCY London City London AGP Malaga (Costa del Sol) -
LGW Gatwick London DUB Dublin -
LHR Heathrow London MAD Madrid Barajas -
LTN Luton London PMI Palma de Mallorca -
The  following  sections  describe  the  evolution  of  traffic  at  these  airports  with  a
particular focus on the low-cost segment. Moreover, for every case, we have also analysed
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major  developments  related  to  infrastructure  expansion and,  to  the extent  allowed by
publicly available information, we have studied airline decisions or events that impacted
the airports  (such as bankruptcies,  mergers,  change of  strategy focus,  start-ups,  bases,
etc.). Also, the airports have been grouped by MAS, in order to allow an easy analysis of the
impacts that events in one airport may have on the other airports of the MAS.
6.1.1 Alicante MAS
Alicante is located in the Costa Blanca along the Spanish Mediterranean coast, making
it a popular destination for tourists in Europe. The MAS is formed by Alicante Elche (ALC)
and Murcia San Javier (MJV) airports. ALC is 9 km southwest of Alicante and it is the main
airport  serving  the city.  MJV  is  a  military  base  that  also  serves  civilian  traffic,  27  km
southeast of the city of Murcia and 85 km southwest of ALC, and conveniently located next
to the Costa Calida (the coast in the region of Murcia, next to Alicante). As a matter of fact
there is a third brand new airport that could belong to the MAS, the Region de Murcia
International Airport (RMU), but it has not been used at all since construction ended in
2012 (this is obviously an interesting issue to analyse).
Air  traffic  in  the  region  is  highly  linked to  tourism,  and both  airports  have  been
developed as a result of the increase in the number of tourists. ALC has been the main
airport for Alicante since 1967. MJV opened to civilian traffic around the same time, yet it
was  only  in  the  1990's  that  its  traffic  became  significant,  after  a  passenger  building
opened.  In recent  times,  traffic  at  these airports  has  been significantly  affected by the
economic recession in Spain, as Figure 31 shows.
At ALC, LCCs have gradually replaced charters as the main airlines, but total traffic has
not grown dramatically. EasyJet was, for some time, the main carrier at the airport (see
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Figure 31: Traffic evolution at Alicante MAS. Left: Alicante Airport. Right: Murcia San Javier Airport.
Source: AENA.
Figure 32) after acquiring Go (an LCC spin-off of British Airways) in 2002 and taking over
its  operations,  including the routes  at  ALC,  since  2003.  Yet  the  growth  of  LCCs  at  the
airport  became  more  expressive  when  Ryanair  started  flying  there  in  2007  and  after
having opened a base there in November that year. Although total traffic fell in 2009 due to
the  economic  downturn,  Ryanair  continued  to  grow  until  a  dispute  with  the  airport
operator over the use of jet bridges in 2011-2012 (Illescas, 2012).
According to media reports, the airline threatened to reduce its operations drastically
because it considered the use of jet bridges expensive, unnecessary and inefficient. Indeed,
the airline had over one million passengers less in 2012 than in 2011. Yet at other Spanish
airports also operated by AENA Ryanair uses jet bridges regularly without disruptions. In
the end,  traffic recovered overall  in  2013,  including over 300,000 more passengers for
Ryanair.
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Figure 33: Evolution of airport market share for Ryanair (left) and Jet2.com (right) traffic in Alicante
MAS. Source: AENA.
Figure 32: Traffic evolution of the main carriers at Alicante MAS. Source: AENA.
The dispute arose in 2011 when the airport operator opened a brand new passenger
building with an associated apron and with a taxiway expansion. The New Terminal Area,
in  which  all  15  contact  positions  have  boarding  bridges,  made  old  terminals  1  and 2
redundant. All airlines use the new terminal as it alone provides capacity for 20 million
passengers per year,  the double of the traffic in 2011.  Iberia,  the major 'legacy' airline
during most of the airport's life, completely abandoned the airport by 2013, transferring
some  of  its  flights  to  Iberia  Express  in  2012  and  2013,  but  these  services  were  also
withdrawn afterwards.
At MJV traffic is even more dependant on LCCs. Ryanair, Jet2.com and easyJet were the
main carriers along the period of analysis (see Figure 32). Traffic was growing until 2007
when Ryanair decided to concentrate its growth in ALC, which it did not serve previously
(see Figure 33 left). Traffic for the other airlines remained more or less stable but Jet2.com
also decided to grow more at ALC after the new passenger building opened (see Figure 33
right). The passenger building at MJV was also expanded in 2004 and again in 2006 to
accommodate traffic growth. In addition, a new runway devoted exclusively to military
operations opened in 2011.
6.1.2 Amsterdam MAS
Amsterdam MAS is composed by Amsterdam Schiphol (AMS), Eindhoven (EIN) and
Rotterdam  (RTM)  airports.  Being  the  fourth  largest  airport  in  Europe  in  terms  of
passengers (51.5 million in 2013), AMS is by far the biggest airport in the MAS and also the
main airport serving the city and the country (see Figure 34 and Figure 35 left). Moreover,
about 40% of the traffic at AMS is transfer passengers and the airport caters especially to
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Figure 34: Total and LCC capacity evolution at Amsterdam MAS and Amsterdam Schiphol (AMS). Source:
Innovata.
this group of travellers (ANNA.aero, 2011b; Schiphol Group, 2013). For this reason KLM is
also by far the largest carrier in the MAS, even if it currently operates only at AMS.
AMS also concentrates most of the LCC traffic in the MAS. In total, the market share of
LCCs in the MAS grew from 7% to 23% between 2004 and 2013, whilst at AMS it grew only
from 7% to 16% during the same period. Thus the share of other airports in this segment
has increased considerably during the last decade (see  Figure 35 right). The strength of
AMS in this segment is largely due to the operations of Transavia Holland (the LCC spin-off
of KLM) and easyJet. However (as Table 6 shows) Transavia is considered an LCC only from
2005 onwards as before it was dedicated to charter services only.
In November 2005 AMS opened a new area in its passenger building, named pier H
(for non-Schengen flights) or pier M (for intra-Schengen flights), developed particularly for
LCCs. EasyJet remains the main user of pier H/M and also the largest LCC at AMS and the
second largest in the MAS, as Figure 36 shows. Transavia, which does not use the 'low-cost'
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Figure 35: Airport market share of total (left) and low-cost (right) traffic at Amsterdam MAS. Source:
Innovata.
Figure 36: Capacity evolution for the major LCCs at Amsterdam MAS. Source: Innovata.
pier, was mainly focused on charter traffic at AMS and RTM but it has grown at EIN since it
has become a LCC (see Figure 36 and Figure 37).
RTM has not had any significant development in terms of infrastructure. Transavia
has been for long the major operator at the airport. Moreover, a business service to London
(both to Heathrow and London City) is  the second largest contributor to traffic at  the
airport,  this  service  being  operated  by  KLM,  Air  France  and  now  British  Airways.
Expansion opportunities at RTM are limited, however.
EIN, on the contrary, has been redeveloped with a stronger focus on LCCs. In 2003 a
new passenger building with capacity for 1.5 million passengers per year opened. Ryanair
started  operating  at  EIN  in  April  2002  and  has  been  responsible  for  a  considerable
proportion of  the airport  growth.  The airline  established a  base at  EIN in  April  2013.
Transavia also grew significantly during the same period and it is now the second largest
carrier at the airport. To face such growth, EIN opened a terminal expansion in June 2013
with an upgraded capacity of 5 million passengers per year.
The  Schiphol  Group  holds  majority  interests  in  all  of  the  three  airports  in  the
Amsterdam  MAS,  along  with  a  fourth  airport  (Lelystad)  that  currently  serves  general
aviation only. The strategy of the company clearly aims at maintaining the hub focus at
AMS in close cooperation with KLM and other members of the Sky Team alliance, whilst
developing  the  other  airports  for  regional,  point-to-point  and  leisure  traffic  (Schiphol
Group, 2013). Yet, as AMS still  has around 60% of origin/destination traffic, LCCs have
been keen to remain at the airport and accounted for over 16% of the capacity in 2013.
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Figure 37: Evolution of airport market share for Transavia at Amsterdam MAS. Source: Innovata.
6.1.3 Barcelona MAS
Barcelona MAS includes Barcelona El Prat (BCN), the main airport located 12 km of
the city centre; Girona (GRO), located 100 km away from Barcelona but right in the Costa
Brava  coast  and  near  the  Pyrenees;  and  Reus  (REU),  a  former  military  base  95  km
southeast of Barcelona and in the Costa Dorada coast. AENA controls the three airports.
Traffic in the entire MAS peaked in 2007 with almost 39 million passengers but was
reduced drastically until 2009. In 2007 Barcelona (BCN) – Madrid (MAD) was the busiest
route in the world with 971 flights per week in both directions (OAG, 2007). But as the AVE
high speed rail line between the two cities opened in February 2008, the air shuttle was
gradually adjusted to the new situation. On top of this, the economic performance of Spain
also contributed to a reduction in traffic at that time. Overall, BCN was the most affected, as
traffic in GRO and REU continued to grow until 2009 (see Figure 38). In September 2010
Ryanair opened a base at BCN and the picture changed altogether.
Ryanair first entered the Spanish market with services to Girona (GRO) in December
2002. The airport was upgraded to a base for the carrier in February 2004 and the LCC has
been responsible for almost the entire traffic ever since (see Figure 39). Likewise, Ryanair
started flying to REU in the early 2000's. They opened a base there in October 2008, and
after this the airline delivered over 60% of the airport passengers. When Ryanair started
operations in BCN with a base in September 2010, traffic at REU and GRO decreased and
eventually the base at REU was abandoned in 2011 and the base at GRO was downsized
the same year.  In 2012, the LCC became the second largest operator at BCN with 12%
market share. Despite the shifts, Ryanair traffic in the MAS always grew between 2005 and
2012 but in 2013 the airline transported almost 1 million passengers less in BCN alone,
compared to the previous year.
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Figure 38: Evolution of total and LCC traffic at Barcelona MAS. Source: AENA.
The growth (and decline) of the secondary airports in the Barcelona MAS is highly
intertwined with the developments of Ryanair. At GRO, however,  the infrastructure was
already in place before Ryanair arrived and no major expansions happened during the
period of analysis. At REU the airport operator upgraded terminal facilities three times. A
new arrivals building opened in 2005, a new check-in building that connected the arrivals
and departures  terminals  opened in  2008,  and a  new boarding  area  opened in  2010.
Likewise, the apron was expanded in 2009 to offer more aircraft stands. There were plans
for an entire new terminal but they did not seem to go ahead. Both REU and GRO have
strong seasonal demand patterns. At REU, Ryanair is the only airline currently operating all
year round services. At GRO, Ryanair is joined by Wizz Air in this sense.
At the main airport of Barcelona (El Prat), apart from Ryanair, the history of LCCs is
particularly linked to the success of Vueling. It started as an independent LCC in 2004 but
it expanded significantly after merging with Clickair (an LCC sponsored and partly owned
by Iberia) in July 2009. In that year Vueling became the largest carrier at BCN and then the
airline almost tripled its traffic from 4.95 million passengers in 2009 to 12.17 million in
2013 (see  Figure 40). After the merger with Clickair, Iberia took a stake in Vueling and
then,  in  April  2013,  International  Airlines  Group  (the  holding  of  British  Airways  and
Iberia) took over Vueling entirely.
The recent rise of LCCs at BCN is also related to the fall of the major 'legacy' carriers at
the airport, as Figure 40 shows. Iberia practically abandoned the airport after transferring
most of its Barcelona network to the short-lived LCC spin-off Clickair in October 2006.
Iberia then focused on its hub development at Madrid and remained only with the shuttle
“air bridge” to Barcelona. Air Nostrum, operating regional flights on behalf of Iberia, also
reduced drastically the number of passengers. Spanair, the flag carrier of Catalonia, went
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Figure 39: Traffic and market share of Ryanair at each airport of the Barcelona MAS. Source: AENA.
bankrupt and ceased operations in January 2012, leaving ample room for LCCs to take on
its passengers. Air Europa also reduced its services to focus growth at Madrid.
These developments helped strengthen the position of BCN in the MAS both in total
traffic and in the low-cost segment, as Figure 41 shows. Besides the decision of the airlines
(in particular the relocation of Ryanair across the three airports and the rapid expansion of
Vueling),  there  is  another  break  point  in  the path for Barcelona  El  Prat  becoming the
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Figure 40: Total passenger traffic at Barcelona El Prat Airport (BCN) by carrier. Source: AENA.
Figure 41: Airport market share of total (left) and low-cost (right) traffic at Barcelona MAS. Source:
Innovata.
largest airport  in Europe in terms of LCC capacity in 2013. In June 2009 a brand new
“Terminal 1” opened at the airport.
BCN had been considerably expanded for the Olympics in the city in 1992. A second
wave of significant capacity expansions started in 1999 with the implementation of the so-
called “Plan Barcelona” by AENA, the airport operator. In 2003 terminals A and B were
expanded to improve boarding, baggage claim and retail areas. In September 2004 a new
runway opened, the third for the airport. In 2007 it was the turn for a new building to
connect  terminals  A  and  B  and  improve  check-in  area,  followed  by  an  expansion  of
terminal C in 2008.
Then, in 2009 the new 1.2 billion Euro Terminal 1 offered 540,000 m2 more to the
passenger building and 600,000 m2 in new aprons. This building alone has a capacity for
30  million  passengers  per  year,  increasing  total  capacity  to  55  millions.  The  former
terminals  A,  B,  C  were  re-branded  “Terminal  2”  and  remained  practically  empty
immediately after the new terminal opening. This created an opportunity for LCCs to use
the spare capacity.
In fact, apart from Vueling (the main user of the new Terminal 1), all other LCCs use
terminals 2B and 2C (the latter is only used by easyJet). Terminal 2A has been closed in the
meantime. Moreover,  the dismal of Spanair further increased the growth of LCCs at the
airport.  The new Terminal  1  also  provided an opportunity  for  Vueling to grow with a
differentiated product that is more up-scale than that of other LCCs, whilst indicating that
the airline is less willing to use 'low-cost' facilities (Airport Business, 2014).
6.1.4 Brussels MAS
Brussels  MAS  includes  Brussels  Zaventem (BRU),  the  main airport  located  11  km
northeast  of  the  Belgian  capital,  and  Brussels  South  Charleroi  (CRL)  46  km  south  of
Brussels. Brussels MAS is a good example of the expansion of the LCC model in continental
Europe, in particular as a platform for the growth of Ryanair.
Figure 42 shows that total traffic in the MAS grew continuously between 2004 and
2013.  From 2008,  however,  all  the growth is  only due to Charleroi.  The main Brussels
airport first suffered the bankruptcy of the Belgian flag carrier, Sabena, in 2001. By then
BRU hosted Virgin Express, an LCC founded by the Virgin group in 1996. In 2006 Virgin
Express merged with SN Brussels, the replacement of Sabena, to form the current Brussels
Airlines and reduced the market share of LCCs at BRU. At the same time, BRU experienced
strong competition from CRL, almost exclusively devoted to LCCs.
Charleroi became one of the first four Ryanair destinations in continental Europe in
1997. The airport also became a model for the emergence of secondary airports in Europe
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to  explore  the  boom  of  LCCs.  It  is  popular  with  scholars  and  practitioners,  and  often
appears  on the  media  for  the long-standing disputes  about  the subsidies  that  Ryanair
received from the Walloon government for its establishment Charleroi.
Ryanair used Charleroi as its first base in continental Europe in April 2001 following
an agreement with the Walloon government that granted special discounts and financial
support to the company (Barbot, 2006). Traffic grew from 200 000 passengers in 1997 to
2 millions in 2004 when Wizz Air started serving the airport as well. As a consequence, the
airport operator built a new terminal and apron that entered into service in January 2008
with a theoretical  capacity of 5 million passengers per year and an investment of  125
million Euros. CRL kept growing and in 2013 it handled 6.8 million passengers.
Over  this  time,  Charleroi  has  grown to  take one quarter  of  the total  market,  and
almost 80% of the low-cost segment, in the Brussels MAS as Figure 43 shows. To compete
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Figure 42: Evolution of available capacity at Brussels MAS. Source: Innovata.
Figure 43: Airport market share of total (left) and low-cost (right) capacity at Brussels MAS. Source:
Innovata.
for LCCs, Brussels Zaventem (BRU) had announced the development of a “low-cost pier” by
the  end  of  2007  but  it  abandoned  this  plan  in  March  2011  (Airport  Business,  2008;
Brussels Airport, 2011). In the meantime, Ryanair became the second largest airline in the
MAS behind Brussels Airlines, as Figure 44 shows. This picture may change even more in
the short-term as Ryanair and Vueling entered BRU in 2014.
Moreover, the strong position that CRL has gained in the low-cost segments might be
challenged as well. In fact, the airport has been targeting other carriers and the dominance
of Ryanair has decreased from 95% of seats provided in 2004 to 84% in 2013,  whilst
Jetairfly, a charter airline, reached 9% in 2013.
6.1.5 Copenhagen MAS
Copenhagen MAS is formed by Copenhagen Airport Kastrup (CPH) 8 km south of the
city centre, and Malmo Airport (MMX) across the Oresund strait in Sweden, 28 km east of
Malmo and 55 km away from Copenhagen. As Figure 45 shows CPH clearly dominates total
and low-cost traffic in the MAS. MMX serves as a regional airport for Sweden with regular
flights to Stockholm and, to a lesser degree, as an alternative to Copenhagen.
Wizz Air has served MMX continuously, and by 2013 it was the third largest carrier
(after SAS and Malmo Aviation) with 17% of the seats offered. Ryanair, has never operated
in CPH, having suspended all services to MMX between autumn 2007 and summer 2011,
and currently operates only seasonal flights. LCC traffic at CPH is mostly represented by
Norwegian and easyJet and their growth was rather moderate in the airport after 2008, in
spite of service reductions from SAS and the bankruptcy of Cimber (Air/Sterling) in 2012
(see Figure 46).
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Figure 44: Evolution of available capacity of major carriers at Brussels MAS (SN Brussels is included as
“Brussels at BRU” in 2004). Source: Innovata.
The market share of LCCs at CPH grew rapidly in the last few years from 6.5% in 2004
to  25%  in  2013.  Most  of  the  growth  is  due  to  the  establishment  of  a  major  base  of
Norwegian after the bankruptcy of Sterling Airlines in 2008. The same year the airport
operator announced the creation of a dedicated “low-cost terminal” – CPH Go, a low-cost
pier in one of the passenger buildings opened in October 2010. Although Norwegian does
not use the facilities, easyJet took the opportunity to grow and become the third largest
carrier at CPH, with over 800,000 seats offered in 2013.
6.1.6 Glasgow MAS
Glasgow MAS includes three airports in Scotland: Glasgow International (GLA), the
main airport  for the city of Glasgow; Edinburgh Airport (EDI),  the main airport  of  the
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Figure 45: Evolution of available capacity at Copenhagen MAS. Source: Innovata.
Figure 46: Evolution of available capacity for the major carriers at Copenhagen MAS. Source: Innovata.
Scottish capital and 62 km east of Glasgow; and Glasgow Prestwick (PIK), a mixed military
and civil  airport  used for cargo,  aircraft  maintenance and pilot training and passenger
services 51 km west of Glasgow. As  Figure 47 shows, GLA used to be the largest of the
three airports in terms of total passengers, but EDI overtook it in 2007. Traffic at PIK was
booming in the 2000's but decreased drastically since 2009.
From the 1960's  to the 1980's,  due to regulation,  Prestwick was  the transatlantic
gateway to Scotland. Following BAA's privatisation by the end of the 1980's the role of the
three airports in the Glasgow area was rearranged. Transatlantic flights were transferred
to Glasgow International, Prestwick was sold to private investors, and Edinburgh, which
was mainly a military airport then, was redeveloped. GLA then became the main gateway
to Scotland, EDI increased the direct  destinations and PIK became a secondary airport
mostly for low-cost services. In this arrangement, as Figure 48 shows, EDI attracted most
of the low-cost traffic in the MAS whilst  PIK – despite having only LCCs for passenger
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Figure 47: Traffic evolution at Glasgow MAS. Source: UK CAA.
Figure 48: Market share of the airports at the Glasgow MAS in the low-cost segment. Source: Innovata.
services – could not retain more than a quarter of the LCC traffic and its share has been
declining.
Once PIK had been sold by BAA, the new investors opened a railway station in 1994
and saw Ryanair starting services as it expanded its Ireland-UK market. With the growth in
passenger numbers,  the terminal  was refurbished in April  2005.  Passengers peaked in
2008 at 2.4 millions and then declined to 1 million in 2012 and recovered to 1.1 millions in
2013.  In November 2013,  the airport  was bought by the Scottish government from its
private owners, who were at the moment considering to close it. Ryanair remains the only
passenger airline at PIK and, despite the fall in traffic, it uses it as a major maintenance
base.
In recent years, traffic increase at EDI made it the largest airport in the MAS, and its
infrastructure has been expanding accordingly. A new “South East Pier” opened 6 boarding
gates  in  2006.  The  main  passenger  building  was  also  extended with a  new departure
lounge in 2010. Another major renewal and expansion started in 2013, including an access
by tram that opened in May 2014. In the meantime, BAA was forced to sell the airport in
June 2012. It was acquired by GIP, the owners of both London Gatwick and London City.
GLA also implemented significant upgrades during the period of analysis. First, a new
facility  dubbed  “Terminal  2”  opened  in  2004.  This  is  a  departures-only  building  that
provides check-in and baggage handling. Then a major expansion of terminal 1, including a
centralised security screening area, opened in December 2008.
The way the major carriers in the MAS assign traffic also impacted the position of the
airports. From Figure 49, we can see that British Airways was the largest airline by 2004
both at EDI and GLA, and also in the MAS.  EasyJet had a strong presence in the same
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Figure 49: Available capacity of major carriers at Glasgow MAS. Source: Innovata.
airports  and Ryanair  was  mainly  operating at  PIK,  but  it  also  operated at  EDI.  British
Airways  lost  market  share,  mainly  to  Ryanair  and  Flybe.  The  four  airlines  are  more
concentrated at EDI, as of 2013, this meaning Ryanair transferred a large proportion of its
traffic from PIK. EasyJet is now the largest operator in the MAS and at each of the two
airports it serves (EDI and GLA). Flybe capacity is almost equally distributed between EDI
and GLA.
6.1.7 Istanbul MAS
Istanbul MAS is composed by the main Istanbul Ataturk Airport (IST) in the European
side of the city,  24 km west of the centre,  and by Sabiha Gokcen International  Airport
(SAW) in  the Asian part,  35 km southeast  of  the city centre.  As  Figure 50 shows,  the
evolution of both airports is closely related to the development of the two largest airlines
in Turkey: Turkish, the flag carrier, and Pegasus, the major LCC.
At IST, a new international terminal with capacity for 20 million annual passengers
opened in 2000. TAV, the company that built the international terminal, won a concession
to operate the entire airport and take responsibility for its long-term development in June
2005. Since then, an expansion of the international terminal in December 2010 increased
total  capacity  to  45.5  million  passengers  per  year.  The  growth  of  the  airport  has
accommodated the growth of Turkish Airlines, that increased its market share (in terms of
seats) at IST from 72.7% in 2004 to 75.6% in 2013 and more than tripled its capacity in
the same period.
SAW opened as a greenfield development in 2001 with the aim of relieving congestion
at IST. Two terminals provided annual capacity for 3.5 million passengers, yet the airport
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Figure 50: Evolution of available capacity of major carriers at Istanbul MAS. Source: Innovata.
was almost empty until Pegasus shifted its business model towards an LCC proposition
and adopted SAW as its main base in 2005. A tender in 2007 granted ISG (Istanbul Sabiha
Gökçen International Airport Investment Development and Operation Inc.) the rights to
operate and expand the airport for 20 years from May 2008. In October 2009 the new
private  operator  opened  a  new  terminal  (and  associated  apron  and  land-side
infrastructure) with a capacity of 25 million annual passengers.
The growth of Pegasus at SAW, from a little over 1 million seats provided in 2008 to
7.6 million seats in 2013, also enticed the growth of other LCCs that could not find room at
IST15. As Figure 51 shows, SAW has taken 26% of market share in the MAS and it handled
96% of  LCC traffic  in  2013.  The market  share of  LCCs  at  SAW was 78% in 2012 and
decreased to 71% in 2013 when Turkish Airlines based aircraft there to serve part of the
traffic that does not need to connect at its hub in IST.
Despite the strong consolidation of LCC services at SAW16 the airport's CEO considers
they “are not a low-cost airport but a full service airport embracing a full range of airlines
and  passenger  profiles  with  [their]  services(...).  Airport  charges  are  similar,  though
possibly a little cheaper than at Atatürk”  (ANNA.aero, 2013b). Having this in mind, it is
possible  that  slot  availability  at  SAW  was  more  important  for  LCCs  than  other
considerations related to specific  infrastructure or airport  fees.  In fact,  this  may be an
important issue as Istanbul gets ready to build a third airport (expected to be finished
before the end of the decade) that may free capacity at the existing airports.
15 Market share of LCCs at IST has not been above 1.1% in the period of analysis (2004 – 2013) and almost all
of it comes from Pegasus as well.
16 Sabiha Gokcen was, from the sample analysed in chapter 5, the fourth largest “European” airport in terms of
total LCC seats in 2013.
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Figure 51: Airport market share of total (left) and low-cost (right) traffic at Istanbul MAS. Source:
Innovata.
6.1.8 London MAS
The London metropolitan area is served by six major airports forming the largest
MAS in the world, in terms of passengers. Traffic in the MAS peaked in 2007 with 139.9
million  passengers,  shrinking  to  127.2  millions  in  2010,  and  growing  again  to  139.7
millions in 2013. As Figure 52 shows, the largest airport is Heathrow (LHR), handling 52%
of the total traffic in the MAS in 2013 more than the double of the second largest airport –
Gatwick (LGW). The other significant airports in the MAS are London City (LCY), Stansted
(STN), Luton (LTN) and Southend (SEN).
Heathrow,  as  many  other  major  airports,  is  in  an  almost  permanent  state  of
construction. The major expansions that happened at LHR during the period of analysis
included:  the opening of  the eastern extension at  Terminal  1  in  2005;  a  new pier  for
Terminal 3 to handle the Airbus A380 in 2006; and the brand new £4.2 billion Terminal 5
in March 2008. Also, a new Terminal 2, on the site of the original Terminal 2, opened in
June 2014. In the meantime, plans for a third runway and a new terminal were approved in
2009 but cancelled in 2010.
LHR is  the  main hub for  British Airways,  that  clearly  dominates  the airport  with
almost  seven  times more  traffic  than  the second largest  carrier  –  Virgin  Atlantic  (see
Figure 53). LHR is also a stronghold for 'legacy' FSCs, and LCCs have little expression at the
airport  with  less  than 2% of  the  total  seats  in  2013,  as  Figure 54 shows.  In  absolute
numbers that is equivalent to 473,000 seats, an all-time high but less than total LCC seats
at  Southend  (SEN)  in  the  same  year.  The  only  LCCs  currently  operating  at  LHR  are
Germanwings (part of Lufthansa, the third largest carrier at the airport) and Vueling (part
of IAG, which also controls British Airways and Iberia).
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Figure 52: Evolution of airport market share at London MAS. Source: UK CAA.
Gatwick  (LGW),  on  the  contrary,  has  seen  a  substantive  growth  in  the  low-cost
segment and by 2013 it had 41% of the total LCC traffic in the MAS, up from only 18% in
2004 (see Figure 54). LGW became not only the biggest airport in terms of LCC capacity in
the London MAS in 2013, but also the second biggest in Europe after Barcelona El Prat (see
Chapter 5). The consolidation of LCCs at LGW is more consistent after BAA PLC was forced
to sell the airport for the sake of competition and it was acquired by GIP in December
2009. Such consolidation is largely due to easyJet, which became the largest carrier at LGW
in 2008, as Figure 55 shows.
EasyJet began its history at Luton (LTN) but it expanded considerably to other London
airports with a series of acquisitions of rival airlines.  Although easyJet started flying to
LGW in December 1999 and opened a base there in 2002, taking over GB Airways in early
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Figure 54: Airport market share of low-cost traffic in the London MAS. Source: Innovata.
Figure 53: Evolution of available capacity for the major carriers at London Heathrow. Source: Innovata.
2008 gave the carrier more slots and a solid position at the airport that has been expanded
ever since, to become the largest base in the airline's network. The major development
regarding airport infrastructure for the period of analysis was the new “Pier 6” (including
the famous air bridge over a taxiway) in 2005.  The airport  also implemented different
renovations and expansions of both terminals North and South.
In 2010,  following the change in ownership,  Gatwick started implementing a new
strategy summarised in their ambition “to compete to grow and become London's airport
of choice”  (Gatwick Airport Limited, 2013, 2012). Two of the strategic priorities set by
Gatwick  relate  to  enhance  passenger  experience  and  to  increase  efficiency  in  air-side
operations, along with commercial agreements, to help airlines grow. In line with these
concerns, the airport has implemented six sigma techniques to improve processes leading
to efficient and on-time operations. Operational efficiency is considered to be crucial for
LCCs using the airport,  yet  the Gatwick strategy also  aims at  attracting new long-haul
traffic. As for the passengers, the airport aims at offering the same high level of service to
all of them, regardless of the airline they use.
Such changes in the management perspective have allowed easyJet and other LCCs,
particularly  Norwegian,  to  effectively  grow  at  LGW  and  counteract  the  effect  of  the
reduction in capacity of British airways,  as  Figure 55 highlights.  In fact,  the growth of
easyJet at LGW has significantly reduced the proportion of the airline's services at other
airports in the MAS, especially Stansted (see Figure 56). Moreover, in 2013 easyJet reached
an agreement with Flybe to acquire all of their slots in Gatwick from 2014. Flybe, in turn,
moved to London City (LCY), also owned by GIP, the same owners of Gatwick. This would
start LCC services at LCY that hosted no LCCs before.
127
Figure 55: Evolution of available capacity for the major carriers at London Gatwick. Source: Innovata.
After acquiring Go from British Airways in 2002 easyJet also gained a base at Stansted
(STN). The airport, however, has been much more crucial for the development of Ryanair,
by far the largest operator at STN over its recent history (see Figure 57). During the second
half of the previous century,  STN was largely used by charter carriers.  The airport was
redeveloped in the 1980's as an alternative to congestion at LHR and LGW.
The renovated STN opened in 1991 featuring a signature architect (Norman Foster)
design, with a railway station and satellite terminals connected with an automated people
mover.  Despite  these characteristics,  usually  not  associated  to  'low cost  airports',  STN
quickly  became  the  preferred  airport  for  LCCs.  As  Figure  54 shows,  STN  had  60%  of
London's  LCC traffic  in 2004,  down to 36% in 2013 due to the developments at  LGW
described above. STN provides ample capacity, estimated at 35 million passengers per year
(ANNA.aero,  2013c).  An  expansion  and  renovation  of  the  arrivals  area  in  the  main
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Figure 56: Distribution of easyJet capacity at London MAS airports. Source: Innovata.
Figure 57: Evolution of available capacity for the major carriers at London Stansted. Source: Innovata.
passenger  building  opened  in  December  2008.  In  March  2009,  the  Competition
Commission ruled that BAA should sell both LGW and STN. STN was sold only in February
2013 when Manchester Airports Group (MAG) took control of the airport.
Ryanair  started  using  STN  in  1991  when  the  new  facilities  were  in  place.  It
transferred its main London base from Luton and created the largest base for the airline
when choosing STN for its European expansion from 1997 onwards. After 2008, Ryanair's
traffic declined significantly at STN (see  Figure 57) due to a dispute with the previous
owner, BAA, over airport charges. In September 2013 the airline signed an agreement with
the new owners, MAG, to grow steadily in the next ten years. EasyJet traffic also declined at
STN with the growth at LGW (yet MAG also signed an agreement with the airline in 2013).
Luton (LTN), as STN, has been traditionally devoted to the low-cost segment in the
London MAS, as Table 15 shows. Luton history for commercial aviation is also linked to the
rise of charter airlines in the second half of the 20th Century. Then, in 1986, Ryanair started
services from Ireland but, as mentioned before, moved to STN in 1991. LTN returned to
growth by hosting the birth of easyJet in late 1995, this coinciding with a major renewal of
airport  infrastructure  between  1992  and  1996.  In  1998  the  Luton  Borough  Council
granted a  concession for  a  private  consortium  for  airport  operation,  management  and
development, for 30 years.
In 1999 LTN opened a new passenger building and a railway station located 1.8 km
from the terminal. In 2005, the passenger building was expanded and renovated. As Figure
58 shows, easyJet shifted its growth strategy to LGW and declined traffic at LTN, yet it still
is  the largest  operator at  the airport  where  its  headquarters  are  located.  Ryanair  also
rationalised capacity after 2008 but did not grow in other London airports. Wizz Air, on
the contrary, has made of Luton one of its most important airports although it is not a
formal base. In fact it became the second largest airline at LTN.
Table 15: Evolution of market share of LCCs at London MAS. Source: Innovata.
Airport 2004 2008 2012 2013
London City (LCY) 6.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Gatwick (LGW) 24.7% 38.0% 55.3% 57.8%
Heathrow (LHR) 0.2% 0.3% 0.9% 1.0%
Luton (LTN) 96.0% 94.4% 94.7% 94.4%
Southend (SEN) 0.0% 100.0% 85.3% 92.3%
Stansted (STN) 91.6% 90.2% 96.0% 96.7%
MAS 24.2% 29.3% 32.4% 33.0%
Southend (SEN) is the newest addition to the London MAS. Stobart Group acquired
the  airport  in  2008  and  redeveloped  its  infrastructure  to  provide  regular  commercial
service. First, a new control tower and a railway station adjacent to the passenger building
(still under construction by then) opened in 2011. A runway extension and a new terminal
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opened in March 2012, on time for the opening of an easyJet base in April that year. Aer
Lingus also started operations in May 2012 but its flights (operated by Stobart  Air,  an
airline partially owned by the airport owners) are to be franchised for Flybe from 2014.
According  to  the  owners,  SEN  was  redeveloped  with  cost-effectiveness  in  mind.
Moreover,  their  position in  the competitive  London  MAS  is  strongly  based on a  quick
access to/from London through the dedicated railway station (see section 5.3.3 item v), on
simple and fast facilities for passengers, and on short taxiing times and slot availability for
airlines  (London Southend Airport, n.d.). Following this strategy, the passenger building
was further expanded and the second phase opened in April 2014.
6.1.9 Manchester MAS
The MAS at Manchester includes the main Manchester (Ringway) Airport (MAN) and
the airports of the nearby cities of Liverpool (LPL) and Leeds (LBA). Manchester Airport is
the largest in the UK outside the London area, and thus more than the double of the size of
LPL and LBA in terms of passengers. LPL is the main airport for the city of Liverpool but it
is located 53 km east of Manchester centre. LBA serves both Leeds and Bradford and it is
located about 70 km northeast of Manchester.
Figure 59 shows that traffic at MAN peaked in 2006 with 22.4 million passengers that
year, fell to 17.7 millions in 2010, almost the same level of 1999, and then grew again to
20.7 millions in 2013. On the other hand, LPL overcame LBA as the second largest airport
in the MAS in 2000 and peaked in 2007 with 5.5 million passengers. In the last two years
traffic  fell  to  4.2  millions  as  MAN  recovered.  LBA  has  had  a  less  dramatic  but  more
consistent growth and more than doubled its passengers from 1.4 millions in 1998 to 3.3
in 2013.
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Figure 58: Evolution of available capacity for the major carriers at London Luton. Source: Innovata.
Low-cost traffic in the Manchester MAS has been always in the rise between 2004 and
2013, influenced by the growth at the secondary airports and by the efforts of MAN to
attract LCCs. As Figure 60 shows, the share of MAN in low-cost traffic has grown to 55% in
2013, mostly at the expense of LPL.
At  MAN the  largest  'legacy'  carriers  downsized  their  operations  during  the  same
period. British Airways cut almost 1.9 million seats and bmi shrunk until bankruptcy in
October 2012, whilst LCCs like Ryanair, easyJet, Flybe, Monarch and Jet2.com significantly
increased their offer (see Figure 61). As in other airports, the acquisition of GB Airways by
easyJet gave the airline slots and existing operations at MAN. Ryanair also opened a base at
the airport in 2011, this making it the largest carrier in the airport.
In the meantime, MAN was implementing expansion programs that saw a new runway
open in February 2001, a public transport interchange (mainly a railway station) in 2004,
and improvements across the three terminals in July 2009. Manchester Airports Group
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Figure 59: Traffic evolution at Manchester MAS. Source: UK CAA.
Figure 60: Airport market share of low-cost traffic in the Manchester MAS. Source: Innovata.
runs MAN but, despite its name, it does not operate the other airports in the MAS (the
group owns East Midlands, Bournemouth and London Stansted).
Liverpool (LPL) is, like London Luton, part of the early history of easyJet. It became
the airline's second base in the UK in late 1997. LPL was privatised early in the 1990's and
in 1997 was acquired by an infrastructure investor, Peel Group. To cater for the growth in
passengers a new terminal opened in 2002. Then, in November 2004, Ryanair announced
the opening of a base at LPL to join easyJet. Since then, the two airlines compete head to
head to be the largest carrier at the airport, as Figure 62 shows. However, Ryanair decided
to grow more at MAN after opening a base there in 2011.
Leeds Bradford Airport (LBA) also follows the development of an LCC. Jet2.com, a
spin-off of a former freight and charter carrier (Channel Express), was launched at LBA in
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Figure 62: Evolution of available capacity for the major carriers at Liverpool Airport. Source: Innovata.
Figure 61: Evolution of available capacity for the major carriers at Manchester Airport. Source: Innovata.
February 2003. The airline has been the largest at LBA ever since (see  Figure 63). The
airport was then privatised in 2007 but no major infrastructure developments have been
implemented. In 2010 Ryanair opened a base at LBA that attained half the size of its bases
in the other two airports in the MAS.
It should finally be noted that, as Figure 64 shows, the diversification of Ryanair into
the three airports in the Manchester MAS made it the largest airline in the MAS. Likewise,
the expansion of easyJet at MAN, whilst keeping its base in LPL increased its position in the
metropolitan  area,  as  Jet2.com  at  MAN  and LBA.  Clearly,  the  reduction  in  capacity  by
British Airways has facilitated the consolidation of the low-cost segment in the region.
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Figure 64: Evolution of available capacity for the major carriers at Manchester MAS. Source: Innovata.
Figure 63: Evolution of available capacity for the major carriers at Leeds Bradford Airport. Source:
Innovata.
6.1.10  Milan MAS
The Milan metropolitan area,  the most populous in Italy,  is  served by three major
airports: Malpensa (MXP), Linate (LIN) and Bergamo (BGY). Linate was the main airport
for the city of Milan before the opening of Malpensa, currently the major airport, 40 km
northwest from the city centre. Bergamo is located in Orio al Serio, 45 km east of Milan.
SEA Milano owns and operates MXP and LIN and holds 31% of the shares in BGY operator
SACBO.
As Figure 65 shows, BGY has grown consistently over the previous decade, sustaining
the traffic level in the MAS, as traffic at MXP has actually declined and at LIN it has been
more or less stable. Indeed, BGY has achieved a total market share of 24% and handles
most of the low-cost traffic in the MAS, although MXP has been growing considerably in the
segment, as Figure 66 illustrates.
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Figure 65: Evolution of available capacity at Milan MAS. Source: Innovata.
Figure 66: Airport market share of total (left) and low-cost (right) traffic at Milan MAS. Source: Innovata.
LIN,  the  airport  that  is  closer  to  Milan  centre,  was  due  to  reduce  its  services
significantly17 after a complete renovation of MXP in 1998. Nevertheless, this downscaling
was never performed and LIN continues in operation, mostly for short-haul domestic and
intra-European routes. Alitalia continues as the largest operator at the airport and, despite
easyJet's long-standing services at LIN, the market share of LCCs has been consistently
below 10% for the last decade.
MXP, on the other hand, was entirely renovated as part of the “Malpensa 2000” plan to
develop  a  major  hub  in  the  region.  The  first  phase  of  the  planned  renovations  was
concluded  in  October  1998,  when  the  new  Terminal  1  entered  into  service.  Shortly
afterwards  Alitalia  established its  main hub at  the airport  but  it  moved back to Rome
Fiumicino in 2008 (this explaining the strong fall in Alitalia's traffic, as shown in  Figure
67). In 2006 the airport operator reorganised the scope of the terminals and devoted the
old Terminal 2 for low-cost flights.
EasyJet was using MXP since September 2005 and, after the reorganisation, it opened
a base there in March 2006. It is the only user of Terminal 2 at MXP and the airport is
currently the second biggest base for the airline, in terms of available seats, after London
Gatwick and followed closely by Geneva. It is by far the largest airline at the airport, trying
to fill the void left by Alitalia (see Figure 67 and Figure 68).
In 2009 Lufthansa created an Italian subsidiary (Lufthansa Italy) that used MXP as a
hub, but the separated airline was terminated in October 2011 and operations transferred
back to the parent company. Still, by 2013 Lufthansa was the second largest operator at
17 The original intention was to close it for all traffic except a shuttle service to Rome.
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Figure 67: Evolution of available capacity for major carriers at Milan MAS. Source: Innovata.
MXP following the downsizing of Air One (see Figure 67). The airport has been catering for
other airlines to establish long-haul operations. In January 2013 it opened a new satellite
for Terminal 1.
The success at Bergamo, that went from the sixteenth largest Italian airport in terms
of passengers in 2002 to the fourth in 2013, is closely related to the ascendency of Ryanair
in the European, and particularly in the Italian market. The airline started flying to BGY in
early 2002 and opened a base in February 2003. Traffic at the airport grew continuously
ever  since and it  became,  by  2013,  the third  biggest  base for  Ryanair,  behind London
Stansted and Dublin, and the biggest in continental Europe, ahead of Brussels Charleroi
and Rome Ciampino. Such growth also allowed Ryanair to become the largest carrier in the
Milan MAS despite an equally strong growth of easyJet (Figure 69).
To cope with this fast growth SACBO, the operator at BGY, implemented an extension
of the parking lots and an improvement of aviation equipment in 2005; a refurbishment
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Figure 68: Distribution of capacity for Alitalia and easyJet between Malpensa (MXP) and Linate (LIN)
airports. Source: Innovata.
Figure 69: Market share of Alitalia, easyJet and Ryanair at Milan MAS (all airports). Source: Innovata.
for the check-in area and the baggage handling system in 2007; an extension and renewal
of departures area in 2009; and a terminal expansion with increased boarding gates and
commercial  space  air-side  in  March  2010.  The  latter  is  part  of  a  200  million  Euro
investment plan that, besides terminal expansion and renovation (including retail areas
and two VIP lounges),  includes  apron  expansion,  runway  renovation and new parking
spaces.
The airport management considers Bergamo does not, currently, match a traditional
“low-cost  style”,  although  it  definitively  caters  especially  for  LCCs.  It  has a  good,  long-
lasting, even “friendly” relation with Ryanair (that accounts for around 85% of the seats
provided  at  BGY)  and  recently  renewed  a  long-term  agreement  with  the  airline  to
cooperate  until  2022.  Nevertheless,  the  airport  is  also  interested  in  attracting  other
carriers,  particularly  from  extra-European  markets,  and  has  been  offering  new
destinations with seasonal charter services.
An important advantage for BGY, and one they consider gives them bargaining power
to negotiate with airlines, is the strong catchment area. The airport is located in a region
with  a  large  population  and  with  a  significant  concentration  of  wealth,  but  also  a
considerable  number  of  companies  that  generate  about  22% of  Italy's  GDP  (Mentasti,
2013) and important migrant flows. With this characteristics the area is a traffic generator
that enhances the position of the airlines, Ryanair in particular, to negotiate incentives at
other airports served from BGY.
BGY also explores cargo activities as a way to improve revenues.  It  leases a cargo
terminal to DHL, which does its own handling and operates most flights during the night.
This setting brings cargo revenues at reduced marginal costs for the airport operator and
little disruption to the day operations of passenger carriers (some charters also operate
during the night).
The recent investments at BGY aim at improving passenger experience and level of
service. The current and planned expansions to the passenger building take the airport
another  step  away  from  the  traditional  notion  of  'low  cost  airports'  by  introducing
premium services  like  fast-track security  and VIP lounges  (paid for  by  the passengers
directly to the airport), extensive retail areas in the second floor of the terminal and a more
modern look. The airport operator argues that understanding and accomplishing the real
requirements of LCCs in terms of punctuality, efficiency, and operational policies is more
important to achieve a successful relationship with the airlines.
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6.1.11  Oslo MAS
Oslo  MAS  includes:  Oslo  Airport  Gardermoen  (OSL),  the  main  airport  for  the
Norwegian capital, 35 km northeast of the city; MossRygge (RYG), an air force base 60 km
south of Oslo; and Sandefjord Torp (TRF), a regional airport 118 km southwest of Oslo.
OSL opened in October 1998 and the old Oslo Airport Fornebu, located within the city,
closed  immediately  and  was  dismantled.  The  location  of  the  new  main  airport  was
inconvenient for the regions to the south and west of the city, creating opportunities for
new airports to emerge. TRF, that had new facilities in place in the 1990's, was the first to
attract regional airlines and LCCs. RYG is a rather new development, at least for civilian
use, having opened for commercial traffic in October 2007.
Traffic in the MAS grew steadily during the last decade fuelled by the growth in low-
cost traffic, as Figure 70 shows. OSL is by far the largest airport in the MAS for both total
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Figure 70: Evolution of available capacity at Oslo MAS. Source: Innovata.
Figure 71: Airport market share of total (left) and low-cost (right) traffic at Oslo MAS. Source: Innovata.
and  LCC  traffic,  yet  RYG  has  taken  a  visible  market  share,  especially  in  the  low-cost
segment (Figure 71). The strength of OSL for low-cost traffic is greatly influenced by the
development of Norwegian, for which the airport is the largest base.
OSL is currently expanding the main terminal of the airport. It opened “Pier South” in
2012, intended as a temporary extension to keep capacity during construction works. For
the first part of the 2000's both Norwegian and SAS grew dramatically at OSL. In the last
five years, however, Norwegian almost reached the size of SAS as SAS shrank its operations
after 2008 (see  Figure 72).  Indeed, including the operations of Norwegian at the three
airports, the two airlines deploy the same capacity in the MAS, as Figure 73 shows. During
the same period, Ryanair grew and became the third largest operator in the MAS, without
using the main airport (see Figure 73).
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Figure 72: Evolution of available capacity for major carriers at Oslo MAS. Source: Innovata.
Figure 73: Market share of the largest carriers at Oslo MAS (all airports). Source: Innovata.
Ryanair first flew to Oslo in November 1997 using TRF, before the opening of OSL. At
RYG, the civilian sector of the airport, fostered by private investors, opened by the end of
2007  and  in  February  2008  Norwegian  established  a  base  there.  But  after  Ryanair
transferred part of the traffic at TRF to a new base in RYG in March 2010, Norwegian did
the opposite and terminated most of its services at RYG by the end of 2012, opening more
services at TRF (see Figure 72). Wideroe remains a regular user at TRF where a terminal
expansion is due to open in 2014.
6.1.12  Paris MAS
The Pairs metropolitan area forms the second largest aviation market in Europe after
London. The Paris MAS includes four commercial airports: Charles de Gaulle (CDG), the
main hub for Air France and the second busiest European airport in terms of passengers,
located 25 km northeast of Paris; Orly (ORY), located 13 km south of central Paris, that was
the main airport for the city before CDG; Beauvais-Tillé (BVA), an airport devoted to LCCs
85 km north of Paris; and Vatry (XCR), a new development, 147 km away of Paris.
Figure 74 shows that total traffic (available seats) in the MAS has declined since 2008
but LCC traffic has grown continuously over the past decade. As  Figure 75 (left) shows,
CDG  is  the  largest  airport  in  the  MAS  and  its  market  share  decreased  only  2%,  this
decrease being compensated by the growth at BVA. Despite being a major 'legacy' airport,
CDG also takes a sizeable share in low-cost traffic, which is dominated by ORY (see Figure
75 right).  Conversely,  XCR,  redeveloped  to  focus  on  cargo  in  2000  and  with  a  new
passenger  building  to  cater  for  LCCs  opened  in  2004,  has  not  been  able  to  secure
significant traffic in either segment.
CDG has been in constant expansion during the period of analysis. The airport opened
in  1974  with  a  single  Terminal  1  featuring  a  particular  circular  design  connected
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Figure 74: Evolution of available capacity at Paris MAS. Source: Innovata.
underground to seven triangular satellite buildings. Terminal 2 is in fact composed by 9
different buildings, and has been built and expanded by phases. Terminal 2E opened in
2003 but part of its boarding dock collapsed and reopened only in 2008. An automated
people mover that connects the different terminals (except 2G), train stations and parking
lots – CDGVAL – opened in 2007. By the end of the same year the first satellite of terminal
2E (called Satellite 3 or Hall L) opened. Then terminal 2G, dedicated to regional flights in
small aircraft opened in 2008. The oldest Terminal 1 was renovated in 2009. Finally,  a
connecting building between terminals 2A and 2C opened in March 2012 and the second
satellite terminal for Terminal 2E (Satellite 4 or Hall M) opened in June 2012.
Such gradual deployment of capacity, along with the four parallel runways available,
make enough room for different airlines. Terminal 3 is frequently referred as 'low-cost'
mainly due to its simple facilities (especially compared to the other buildings). Terminal 3
is used mainly by charters and some LCCs (see Table 10), is not used by easyJet, the second
largest carrier at CDG far behind Air France (see Figure 76). Although CDG was the sixth
largest base for easyJet in 2013, the airline also uses ORY where it is the second largest
carrier behind Air France too.
ORY, operated by Aéroports de Paris as CDG, was the main airport for Paris before
CDG. Infrastructure development has been more limited during the period of analysis. A
renovated Hall  2 in Terminal  Ouest (West) opened in April  2006 whilst  renovations in
Terminal Sud (South) opened between 2007 and 2008. Access via tramway (line T7 that
connects  with  metro  line  7  in  South Paris)  opened in  November 2013.  ORY  has  been
focusing  more  on short  and medium-haul  non-hub traffic.  Thus  a  series  of  LCCs  have
expanded at the airport.  Besides easyJet,  this is also the case of Vueling and Transavia
France (the low-cost subsidiary of Air France).
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Figure 75: Airport market share of total (left) and low-cost (right) traffic at Paris MAS. Source: Innovata.
Beauvais (BVA), originally used by the military until the 1950's, was redeveloped as a
civilian regional airport. A passenger building, current Terminal 1, opened in 1979. Yet it
was  more  recently  that  the  airport  became  significant  in  terms  of  passenger  traffic.
Beauvais, along with Charleroi and Stockholm Skavsta and Oslo Torp, was among the first
airports  in continental  Europe to take advantage of  the expansion of Ryanair.  The LCC
started services from Dublin in May 1997 and low-cost traffic has grown consistently ever
since.  A  new  sparse  passenger  building,  Terminal  2,  opened  in  December  2010  to
accommodate this growth.
Although Ryanair clearly dominates the airport (it offered 92% of the seats in 2004
and  88%  in  2013),  BVA  managed to  attract  other  airlines,  particularly  Wizz  Air  (that
accounted for 11% of the seats in 2013). Despite handling over 3.9 million passengers in
2013, BVA is not a formal base for any airline hence there are no aircraft overnight at the
airport. This keeps the costs for the airport operator low as it is able to close after the last
departures at 23:30 and reopen only for the first arrivals and departures at 06:30.
6.1.13  Rome MAS
The  MAS  of  Rome  includes  the  main  Rome  Fiumicino  airport  (FCO),  the  busiest
airport in Italy, located 35 km southwest of the city centre, and Rome Ciampino (CIA), the
former main airport of the city 12 km southeast of central Rome. FCO opened in the 1960's
because  there  was  no  space  available  to  expand  CIA,  that  remained  open  mostly  for
charters and general aviation.
Fiumicino (FCO) is  clearly  the largest  airport  in the MAS,  as  shown in  Figure 77.
Although the capacity offered by the airlines has receded after 2008, passenger numbers
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Figure 76: Evolution of available capacity for major carriers at Paris MAS. Source: Innovata.
have actually increased to 36.2 millions in 2013 (compared to 34.8 in 2008). This situation
can be explained by the growth of LCCs that already saturate CIA, but have been expanding
at  FCO  and  usually  operate  with  higher  load  factors.  As  Figure  78 shows,  easyJet
transferred all  its flights from CIA to FCO around 2008, and Vueling also established a
significant  presence  at  the  airport.  At  the  same  time,  Air  One  reduced  its  offer  after
merging with Alitalia. Infrastructure development during this period was not significant,
only Terminal 5 – offering departures to US and Israel in some airlines – opened in 2008.
Ciampino (CIA) reached its maximum capacity and can hardly handle more than 5
million annual passengers. Nevertheless, the airport had almost 5.4 million passengers in
2007 but then the Italian civil aviation authority, ENAC, capped the number of flights per
day allowed at CIA, to control noise. Given these limitations, LCCs have diverted to FCO
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Figure 77: Evolution of available capacity at Rome MAS. Source: Innovata.
Figure 78: Evolution of available capacity for major carriers at Rome MAS. Source: Innovata.
during the last years, and the main airport now handles more low-cost traffic than CIA (see
Figure 79).
Ryanair, based at CIA since 2004, offered over 93% of total seats at the airport. Wizz
Air, the only other airline at CIA also operates at FCO. Even Ryanair opened a base at FCO
by the end of  2013,  coinciding with the planned growth of  easyJet  and Vueling at  the
airport (CAPA Centre for Aviation, 2014d).
6.1.14  Malaga Airport
Malaga Airport (AGP) is located 8 km away of Malaga, in the Mediterranean Costa del
Sol, one of the most important tourist destinations in the south coast of Spain. As Figure 80
shows, the total traffic at AGP fluctuated around 12 million passengers per year between
2005  and  2013.  Nevertheless,  the  market  share  of  LCCs  grew  steadily  and  they  now
dominate the airport with over two thirds of the market.
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Figure 79: Airport market share of total (left) and low-cost (right) traffic at Rome MAS. Source: Innovata.
Figure 80: Evolution of passenger traffic and the market share of LCCs at Malaga Airport. Source: AENA.
Indeed, as shown in Figure 81, most LCCs have grown at Malaga (AGP), especially over
the last five years as 'legacies' Iberia and Spanair abandoned the airport. EasyJet took the
lead but reduced some services after 2009. Ryanair opened a base at AGP in June 2010 and
became the largest carrier since then. Vueling, now the third largest operator, inherited the
base that Clickair had established in 2007 after the merger of the two airlines. Norwegian
also opened a base at AGP in 2012, and subsequently increased its own traffic. Air Berlin
remains the largest FSC at AGP, with traffic more or less stable.
Despite  the  lack  of  extensive  traffic  growth,  the  airport  experienced  significant
infrastructure  investments  during  the  period  of  analysis.  A  new  410  million  Euro
passenger building, Terminal 3, opened in March 2010 to increase peak capacity. Terminal
2 was then merged with the new building, and Terminal 1 was closed. Following the new
terminal,  a railway station opened in September 2010. Then,  a new runway opened in
2012, along with a new apron and corresponding taxiways.
6.1.15  Dublin Airport
Dublin (DUB) is the largest airport in Ireland in terms of passengers. It is also the
location  of  Ryanair  headquarters  and  part  of  the  airline's  history,  almost  since  its
beginning when it was still a FSC. Ryanair first flew out of DUB in 1986 before becoming a
LCC in 1990. Traffic at DUB grew considerably during the 1990's and 2000's until 2008,
along with the market share of LCCs (see Figure 82). Passenger numbers then fell sharply
in 2009 and 2010 due to the Irish financial recession and a drastic cut in Ryanair's capacity
(see Figure 83).
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Figure 81: Evolution of traffic for the largest carriers at Malaga Airport. Source: AENA.
The main passenger building, Terminal 1, expanded considerably during the 1990's.
As traffic growth continued, a new “Pier D” for Terminal 1 opened in October 2007. This
pier, that lacks air bridges to board aircraft, is used for all Ryanair flights since its opening.
By 2008, Ryanair was the largest user at DUB (see  Figure 83) and strongly opposed the
development of a new passenger building (Terminal 2) that they deemed not cost efficient
(Ryanair, 2007). Despite this opposition, Terminal 2 went ahead and opened in November
2010 amid financial crisis in Ireland and the Euro zone. Both Ryanair and Aer Lingus had
reduced their services but there was an important recovery in 2013.
The strong position of Ryanair at DUB, that encouraged significant cost reductions in
the  Irish  flag  carrier,  Aer  Lingus  (ANNA.aero,  2008),  kept  other  LCCs  away  from  the
airport. In 2013 Ryanair offered 37.7% of the total seats at DUB, very close to the total LCC
share at 39.4%. This pattern repeated for the period of analysis and, in fact, Ryanair and
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Figure 83: Evolution of available capacity provided by the major carriers at Dublin Airport. Source:
Innovata.
Figure 82: Evolution of passenger traffic and the market share of LCCs at Dublin Airport. Source:
Innovata.
Aer Lingus offered 82% of the total capacity at DUB in 2013, leaving little room for other
airlines to consolidate.
6.1.16  Madrid Airport
Madrid Barajas (MAD) is the airport serving the Spanish capital city. The airport was
subject to extensive investments in capacity expansion between 1998, when a new runway
opened, and 2006 during the implementation of the “Plan Barajas” program by AENA. The
plan  aimed  at  alleviating  congestion  in  terminals  1,  2  and  3,  and  at  providing  better
infrastructure for the hub of Iberia, the Spanish flag carrier.
The plan was completed in February 2006 with the opening of the new Terminal T4,
along with the satellite 4S (connected by an underground automated people mover to T4),
two new runways, and associated aprons and taxiways, and the supporting systems for
baggage handling and traffic control. The new terminals provided additional capacity for
35 million passengers per year, doubling the total capacity at MAD to 70 millions. Iberia
and its One World allies became the main users of the new terminals.
As Figure 84 shows, traffic grew for another two years after infrastructure expansions
but then decreased considerably. In 2013 MAD handled 39.7 million passengers, less than
the 41.8 millions in 2005 prior to renovations. This let the airport with extensive capacity
available that was largely taken by LCCs. Indeed, the low-cost segment grew from just 4%
in 2005 to 27% in 2013 mostly using the old terminals 1 and 2 (except for Vueling and
Iberia Express more recently).
The opening of the high speed train line between Madrid and Barcelona in February
2008 also impacted traffic at the airport, particularly for Iberia (see Figure 85). On top of
that, the weak economic situation of both the country and Iberia by the end of the decade,
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Figure 84: Evolution of passenger traffic and the market share of LCCs at Madrid Airport. Source: AENA.
hampered traffic development. Ryanair and easyJet, operating at MAD since the end of the
1990's,  were  quick  to  take  advantage  of  available  capacity.  Ryanair  opened  a  base  in
November 2006 and easyJet followed in February 2007.
Nevertheless, as AENA increased airport fees in 2012, Ryanair downsized operations
at MAD and easyJet dismantled its base in the winter 2012/2013 season. Iberia, on the
other hand, responded to the intense competition by creating yet another in-house LCC
(Iberia Express this time) and assigning more feeding for the hub to its regional franchisee
Air  Nostrum.  Overall,  adding  up  the  market  share  of  Iberia,  Iberia  Express  and  Air
Nostrum, these airlines were responsible for 41% of the passengers in 2013, 10% less
than Iberia and Air Nostrum in 2005 (see Figure 86). Air Europa, in the meantime, took the
opportunity of a weaker Iberia to grow and make of MAD its hub as well.
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Figure 86: Evolution of the market share of major airlines at Madrid Barajas. Source: AENA.
Figure 85: Traffic evolution of largest carriers at Madrid Airport. Source: AENA.
6.1.17  Palma de Mallorca Airport
Palma de Mallorca Airport (PMI), located in the largest of the Balearic Islands, is the
third largest in Spain, with over 20 million passengers per year. PMI is home of Air Europa
headquarters and it is the second largest airport for the airline, after its Madrid hub. PMI
also serves  as a hub for intra-European flights  of  Air Berlin and it  is  the third largest
airport for the airline.
PMI  concentrates  regional  traffic  between  the  different  islands  in  the  Balearic
archipelago.  A  passenger  building,  “Module  B”,  opened  in  2003  to  handle  inter-island
traffic  exclusively.  But  PMI  is  mainly  a  major  tourist  destination  in  the  Spanish
Mediterranean. As a consequence, charter traffic was considerable at the airport and more
important than low-cost traffic before 2008 (see Figure 87). Due to the influx of tourists,
the airport is subject to significant seasonality and another passenger building, “Module A”,
is used only during the summer periods. LCCs have gradually replaced charters from 2008
onwards.  Total traffic fluctuated around 22.5 million annual  passengers during the last
decade.
Air Berlin, which followed a more low-cost model during late 1990's and early 2000's,
connects some traffic at PMI. To facilitate this kind of hub operations, the airport operator
expanded and refurbished the “Module C” concourse in 2011.  As  Figure 88 shows,  Air
Berlin  is  the  largest  carrier  at  PMI.  The  reduction  in  traffic  in  2011  was  due  to  the
assignment of routes to Niki, another airline of the Air Berlin group, hence the traffic level
for the group has remained stable after several years of continuous growth.
Some charter airlines are still strong at PMI, such as Condor and Thomson. LCCs are
mainly represented by easyJet and Ryanair. The latter started using the airport in 2007 and
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Figure 87: Evolution of passenger traffic at Palma de Mallorca Airport. Source: AENA.
kept growing to become the second largest operator. In 2012, Ryanair opened a base at
PMI.
6.2 Dynamic evolution of airports
Based on the findings of the multiple cases presented above, and inspired by the work
of Bonnefoy (2008) on the evolution of Multi-Airport Systems in metropolitan regions, this
section presents a conceptual model that aims at understanding the impact of LCCs in the
evolution of European airports. First we identify generic patterns for traffic development,
then we describe how the mechanisms that generate those patterns dynamically interact
in order to redefine the airport  systems in what  concerns the distribution of  low-cost
traffic.
6.2.1 Patterns of low-cost traffic evolution at European airports
Despite the particular characteristics that make every case unique, we have identified
four generic mechanisms that trigger different patterns of traffic evolution in the airports
involved. Table 16 gives examples of each case.
i) Capacity expansion at primary airports
The first mechanism relates to the implementation of a major capacity expansion at a
primary18 (or at the only) airport in the system. In this case low-cost traffic is typically
promoted because the airport is unable to attract the foreseen growth in non-LCC traffic
that has apparently justified the expansion (see Figure 89). Given that additional capacity
can only be deployed in lump sums, some airports invest in large expansions, based on
long-term forecasts that are highly uncertain. When investments are realised (typically 2
18 Bonnefoy (2008) considers primary airports those that handle over 20% of total traffic in a Multi-Airport
System (secondary  airports  thus handle  20% or less).  In the case of  systems with a  single  airport  this  is
naturally considered a primary one.
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Figure 88: Traffic evolution of largest carriers at Palma de Mallorca Airport. Source: AENA.
to 6 years after construction started depending on the scale of the project, and 5 to 15
years after planning – i.e. forecasting – started) external conditions that affect demand are
different (as in the case of Spanish airports in which most major expansions opened in the
middle of the economic recession).
Table 16: Mechanisms of low-cost traffic evolution in airport systems.
Capacity expansion at 
primary airports
New/emerged primary airports New/emerged 
secondary airports
Market disruptions
Examples from the case studies:
Madrid (MAD), Barcelona
(BCN), Alicante (ALC), 
Edinburgh (EDI), Milan 
Malpensa (MXP), Malaga 
(AGP), Paris Charles de 
Gaulle (CDG), 
Amsterdam (AMS), 
Palma de Mallorca (PMI)
Primary airports unable to 
attract non-low-cost traffic:
Istanbul Sabiha Gokcen (SAW), 
London Stansted (STN), 
(Eindhoven, EIN, to a lesser 
extent as it was developed 
mainly with charter and LCCs in 
mind)
Primary airports fostering LCCs at
new/emerged secondary or 
former primary airports:
Oslo (OSL), Rome Fiumicino 
(FCO), Paris Charles de Gaulle 
(CDG)
Murcia San Javier (MJV), 
Girona (GRO), Reus 
(REU), Charleroi (CRL), 
Prestwick (PIK), Luton 
(LTN), Southend (SEN), 
Liverpool (LPL), Bergamo 
(BGY), Oslo Rygge (RYG), 
Beauvais (BVA), Paris 
Vatry (XCR)
Alicante (ALC), 
Rotterdam (RTM), 
Barcelona (BCN), Brussels
(BRU), Copenhagen 
(CPH), Oslo (OSL), 
Glasgow (GLA), 
Edinburgh (EDI), Gatwick 
(LGW), Manchester 
(MAN), Milan Malpensa 
(MXP), Paris Orly (ORY), 
Madrid (MAD), Dublin 
(DUB), Malaga (AGP), 
Palma de Mallorca (PMI)
Other examples not in the case studies:
Lisbon (LIS), Porto (OPO) Athens (ATH), Lublin (LUZ), Berlin
Brandenburg (BER, catering to all
kinds of traffic, whenever opens)
Warsaw Modlin (WMI), 
Frankfurt Hahn (HHN), 
Munich Memmingen 
(FMM), Grenoble (GNB)
Budapest (BUD), 
Cologne-Bonn (CGN), 
Düsseldorf (DUS)
If expected demand does not occur, unused facilities with high fixed costs become a
burden for the airport operator. LCCs (and in particular the largest European LCCs) have
large fleets that can be deployed quickly and flexibly (crew and single-type aircraft are
readily available across many bases) to stimulate demand with low fares and occupy the
emerging empty space. This pattern is more visible when capacity was added by building
new separate terminals. The old terminal(s) either close, possibly creating congestion in
the new buildings, or attract LCCs.
If demand for traditional airlines effectively grow but not at the expected rate, the
marginal cost of providing capacity for LCCs is much lower than before the expansion,
when the airport was more congested. In this case LCCs can also thrive at the airport by
exploring new markets with higher yields.
151
Figure 89: Typical traffic patterns at a primary airport before and after considerable capacity expansion.
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ii) New/emerged primary airports
The  second  mechanism  involves  the  emergence  of  a  new  primary  airport  in  the
region, not necessarily a greenfield project as major redevelopment of former facilities can
also be considered. When, in a given airport system, a new primary airport is built (or an
existing  airport  is  extensively  redeveloped  to  become  a  primary  airport),  there  are
typically two patterns of evolution according to whether the new/emerged airport is able
to capture traffic or not (see Figure 90).
In the first case (Figure 90 left) the new airport opens, the old one is not closed, and
its traffic is not forced to transfer to the new location. As traffic does not materialise in the
new facilities, the airport operator needs to increase revenues to balance high fixed costs
and  LCCs  become  a  natural  option  for  the  airport  to  foster  growth.  In  the  meantime,
capacity  at  the  original  primary  airport  may  be  increased  to  cope  with  congestion.
Eventually, some LCCs may operate from the original primary airport as well, especially
through  acquisitions  or  mergers,  whilst  some  non-LCC  carriers  may  also  use  the
new/emerged airport, especially foreign FSCs or charters.
London Stansted (STN) and Istanbul Sabiha Gokcen (SAW) are the best examples of
this pattern. Built to alleviate congestion in other primary airports, STN and SAW only
grew to prominence when LCCs started regular services.
In the second case (Figure 90 right) traffic is transferred from the original primary
airport to the new development, but the old airport is not dismantled. Eventually, low-cost
traffic may develop almost exclusively in the original primary airport (which can become a
secondary one if traffic at the new primary grows considerably) but limited to the available
capacity. When capacity is reached, the airport is not expanded (usually there is no space
to do it,  this being the reason for the new development) and some LCCs can go to the
new/emerged primary airport to continue growing. The Rome MAS illustrates this case
very well. Fiumicino (FCO) was built to replace Ciampino (CIA) as the main airport, after
some years empty CIA turned a secondary airport for LCCs but then most LCCs started
expanding at FCO.
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Figure 90: Typical traffic patterns when a new or redeveloped primary airport emerge.
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It may also happen that the original primary airport gets closed and dismantled (as in
Oslo or as it is planned for Berlin). The new airport can be designed with different types of
traffic in mind and thus allow space for the growth of LCCs. Moreover, especially when the
new location becomes inconvenient for some travellers (as in the case of Oslo), the new
primary airport can foster the (re)development of secondary airports that mainly target
LCCs.
Sometimes  the  new  primary  airport  does  not  capture  any  traffic  at  all.  Montreal
Mirabel Airport is perhaps the most renowned case, but it is out of the geographical scope
of this dissertation. Examples in Europe are not uncommon though: the 1.1 billion Euro
Ciudad Real Airport (intended to be South Madrid Airport) opened in December 2008 and
closed in 2012 with less than 100 000 passengers over that period; the Region de Murcia
International Airport, also in Spain, has not seen its first passenger despite construction
ended in 2012; opening of Berlin Brandenburg has been severely delayed and it  is  not
expected to happen soon.
iii) New/emerged secondary airports
The third mechanism relates to the emergence of a new, or existing but underused,
secondary airport in the region served by an existing primary airport.  In this case the
emerging airport typically attracts mostly low-cost traffic (see Figure 91). In many cases,
secondary airports  accompanied the expansion of  LCCs and their  developers  provided
incentives or better opportunities to capture that market (as in Charleroi, Luton, Liverpool,
Bergamo, Beauvais, for instance). For start-up LCCs, these airports offered a lower cost but
also  lacked  congestion  and  had  simple  layouts  that  favoured  streamlined  efficient
operations.
Yet emerged secondary airports can also foster the growth of LCCs at the primary
airport mainly by raising awareness of competition between airlines and between airports.
Thus,  as  Figure  91 shows,  low-cost  traffic  at  the  primary  airport  may  become  more
important  than  at  the  secondary  airport,  particularly  when  LCCs  with  a  more  hybrid
proposition come to the primary airport. In addition, if non-LCC carriers cannot sustain
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Figure 91: Typical traffic patterns when a new or redeveloped secondary airport emerge.
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competition from their low-cost counterpart, the significance of LCC traffic at the primary
airport can also increase as these airlines downsize their operations.
Secondary airports may also fail to attract traffic, thus facing closure or downscaling,
transferring part of their LCC traffic to primary airports (or to other secondary airports).
Paris Vatry (XCR), for instance, has not been able to establish significant operations since
its redevelopment. Forli Airport, in Italy, went bankrupt in 2013 and most flights moved to
Rimini and Bologna nearby. Hamburg Lubeck, although it has not closed and still handles
LCC traffic from Wizz Air, also filed for bankruptcy in early 2014 as it lost most services
from Ryanair. Beja Airport, located in between Lisbon and the Algarve in Portugal, opened
in 2011 aiming at attracting LCCs but has not attracted any regular scheduled operator to
date.
iv) Market disruptions
The  fourth  mechanism  involves  the  occurrence  of  market  disruptions  at  a  given
primary or  secondary airport  affecting either  the airlines  that  use  the airports  or the
airports themselves.  Market disruptions imply changes in the traffic mix of the airport
system that are not directly related to changes in the infrastructure.  These disruptions
include new LCC start-ups, changes in the commercial focus of a major airline (from FSC or
charter to LCC, or vice versa, for instance) at the airport, or of the airport itself (due to
change in ownership or management); bankruptcy or downscaling of a major airline (de-
hubbing, for instance); and mergers or acquisitions.
Figure 92 shows the typical traffic pattern that leads to strengthened position of LCCs
at an airport after market disruptions. The overall growth of LCCs in Europe increased
competition with traditional 'legacy' and charter carriers, and this in turn added pressure
for these airlines to control their costs and, in many cases, to restructure and concentrate
their operations.  For many small  regional  airports  this  meant that  LCCs were the only
viable  alternative  to  sustain traffic.  Other major airports  (see  Table  16) changed their
attitude towards LCCs as the airlines they were used to serve gradually (or suddenly in
some cases) vanished or transformed themselves.
As Figure 92 illustrates, typically LCCs are keen to (and the airports are also keen to
have  LCCs)  substitute  the  void  left  by  'legacy'  carriers  that  went  bankrupt.  Moreover,
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Figure 92: Typical traffic patterns after market disruptions.
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'legacy' carriers may replace themselves with their in-house LCC subsidiaries to focus on
their hubs for long-haul traffic. The major independent LCCs (Ryanair, easyJet, Norwegian,
Vueling before IAG acquisition, or Wizz Air, for instance) usually gain larger market shares
because they have larger fleets and better financial positions to fund expansion.
6.2.2 Conceptual model for dynamic airport evolution
The different mechanisms described above may also appear in several combinations,
normally accelerating or increasing the impact of low-cost traffic evolution at the airports.
Figure 93 shows a conceptual model that describes the dynamic evolution of airports, and
aids in the analysis of the interactions between the different mechanisms and the resulting
infrastructure. These interactions produce a given dynamic state for an airport system in
what concerns the development of low-cost traffic.
The model presents seven states that can be reached from an initial  state.  In this
initial state, the airport system is composed of an original primary airport in which low-
cost  traffic  is  not  relevant  (not  necessarily  a  single  airport.  London,  for  instance,  had
Heathrow and  Gatwick before the development of Luton, Stansted, City and Southend).
The states are defined by the infrastructure (i.e. airports) included in the system and the
significance of low-cost traffic in each case. The transitions between states are triggered by
the mechanisms described above.
The system can go back to the initial state if the mechanisms, market disruption in
particular,  trigger  such  feedback.  Alternatively,  any  new state  can  be  considered as  an
initial state for the future evolution of the system according to the development of the
155
Figure 93: Conceptualisation of the dynamic evolution for airports with regards to low-cost traffic.
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market  conditions and the regulatory environment that  is  uncertain.  Perhaps the most
likely transition from any state with more than one airport is related to closing airports to
concentrate all traffic segments in a single airport (as in Berlin, whenever the new airport
opens).
Likewise, the most likely transition from a state involving one airport is the expansion
of the airport system by developing emergent airports possibly focused on a given type of
traffic  (not  necessarily  low-cost,  as  airline  business  models  may  evolve  in  different
directions in the long-term).
6.3 Summary
LCCs in Europe have significantly impacted both major and secondary airports. The
way  airport  systems  react  to  the  ascendency  of  LCCs  determines  the  evolution  of  the
system. By analysing historical traffic and the key recent events that affected the evolution
of  42  airports,  38  of  them  part  of  Multi-Airport  Systems,  this  chapter  proposed  a
conceptual  model to help understanding the dynamic evolution of  airports.  The model
identifies four mechanisms that can produce different states related to the infrastructure
of the airport system and the traffic patterns.
The mechanisms that trigger the transitions in the airport systems are related to the
development of physical infrastructure but also to changing market conditions for airlines
and airports.  This  finding highlights  the need for  a  new paradigm in  airport  strategic
development that incorporates the planning and design of infrastructure, along with the
definition of a corresponding business strategy. Encompassing infrastructure and business
plans, airport planners and managers can aim at guaranteeing the long-term sustainability
of an airport. This will be the subject for the next chapter.
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7 Airport strategic planning
Master plans have been and remain the norm in airport planning and designing (de
Neufville and Odoni, 2003). Usually, master plans forecast a future demand level and type
of traffic, and aim at preparing airport infrastructure to deal with that assumed future. Yet,
as the case studies presented in the previous chapter clearly show, even in the short term,
the traffic amount and mix can change considerably, especially when LCCs emerge at or
withdraw from the airports. In addition, master plans do not deal with the possibility that
airport managers can somehow shape the future, by defining the characteristics of their
product.
In  the  context  of  the  remarkable  LCC  ascendency,  the  airport  industry  has  been
significantly reshaped as we have discussed along this dissertation. These changes provide
new opportunities for airports to explore alternative approaches to the way they conduct
business. In this chapter we propose an integrated framework to facilitate airport strategic
planning, by articulating the main elements and findings of the previous chapters.
This framework, referred as the [New] Airport Business Network, aims at providing a
tool  for  strategic  planning intended to  be applicable  to any airport.  Nevertheless,  it  is
important to bear in mind that airports differ in location, size and governance,  among
other  aspects  that  impact  the  planning  process.  Hence,  despite  the  generalisation
proposed, for specific cases “the airport  strategic planning process must be tailored to
each airport to account for its individual characteristics” (ACRP, 2010).
7.1 Stakeholder involvement
Airport strategic planning should explicitly take into account the fact that the airport
product is provided and influenced by several different actors. Section 3.1 grouped airport
stakeholders according to their influence in airport activities. This section describes how
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the stakeholders interact to provide a seamless airport product, and how they should be
integrated into the planning process.
Jarach  (2001) proposed  market  relations  (business  to  business,  and  business  to
consumer)  between  some  airport  stakeholders  to  characterise  the  interactions  that
generate a range of value propositions that satisfy customer requirements. We expand this
notion to  describe  how the airport  stakeholders  form a  network of  relationships  (see
Figure 94). The airport management, representing the airport as a firm (i.e. not merely an
infrastructure provider), is in the core of the network. This means managers play a crucial
role  in  articulating  all  the  other  stakeholders  and  bringing  together  their  different
interests to create a seamless airport product. The stakeholders are linked to each other
according to the following three types of relationships: business to business; business to
consumer; or planning influence.
7.1.1 Business to business relationships
Business  to  business  (B2B)  relationships  are  mediated  by  commercial  interests
between  companies,  often  associated  to  maximise  profit.  In  B2B  relationships  the
companies mutually interact to provide integrated or complementary products or services
to  final  customers.  In  the  network  of  stakeholders,  the  Airport  Firm  establishes  B2B
connections with Airlines,  Aeronautical and Non-Aeronautical Business Units (ABU and
NABU respectively  in  Figure 94),  and Air  Navigation Service  Providers  (ANSP),  all  the
entities being partners in the airport business. Similarly, B2B relationships exist between
the Airport Firm and the Aviation trade and Commercial trade groups of customers (see
section 3.2 for details on airport customers).
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Figure 94: Network relationships between the stakeholders involved in the airport business (NGOs: Non-
Governmental Organisations; ABU: Aeronautical Business Units; NABU: Non-Aeronautical Business Units;
ANSP: Air Navigation Service Provider).
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Airlines were traditionally perceived as the main airport customer. Yet in the current
context,  a  B2B relationship  between the airport  firm and the airlines  implies  a  closer
cooperation  to  foster  business  in  both  sides,  and  a  better  understanding  of  the  real
requirements of airlines in terms of infrastructure and operations. Long term commercial
agreements between airlines, particularly LCCs, and airports make the idea of cooperation
for  mutual  benefit  more  explicit  and  critical.  These  agreements  also  reduce  airports
uncertainty in planning infrastructure investments.
Airlines also follow a B2B relationship with the Aeronautical Business Units, which in
turn can offer their services directly to other corporate customers in the Aviation trade
group. Although some airlines perform related aeronautical activities (especially ground
handling) themselves or through subsidiaries, they often subcontract companies that are
part of the Aeronautical Business Units. This is particularly true for LCCs in the European
context.
Aeronautical  Business  Units  can  also  be  part  of  the  airport  operator,  but  it  is
increasingly  common  to  have  different  providers  at  the  same  airport,  partly  due  to
liberalisation  in  the  ground  handling  industry.  Thus  the  Airport  Firm  is  linked  to  the
Aeronautical  Business  Units  and  to  the  Aviation  trade  customers  through  a  B2B
relationship  as  well.  The  airport  must  guarantee  airlines  have  access  to  competitive
services  and  a  sufficiently  attractive  business  environment  for  the  aeronautical  units,
whilst  fulfilling all  applicable  regulations.  For  planning purposes,  the  B2B relationship
between the Aeronautical Business Units and the Airport Firm should also contribute to an
efficient use of the infrastructure.
Like the aeronautical counterpart, Non-Aeronautical Business Units (e.g. retail stores)
can be part of the airport operator but are usually third-party companies. Thus there is a
B2B relationship between these units and the Airport Firm. Other non-aviation related
services can be offered by the airport directly to customers in the Commercial trade group,
also following a B2B approach.
Finally, there are B2B relationships between Air Navigation Service Providers and the
Airlines, as direct users, and also with the Airport Firm, as user of ground traffic control
and  as  the  interface  between  ground  and  air  traffic,  to  ensure  efficient  and  on-time
operations. Moreover, ANSPs can also become the link between different airports to ensure
the  reliability  and  safety  of  the  entire  airport  network,  as  it  is  the  case  of  the
implementation of Airport Collaborative Decision Making initiatives (Eurocontrol, 2012).
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7.1.2 Business to consumer relationships
In Business to Consumer (B2C) relationships stakeholders aim to provide/acquire a
product or service for final consumption. In this case profit maximisation is not the main
goal for any of the parties. The Airport Firm follows a B2C approach to offer the products
and services of the interest of the Individuals customer group. Some of these products are
not directly produced by the airport but result from the B2B interactions described above.
In this sense, Individuals are also connected to Airlines and Non-Aeronautical Business
Units through B2C relationships.
Similarly,  Non-Aeronautical  Business  Units  can  offer  their  products  and  services
directly  to  the  employees  of  the  airport  and to  the  different  companies  settled  in  the
airport site. In addition, airport employees represent the airport interests, being its public,
visible  face,  when  offering  the airport  product  to  the  Individuals  customer group.  For
planning purposes this  is important because it  means that  employees are in charge of
translating the airport strategy to day-to-day activities.
7.1.3 Planning influence
The stakeholders that are less involved in defining specific airport activities (i.e. those
in the Society group in  Figure 94) can be,  nonetheless, very influential in the planning
process.  These stakeholders  are  in  some way  linked to  the Airport  Firm and to  other
stakeholders, by non-business relationships that are not directly mediated by commercial
interests (such as profit maximization). At the same time, airport activities can influence
the perception that these stakeholders have of the airport.
The influence on the airport business can be positive or negative, and have a strategic
or  operational  impact.  For  instance,  local  residents  affected  by  noise  can  dictate
operational  changes  that  affect  airport  capacity,  such  as  curfews  or  limits  to  runway
utilisation. In contrast, local governments can support the airport to foster development in
the region. On the other hand, changes in regulation, concerning security measures for
instance,  can  significantly  influence  the  development  of  airport  infrastructure  or
equipment.
It is therefore important that the Airport Firm keeps a constant communication with
all relevant stakeholders in this group, to ensure they actively contribute for the definition
of the airport strategy. Feedback mechanisms should be implemented in airport planning,
whilst development plans should be exposed directly to the affected parties, to minimise
harmful impact and maximise benefits.
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7.2 Airport differentiation and strategic focus
Differentiation lies in the core of strategy definition. Organisations trade-off among
factors that define a unique position within their markets (Porter, 1996). Similarly, airports
can establish a set of differentiation factors, as a way to enable a successful strategy in a
rather  competitive  environment.  The  differentiation factors  would,  in  principle,  attract
specific airport customers, but given the particular characteristics of the airport industry,
it is common that different customer segments use the same airports. Indeed, chapters 4 to
6 showed how LCCs use a diverse range of airports. For this reason, we have considered
differentiation factors that can be targeted at particular customers, within the three main
customer groups defined in section 3.2.
These differentiation factors can then be implemented into the six service packages
that were defined in section 3.3 as the airport product. The service packages are consumed
by one or more of the customer groups. The extent to which an airport implements the
service packages and the way the differentiation factors are embedded into those packages
determines  a  given  strategic  focus  for  the  airport.  Section  3.4 covered  six  generic
approaches to the airport business that can be translated into strategic focuses.
Figure 95 summarises the factors identified as possible sources of differentiation for
airports. These factors are linked to specific customer segments at whom the strategies
that implement each (or a combination) of the factors may be targeted. These sub-groups
are contained in the three main customer groups for the airport service packages.
7.2.1 Factors mainly targeted at aviation trade customers
Dedicated infrastructure can be attractive for commercial airlines and general aviation
users.  This may include exclusive terminals,  parking stands, boarding gates or check-in
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Figure 95: Differentiation factors for airports and the customers they are targeted at.
Aviation 
trade
Customers
Commercial 
trade
Individuals
Service packages
Transport 
network
Infrastructure and 
aeronautical services
Retail and non 
aeronautical services
Activities and 
events
Real estate 
development
Consultancy and 
managerial services
General aviation
Cargo airlines
Low cost carriers
Traditional airlines
Outbound travellers
Transfer travellers
Inbound travellers
Visitors
Residents
Employees
Tennants
Businesses and 
organisations
Other airports
Non-user stakeholders
+ Availability of slots
+ Dedicated infrastructure
+ Incentive programs
+ Network (destinations)
+ Seamless inter-modal integration
+ Access to low fares
+ Passenger experience
+ Retail and catering offer
+ Entertainment and events
+ Attractive hinterland
+ Real estate projects and availability
+ Airport efficiency and know-how
+ Economic benefit for the region
+ Environment protection initiatives
+ Quick aircraft turnaround
+ Low aeronautical charges
Target segments Differentiation factors
+ Convenient location
areas  in  the  passenger  buildings.  Dedicated  infrastructure  can  be  targeted  at  airlines
willing to gain visibility, improve branding or influence airport planning by becoming, in
relative terms, large carriers at the airport. Infrastructure may also be used to separate
market  segments  with  dedicated  areas,  for  instance  for  low-cost  carriers  (e.g.  Kuala
Lumpur Airport in Malaysia), freight integrators (e.g. Memphis International Airport in the
United States), or premium passengers (e.g. Lufthansa's First Class Terminal at Frankfurt
Airport in Germany).
Availability of slots is quite important for airport growth and is targeted specifically at
commercial  airlines  (cargo  and  passengers).  This  is  one  of  the  advantages  of  smaller
airports,  when  attracting  low-cost  airlines  (Barret,  2000),  but  any  airport  willing  to
establish  a  competitive  position  must  provide  available  capacity  to  accommodate  the
desired increase in traffic. Besides spare capacity, it is crucial to provide slots at attractive
times, but some LCCs may be keen to schedule flights off-peaks in more congested airports,
not only to circumvent congestion but also because the current methods to allocate slots
usually favour incumbent airlines that already have the right to use them (Belobaba et al.,
2009).
Low aeronautical charges, as discussed in section 5.4.1, can be targeted at LCCs, but
also to general aviation users that do not necessarily derive a profit from their activities.
The  implications  of  low  aeronautical  charges  as  the  sole  differentiation  factor  are
discussed in more detail in section 7.2.5, but clearly this may not be the only way to attract
price-conscious airlines.
Airports may implement strategies that include incentive programs to support route
development of commercial airlines (including cargo), and then attract more customers to
the  airport.  Secondary  airports  established  incentive  programs  to  attract  LCCs,  but
nowadays  these  programs  are  widely  used by  different  airports,  and  diverse  types  of
airlines benefit from discounts or support in the light of these programs.
Quick aircraft turnaround is another factor particularly targeted at LCCs to help them
improve  aircraft  utilisation.  Although  the  duration  of  the  turnaround  is  the  main
responsibility of the airline and its selected handler, airports can advertise this as a factor
of  differentiation  when  they  are  able  to  provide  short  taxiing  times  and  efficient
procedures at the stand and boarding gate (besides other measures discussed in section
5.4.1).
7.2.2 Factors mainly targeted at individual customers
A  convenient location of  the airport site can be targeted at outbound and inbound
travellers,  but  also  at  general  aviation  users  that  want  to  have  their  aircraft  easily
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accessible, and at traditional airlines that want to promote location as an advantage for
their passengers. The convenience obviously differs according to the location of the airport
relative to the actual origin of passengers, or according to the location of the airport where
the flight  ends,  relative  to the passenger final  destination. Previous research highlights
access time and cost, and level of service (flight frequency, timetable and flying time) as
key aspects that determine traveller’s choice of departure airport (Hess and Polak, 2006;
Lian and Rønnevik, 2011).
In  this  sense,  network  provision  (destinations) is  also  a  crucial  factor  for  airport
competitiveness.  A  wider network (offered through improved connectivity or non-stop
destinations), in combination with adequate frequencies and timetables, can significantly
expand the airport's  catchment  area.  The  network  of  destinations  may  be  targeted at
outbound and transfer travellers  (as  well  as  travel  agents  and tour operators),  and to
businesses and organisations located in or around the airport.
The  access to low fares for passengers, strongly linked to the presence of LCCs, may
differentiate  airports  by  providing the cheapest  alternative  for  outbound and inbound
travellers.  Strategies  that  implement this  objective  as  a  key differentiation factor must
include elements to attract the airlines that provide the low fares,  and to market these
fares to the passengers, as section  5.4.1 describes. It also helps if ground transportation
offers competitive fares too, as passengers normally would consider the full price for their
trips, obviously including all components.
The overall  passenger experience at the airport can be targeted at all travellers. This
includes the level of service (mainly space and waiting time) during all airport processes,
particularly check-in,  security controls  and baggage claim; but also the cleanliness and
availability of facilities (e.g. lounges, Wi-Fi, or showers), airport way-finding, aircraft-to-
curb time,  walking times  inside the buildings,  or  even  the convenience  offered by  the
possibility to avoid transfers.
Seamless  inter-modal  integration is  also  a  key  differentiation  factor  that  may  be
targeted at outbound and inbound travellers, visitors, residents, employees and businesses
and organisations. Inter-modal integration may require specific infrastructure for shifting
between the modes, but also coordinated services such as air-rail,  air-cruise, or air-bus
that provide seamless origin to destination travelling.
All customers in the Individuals group can be lured with a proper retail and catering
offer and  entertainment  and  events. This  differentiation  factors  aim  at  encouraging
travellers  to enjoy the airport  as  a  place  to be at,  and not  only  to  pass by.  Retail  and
catering can be tailored to the specific segments (e.g. business or low-cost travellers) or
even to seasonal patterns (summer or winter trips), whilst entertainment activities and
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events may include airport tours, viewing terraces, concerts, sport tournaments and so on,
depending on the characteristics of the buildings and available space.
7.2.3 Factors mainly targeted at commercial trade customers
An  attractive  hinterland is  a  factor  based  on  the  promotion  of  the  airport  or  its
hinterland  as  a  destination.  This  factor  is  targeted  mainly  at  inbound  travellers  and
tenants,  and  may  be  explored in  terms  of  tourism  in  the  region  where  the  airport  is
located, or in terms of the opportunities created by real estate developments around the
airport (for instance, the centre for quick surgeries in The Circle project at Zurich Airport,
to  attract  “medical  tourists”).  In  this  sense,  real  estate  projects  and  availability can  be
targeted at tenants, businesses and organisations willing to invest in the airport hinterland
either to locate their offices or to develop their own productive projects.
Another  factor,  airport  efficiency  and  know-how, is  related  to  the  airport  firm’s
performance  and  goodwill.  Airports  with  a  reputation  of  good  performance  have  an
advantage when targeting other airports to provide business and engineering consulting
and managerial services. Efficient airports may also target this factor at LCCs that require
operational efficiency to guarantee high aircraft utilisation.
Finally, taking advantage of the growing development around airports, two additional
differentiation factors are related to the side benefits produced by an airport  economic
benefit  for  the  region and  by  environmental  protection  initiatives.  Strategies  to  explore
positive impacts can be targeted at local residents to gain their support; at other airports
interested in implementing similar initiatives; and at non-user stakeholders also to gain
their support for airport activities.
7.2.4 Airport strategic focus
Section  3.4 introduced six  business  approaches  that  airport  managers  can pursue
according  to  the  extent  to  which  the  airport  implements  each  one  of  the  six  service
packages  presented  in  section  3.3:  public  utility  provider  (in  association  with  the
infrastructure  and  aeronautical  services  package),  multi-modal  interface  (with  the
transport network package), commercially oriented (with the retail and non-aeronautical
services package), consumer oriented (with the activities and events package), airport city
(with the real estate development package), and global business (with the consultancy and
managerial services package). Each of such approaches characterises a generic strategic
focus to define the airport strategy.
A strategy canvas presents the offering level  (vertical  axis) of  different  competing
factors  (horizontal  axis)  that  buyers  in  an  industry  receive  according  to  the  value
proposition  resulting  from  the  strategy  of  a  given  company  or  companies  (Kim  and
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Mauborgne, 2005). Figure 96 shows a strategy canvas for the six generic airport strategic
focuses  and  the  offering  level  for  each  of  the  differentiation  factors  identified  in  the
previous section.  This  element may aid managers in defining a unique position for the
airport.
The  specific  strategic  focus  of  a  particular  airport  must  be  decided  by  the
management  team in accordance to the intended offering levels  for the differentiation
factors. This decision is naturally influenced by the characteristics of the airport site and
must  be  aligned  with  decisions  on  infrastructure  investment.  Moreover,  given  the
uniqueness of every airport, managers can identify other differentiation factors that are
more relevant  for  their  particular  situation,  as  well  as  modify  or eliminate  the others
accordingly.
7.2.5 Airport cost leadership
Given the particular focus of this dissertation on low-cost airlines and airports, the
use  of  cost  leadership  as  a  standalone  strategy  is  analysed in  more  detail.  Before  the
growth of LCCs,  airport charges normally accounted for a small proportion of air fares
charged  to  passengers  (European  Commission,  2002).  In  a  regulated  market  that
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Figure 96: Strategy canvas for generic airport strategic focus.
prevented airline competition, a ‘cost-plus’ environment generated inefficiencies along the
business chain  (de Neufville, 2008). As a consequence, airport fees were not a relevant
factor for competition in the industry.
Economic liberalisation creates a completely different operational environment. Price
competition between airlines leads to lower costs that are passed on to passengers. In this
context,  aeronautical  charges  gain  relevance as a source  of  competitive  advantage and
airports advertise them to attract airlines, LCCs in particular.
As a result of the discount scheme for airport charges implemented by Aer Rianta
(now Dublin Airport Authority), traffic at the Dublin airport doubled between 1993 and
1998 and congestion also rose significantly. Ryanair sought further discounts to promote
new routes to mainland Europe. Unsuccessful, the airline shifted its route development to
London Stansted. This provides evidence for how “in a competitive airport environment
airport  managers  will  have  to  engage  in  price  negotiations  with  airlines  rather  than
present a fixed set of charges on a take it or leave it basis” (Barret, 2000).
Indeed,  when regulation on single  or dual  till  approaches  allows it,  airports  offer
reduced  fees  to  increase  the  number  of  passengers,  and  non-aeronautical  revenues,
expecting a higher general profitability. However, when aeronautical charges are reduced,
“there is a need to ensure adequate retail facilities are in place to generate commercial
revenue” (Francis et al., 2003). Otherwise, there is no opportunity to compensate for the
loss of income in the aeronautical side.
Competition through aeronautical  charges  may not  always  enhance welfare  in the
case of Multi-Airport Systems (Forsyth, 2010). When competition occurs between a major
airport and a secondary one located nearby, and the major airport has spare capacity, the
marginal  cost  of handling extra flights there may be much lower than the cost  for the
secondary airport. Consequently, the allocation of new services to the secondary airport
would result in higher overall costs and less general welfare. Price competition from the
smaller airport could act as an incentive for the major airport to improve efficiency and
eventually encourage airlines to move from the secondary to the main airport.
Conversely, low airport fees may be so “successful” that they could lead to significant
congestion problems. In the long run, the strategy may put the airport in a less competitive
position  as  the  level  of  service  decreases  and  congestion  increases  (Graham,  2010).
Therefore  cost  leadership  strategies  must  be  closely  linked to  infrastructure  planning,
pursuing the achievement of common goals.
In addition, regardless of the weight of airport charges in their overall costs, airlines
do obviously consider all  costs incurred when operating at an airport.  Accordingly,  the
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framework we propose in this work aims at supporting the formulation of strategies that
consider  multiple  elements  required  to  create  advantages  for  airports  in  current
competitive environments, not just to guarantee cost leadership.
7.3 The [New] Airport Business Network
The  [New]  Airport  Business  Network (see  Figure  97)  is  an  integrated  framework
proposed by this research to aid airport managers in the pursuit of differentiation in their
strategic planning process. The framework articulates the different elements described in
this chapter around the airport customers and the corresponding service packages (i.e. the
airport  product).  The  resulting  framework  is  useful  to  identify  the  most  relevant
stakeholders that are involved in the implementation of the desired strategic focus for the
airport.
Some of the network relationships between the airport stakeholders (to the left in
Figure 97) have been simplified from the more detailed description presented in section
7.1. This is intended to emphasise the role of the airport management team as a mediator
between  all  the  stakeholders,  to  harmonise  their  different  interests  towards  the
accomplishment of the same strategic objectives. Also, the influence relationship between
the owners and the airport management has been highlighted as the one where such broad
strategic  objectives  are  defined,  not  necessarily  imposed  by  the  owners  but  mutually
agreed in accordance with the requirements and interests of all the stakeholders. Likewise,
the influence relationship between airport management and employees is highlighted as
the one where strategy communication occurs to ensure that all customers perceive the
intended strategy in an adequate manner.
This tool is intended to be an integrated approach to provide planners and managers
with a big picture of the airport position in a competitive environment. In this sense, the
[New] Airport Business Network associates the following elements: the value proposition
that  results  from  the  intended  airport  strategy;  the  specific  factors  that  need  to  be
strengthened in accordance with the value proposition; the target customers to which the
strategy  is  most  attractive;  the  service  packages  that  need  to  be  implemented  in
accordance with the selected differentiation factors; the generic customer groups that have
an interest in the packages as a product to acquire; and, finally, the relevant stakeholders
that  participate  in the provision of  the specific  product  that  materialises  the intended
strategy.
Another feature of the proposed integrated framework is that it allows to incorporate
infrastructure development plans into the process of strategy definition. This ensures that
airport planners and managers align the development of physical facilities with the goals
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Figure 97: The [New] Airport Business Network, a tool for airport strategic planning.
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of their intended business strategy. In specific terms, airport infrastructure is incorporated
within the first five service packages.
Each  of  these service  packages  (infrastructure and aeronautical  services,  transport
network,  retail  and  non  aeronautical  services,  activities  and  events ,  and  real  estate
development)  can be associated to  specific  facilities  in accordance to the offering level
selected  for  the  differentiation  factors,  and  for  existing  airports,  these  factors  can  be
selected in line with the characteristics of the current facilities. The essential point is that
both infrastructure and strategy should match to support the success of the airport. The
use of this integrated framework was validated by applying it to a case study, as presented
in section 7.5.
7.4 Flexibility and strategic adaptation
The definition of a strategy can obviously help in shaping the future of an airport, in
terms of its infrastructure and traffic. However, external events that are not controlled by
airport management can still occur and affect the position of the airport. Likely events, but
not  necessarily  predictable,  include  changes  in  regulation  that  modify  the  standard
procedures for airport activities and, more often, market changes affecting the airlines. In
this  case,  new  airlines  can  start  service  at  the  airport,  or  existing  airlines  can  either
disappear or evolve towards a different business model.
New  airline  with  new  business  models  can  challenge  airport  operations  if  their
requirements  differ  substantially.  Airlines  withdrawing  service  can  severely  affect  the
sustainability  of  the  airport  business.  In  both  cases,  strategic  planning for  the  airport
should  allow  for  the  necessary  adaptations  to  prevent  undesirable  outcomes  or  take
advantage of new opportunities. In the first case,  flexibility may be valuable in order to
allow the airport to host the new entrants. In the second case, strategic adaptation may be
valuable to quickly restore service.
During the last  decade,  in the European context,  most of these unexpected events
associated to airlines were related either to the emergence and expansion of an LCC, or to
the bankruptcy or downsizing of a FSC. In most cases, these changes led LCCs to use the
same facilities previously developed for traditional airlines. Often, this situation implied
adaptations for the operations of LCCs (see Table 17 for some examples), as well as a shift
in the attitude of airport managers towards this type of airlines.
Conversely,  airports can also adapt to the evolution in the business model of LCCs
towards a more hybrid product. Some airports (Milan Bergamo notably) increased retail
areas to profit from passenger growth and also introduced premium services such as VIP
lounges or fast-track for security lines.
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Table 17: Examples of airport adaptations to LCC operations.
Adaptation Description
“Bus gates” used as 
“walking gates”
Some airports provided “bus gates” to access remote stands, usually for smaller 
aircraft used by regional carriers. The use of these gates changed to allow walking 
access to aircraft in adjacent stands. Some airports (Brussels Charleroi, for instance) 
feature covered walkways to access more distant stands.
Converted use of jet bridges
(holding queues)
At airports featuring jet bridges connected to fixed walkways that separate inbound 
and outbound flows (Porto, for instance), LCCs can use the outbound section to hold 
the queue of boarding passengers and start aircraft boarding shortly after the 
disembarking process has finished in order to reduce turnaround times.
No use of jet bridges At airports featuring jet bridges connected to fixed walkways with direct access to 
the stand via stairs (Wroclaw, for instance), airlines can avoid the use of jet bridges 
and board/disembark the aircraft using both doors.
Airports  that  have  built  new  facilities  with  LCCs  in  mind  favoured  some  flexible
alternatives such as shared-use space and modular buildings. Shared-use space is mainly
used  to  provide  common  pre-boarding  rooms  where  passengers  mingle  before  gate
numbers are announced closer to departure in smaller, spare areas. Modular buildings are
used in  particular  to  allow for  “swing gates”  that  feature  passport  control  booths,  for
international flights19, located closer to the gates. Airports that have built new facilities but
did not anticipate the growth in the low-cost segment, have mostly been forced to close
part of their old facilities to reduce operating costs.
In general, these adaptations emerged more as a necessity due to external disruptions
and less as a concious (or at least documented) decision of airport managers to implement
flexibility. The idea of an airport strategic planning process is to incorporate adaptability.
Thus airport infrastructure can cope with unforeseen changes whilst airport strategy can
take on new opportunities as markets develop and evolve.
7.5 The  case  of  Lelystad  Airport  in  the  Amsterdam  Multi-Airport
System
Amsterdam Schiphol (AMS) is the main airport in the Netherlands. It was the fourth
busiest airport in Europe, in 2013, in terms of passenger traffic. AMS is also the main hub
for KLM, which provided 54% of the seats available at the airport in 2013, and a major
airport for the SkyTeam alliance, whose members – including KLM – are responsible for
70% of the airport traffic. Its role as a hub, called “Mainport” by airport management, is
central to the airport strategy, especially considering the small size of the domestic market
in the Netherlands (Schiphol Group, 2013).
For  environmental  reasons,  the  capacity  at  AMS  is  limited  to  510,000  air  traffic
movements per year. In 2013 there were 425,565 movements at the airport, 83% of the
imposed cap. The Schiphol Group, the airport owner and operator, would like to support
the “Mainport” strategy by redistributing non-hub related traffic to other airports in the
19 Out of the Schengen space in the European context
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Netherlands  in  order  to  relieve  capacity  at  Schiphol.  The  preferred  alternative  is  to
redevelop the Lelystad Airport (LEY) to attract “flights to European cities and regions, with
focus  on  tourist  destinations”,  “in  order  to  accommodate  selective  growth  at  AMS”
(Schiphol Group, 2014a).
Lelystad is  the largest  airport  for general  aviation traffic  in  the Netherlands.  It  is
located 56 km from central Amsterdam, about 45 minutes by car to the east. The airport is
wholly owned by the Schiphol Group, which also owns the Rotterdam airport (RTM) and a
51% stake in the Eindhoven airport (EIN), both in the Amsterdam Multi-Airport System
(see Figure 98).
The strategic planning for the case of Lelystad appears as an interesting opportunity
to apply the framework developed in this work (as presented in the current chapter) – the
[New] Airport Business Network. The airport will need to change its infrastructure in order
to  accommodate larger  aircraft  and passenger  processing  and will  therefore require  a
corresponding strategy to attract  the specific type of traffic,  as planners and managers
desire. In addition, the converted airport would operate in a very competitive environment
and thus requiring a differentiated position within the Amsterdam MAS in order to be
attractive for both airlines and passengers.
7.5.1 Lelystad Airport within the MAS
The Lelystad airport has a main asphalt runway with 1,250 m in length and a grass
runway with 430 m.  It  is  used only  by  general  aviation aircraft,  including helicopters,
with110,000 air transport movements in 2013. The airport also hosts an aviation museum.
The runway is too short for larger commercial aircraft and there is no apron able to handle
them either.
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Figure 98: Location of Lelystad (LEY) and the other airports in the Amsterdam MAS: Schiphol (AMS),
Rotterdam (RTM) and Eindhoven (EIN).
In relation to Eindhoven (and also to Groningen, in the northeast of the Netherlands,
and Maastricht in the south), Lelystad is considerably closer to Amsterdam and thus better
located to serve  as  a  secondary airport  for the city.  In terms of  distance,  the Lelystad
airport is also closer to Amsterdam than the Rotterdam airport, but considering available
connections travel time is not very different.
The  ambition  to  divert  short-haul  non-hub  traffic,  “with  focus  on  tourism
destinations”, to Lelystad implies a stronger focus on the airlines that are able to deliver
such type of traffic. Over the past years LCCs in Europe have focused on short-haul point-
to-point leisure traffic, although more recently they have been targeting business travellers
more  actively,  and  some  of  them  even  offer  interline  connectivity  using  simple  hub
structures. This means the development at Lelystad should consider the evolution of this
segment in other airports in the MAS, with which it may compete.
Section 6.1.2 already covered the evolution of the Amsterdam MAS in terms of traffic
and airport development. In recent years Eindhoven grew to become the second largest in
the MAS, with a particular focus on low-cost traffic. Rotterdam is mainly used by Transavia,
the low-cost arm of Air France-KLM, for leisure traffic. And despite its main role as a hub,
LCCs at Schiphol reached 16% of market share in 2013 supported by the growth of easyJet
(the second largest carrier after KLM) and Transavia.
7.5.2 Lelystad Airport Business Network
i) Strategic focus for Lelystad Airport
In order to become an attractive alternative, Lelystad must develop a differentiated
position that enables the airport to capture the intended traffic.  Whether that traffic is
actually diverting from Amsterdam Schiphol (such that it frees capacity for the “Mainport”)
is not entirely certain. The fact that in this case the three current airports in the MAS, plus
Lelystad,  share  ownership  could facilitate  the coordination of  the airport  strategies  to
accomplish a global objective for the MAS. Yet the airport operator is not able to force
airlines to move from one airport to the other, nor to restrain any airline willing to use any
of the airports (slot considerations aside).
Indeed the Schiphol Group recognises this situation and proposes specialisation and
marketing to attract different target segments for each airport  (Schiphol Group, 2014b).
Thus Lelystad should have a strategic focus that differentiates it from the other airports in
the MAS, especially from Rotterdam and Eindhoven that also serve non-hub related traffic.
Considering  the  differentiation  factors  introduced  in  section  7.2,  Figure  99 shows  the
strategic focus for the airports in the MAS using a strategy canvas.
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For Amsterdam Schiphol (AMS),  Eindhoven (EIN) and Rotterdam (RTM) the value
curves reflect the current offering according to the characteristics and strategy of each
airport.  The strategy for  AMS resembles  a  combination of  the Airport  city  and Global
business approaches, whilst EIN and RTM combine elements from Multi-modal interface
and Commercially  oriented airports.  Based on these observations,  we propose a  value
curve that reflects a differentiated position for Lelystad (LEY).
Figure  99 suggests  the  differentiation  factors  that  should  be  integrated  into  the
airport strategy:  availability of slots; quick aircraft turnaround; low aeronautical charges
and incentive programs, for  customers in the aviation trade group;  access  to  low fares,
convenient location, and entertainment and events, for individuals; and economic benefit for
the region, particularly targeted at non-user stakeholders.
ii) Target segments
The specific  implementation of  the differentiation factors  and their  impact  on the
airport  strategy  and  infrastructure  can  be  analysed  with  the  [New]  Airport  Business
Network illustrated in  Figure 100 for the case of Lelystad. The factors highlighted above
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Figure 99: Offering level of the differentiation factors according to the value proposition of each airport
in the Amsterdam MAS: Amsterdam Schiphol (AMS), Eindhoven (EIN), Rotterdam (RTM) and Lelystad
(LEY).
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Figure 100: The Lelystad Airport Business Network.
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can be targeted with more emphasis in the case: of  low-cost carriers,  outbound travellers
and inbound travellers; and to a lesser extent to general aviation users, traditional carriers
(i.e.  non  LCCs),  visitors and  non-user  stakeholders (such  as  the  government  and  local
residents).
At the beginning of the redevelopment of Lelystad as a commercial airport, it is crucial
to  attract  airlines  and  passengers  so  that  the  airport  becomes  a  viable  alternative.
Necessarily, airlines must come first providing the scheduled destinations that, in turn, will
attract passengers. LCCs are more likely to come first since they usually have large fleets
that can be easily deployed to different airports and many of them have aircraft orders to
expand their fleets in the coming years (Schiphol Group, 2014b). Moreover, LCCs are more
keen than other airlines to explore new markets as are able to stimulate demand by setting
lower fares.
In  order  to  attract  airlines,  especially  LCCs,  Lelystad  would  need  to  provide  the
following differentiation factors:  availability of slots; low aeronautical charges; incentive
programs; and quick aircraft turnaround. Available slots are crucial for airlines to start new
services at times that match their network configuration and are attractive to passengers.
At Lelystad the availability of slots can be hampered by the intense general aviation traffic
and  the  possible  conflicts  with  air  traffic  in  approach  and  departure  trajectories  at
Schiphol. Both aspects need to be considered for Lelystad during the planning phase in
order to ensure safety and complementarity for commercial and general aviation without
interfering with operations at Schiphol, especially at peak times.
As for low aeronautical charges, the investments at Lelystad must be carefully studied
and crafted to avoid unnecessary expenditures, that airlines would not be willing to pay. At
the same time, the airport can explore non-aeronautical revenues to ensure it can maintain
fees that  are lower than those in the other airports  in the MAS.  In addition,  incentive
programs can entice airlines to develop the intended destinations and market segments
whilst  sharing  the  risk  of  starting  new  services.  These  programs  must  be  carefully
designed  not  to  affect  the  position  of  Schiphol  Airport  in  terms  of  hub-related
traffic(considering both airports are owned by the same organisation).
Regarding short aircraft turnaround times, Lelystad development should encourage
and exploit the advantages of a compact, single-runway airport site. This would minimise
taxiing  times  which,  in  turn,  help  airlines  reduce  fuel  costs.  Also,  air  traffic  must  be
adequately managed to avoid holding patterns and delays.
In order to attract  passengers Lelystad can take advantage of its more convenient
location, in comparison to other airports in the Netherlands, as an alternative to Schiphol
for the Amsterdam region. The challenge for the airport is to explore that advantage in
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association  with  the  access  to  low  fares as  a  differentiation  factor.  Especially  because
Rotterdam  and  Eindhoven  currently  provide  a  number  of  interesting  alternatives  for
surface access.
To a lesser extent,  at least in the initial stage of redevelopment,  Lelystad can take
advantage  of  the  presence  of  general  aviation  and  the  in-site  museum  to  explore
entertainment and events as a differentiation factor to attract visitors (that could buy non-
aeronautical services) and enthusiast travellers. Similarly, the airport can use the expected
growth in employment and economic benefits for the region to leverage support from non-
user stakeholders.
iii) Service packages and airport infrastructure
As  Figure  100 highlights,  in  order  to  explore the differentiation factors  described
above, the Lelystad airport should focus on the implementation of the following service
packages:  infrastructure  and  aeronautical  services;  transport  network; and,  to  a  lesser
extent, activities and events, and retail and non-aeronautical services. There is no doubt that
infrastructure  and  aeronautical  services is  the  most  important  in  the  initial  stage  of
redevelopment because the current conditions do not allow for commercial service with
the types of narrow-body aircraft that are expected. In the design and development of the
infrastructure it  is  crucial to take into account that  low aeronautical charges and  quick
aircraft turnaround are desired differentiation factors.
In what concerns air side development, Lelystad would require a runway extension to
allow for the operation of narrow-body aircraft to serve the intended destination markets.
The Schiphol Group (Schiphol Group, 2014c) estimates that a runway with a total Take-Off
Distance Available (TODA) of 2,700 m (composed of 2,100 m of Landing Distance Available
– LDA – and two Runway Safety Areas – RESA – of 300 m at each end of the runway) is
sufficient for intra-European flights and even for more distant leisure destinations such as
the Canary Islands or Morocco. This extension can be accommodated within the current
boundaries of the airport and using the existing runway.
A  new  apron  is  also  required,  and  it  is  estimated  in  an  initial  stage  to  be  able
accommodate up to four stands for code C aircraft (such as Boeing 737 or Airbus A320) in
the northeast corner of the airport site. In addition, a new parallel taxiway is required to
connect the runway with the new platform. To minimise runway occupancy times, thus
favouring  the  mix  of  commercial  and  general  aviation  without  affecting  capacity,  and
support short turnaround times, the taxiway can extend up to two thirds of the runway
length in the initial stage of development.
A new passenger building can be developed next to the new platform, along with the
associated infrastructure for parking and public transport.  Given the uncertainty about
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traffic  development,  a  small  passenger  building  with  appropriate  space  to  expand  is
preferable.  The official preliminary plans  (Schiphol Group, 2014c) estimate a “start-up”
phase that includes a terminal with a capacity of around 1.5 million annual passengers.
The specific characteristics of the building has not yet been designed, but it should
take into account the desired target customer segments, as well as the intention to provide
low aeronautical charges. Recent developments at London Southend and Warsaw Modlin
(Figure 101) are examples of simple, inexpensive buildings that provide adequate levels of
service for the passengers and enough space for a matching retail and catering offer.
It is crucial to implement flexibility in the design of the passenger building to allow for
expansion should the commercial airport succeed, or for a change in use if required. In
case commercial operations do not become successful, the passenger building should be
able to be converted to a terminal for executive aviation, or to office space for fixed-base
operators, thus adapting the airport strategy towards general aviation again.
The  second  service  package  in  terms  of  importance  for  the  desired  strategy  at
Lelystad is the  transport network.  An air transport network (set of destinations) would
attract travellers (directly or via tour operators or travel agencies) but only after airlines
decide  to  establish  operations.  A  surface  transport  network  is  essential  to  allow
passengers to have access to the low fares offered by the targeted airlines. De Neufville
(2006) suggested that road-base transportation is in general more flexible and minimises
the  necessary  investment.  Indeed,  in  line  with  common  practice  at  other  European
airports,  Lelystad  could implement  (by  itself  or  through  partners)  a  bus  network  that
connects the airport at least with central Amsterdam and with Lelystad train station.
As stated before, the activities and events service package can be in direct connection
with  the  existing  aviation  museum  to  attract  visitors.  In  addition,  the  retail  and  non
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Figure 101: Public areas inside Warsaw Modlin passenger building as of January 2014 (more retail and
catering spaces have been added in the second floor as of September 2014).
aeronautical  services package  must  be  aligned  with  the  intended  segments  in  the
individuals customer group. In the future, the airport could explore opportunities in  real
estate  development,  but  the  consultancy  and  managerial  services package  is  better
implemented within the parent company, Schiphol Group.
iv) Relevant stakeholders
As  Figure  100 shows,  in  order  to  market  the  airport  strategy  with  the  elements
described so far, it is important to focus on the  aviation trade  and  individuals  groups of
customers. And in order to successfully implement the elements of the strategy it is crucial
to  work  in  close  collaboration  with  airlines,  aeronautical  business  units  and,  given  the
particular characteristics of the air space around Lelystad, with the air navigation service
provider.
Regarding airlines,  as discussed above, it is foreseeable that the main users of the
redeveloped airport, at first at least, would be current LCCs. In this sense, a permanent
communication  should  be  established  with  their  representatives  to  integrate  their
concerns into the airport design. It is also important to bear in mind that other airlines
may  oppose  these  development  plans,  as  they  may  be  perceived  as  introducing  more
competition.  Planners  must  evaluate  carefully  how  Lelystad  could  impact  the  strategy
intended for Schiphol.
In this sense, easyJet and Transavia, the largest low-cost operators at Schiphol, might
be unwilling to transfer their operations to Lelystad because they have already gained an
important market position and a significant customer base at the main airport. Moreover,
as Transavia started performing some flights in code-share with its parent KLM (Schiphol
Group,  2014d),  part  of  its  traffic  can  actually  be  considered hub-related  and thus  not
desirable to be diverted to Lelystad.
Under these conditions, it might be more likely for Lelystad to attract growth in the
point-to-point leisure travel segment than actually capture current traffic from Amsterdam
Schiphol. It is also likely that Lelystad could divert part of the current traffic at Eindhoven
or other surrounding airports (Maastricht, Groningen, Weeze) from airlines that do not
serve Schiphol. The case of London Southend could provide some insights in this respect
and might be valuable to study it in more detail.
In addition, as Lelystad is not likely to start commercial operations before 2018, it is
important to follow different current market trends as well. Other airlines could become
an interesting target for Lelystad in the future, but might not be evident today. For instance
regional airlines that have a lower cost structure than competitors and have the flexibility
to serve thinner markets, as it is the case of Flybe and Volotea currently.
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Concerning  the  other  stakeholders,  it  is  important  for  Lelystad  to  ensure  a  close
cooperation with the  aeronautical  business  units in  order to offer an environment that
matches the desired low aeronautical charges and quick aircraft turnaround. Moreover, in
partnership  with  the  aeronautical  units  the  airport  can  explore  technological
developments that translate into cost and emission savings for the airlines and the airport
itself, such as electric Automated Guided Vehicles instead of the traditional fuel powered
tugs, to move aircraft at the stands and hangars.
It is also important to study in detail the impact of commercial services at Lelystad in
air  traffic  management  and the ways  to  articulate  these services  with  current  general
aviation  traffic  or,  alternatively,  the  likelihood of  diverting  part  of  this  traffic  to  other
regional airports. Similarly, the entire planning process must especially consider feedback
from local residents, economic agents and the government as it is also highlighted in the
developed framework (see Figure 100).
7.6 Summary
The  traditional  approach  to  airport  planning  (master  plans)  focuses  only  in
infrastructure development and does not allow managers to be proactive in defining a
strategy  that  could  shape  the  future  of  their  airports.  Master  plans  also  hamper
adaptability to changing market  conditions,  which have been heavily influenced by the
ascendency of LCCs. This chapter presented an integrated framework for airport strategic
planning,  the  [New] Airport Business  Network,  which complements existing methods of
infrastructure development.
Airports,  as  organisations  in  other  industries,  should  be  able  to  define  a  unique
position that  differentiate  them among competitors  before their  target  customers.  The
framework we presented is based on a set of differentiation factors that align with the
intended strategic focus of airport planners or managers. The strategic focus reflects the
value proposition offered by the airport in accordance to the particular characteristics of
the airport site. Similarly, for new developments, the characteristics of the airport product
(including the attributes of  airport  infrastructure) should reflect  the intended strategic
focus.
As the airport  product  is in fact  delivered by a diverse array of  actors,  the [New]
Airport Business Network also allows planners and managers to identify the most relevant
stakeholders  in order to materialise a given airport  strategy.  However,  considering the
specificities of different airport sites,  the process of airport  strategic planning must be
tailored to each particular case.
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This chapter also presented the case of the Lelystad airport in order to illustrate the
application  of  the  proposed  framework.  The  framework  provided  a  tool  to  select  a
strategic focus that differentiates Lelystad from other airports in the Amsterdam Multi-
Airport System. Although it is not intended as an exhaustive representation of the entire
planning process, the example aimed at helping decision makers in defining the features of
the airport to achieve the goal of relieving capacity at Amsterdam Schiphol to strengthen
its competitiveness as a major hub.
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8 Conclusions
The  liberalisation  of  the  air  transport  market  in  Europe  introduced new relevant
dynamics in the airport industry. In recent decades, airports evolved from infrastructure
providers in a monopolistic context, to commercially oriented enterprises, in a competitive
environment. Airports nowadays are multi-service firms that interact with a network of
stakeholders  to  deliver  a  set  of  service  packages  (as  the  airport  product)  to  different
groups of customers.
A liberalised market also provided the proper ground for LCCs to proliferate. Initially,
smaller regional airports took a clear advantage of the expansion of LCCs, thus becoming
major players in the industry. The academic literature in this area has shaped the notion of
'low cost airports'; a notion that did not follow the enormous evolution of the low-cost
segment, being too much rooted in the initial phase of LCC consolidation.
Yet the airports that LCCs use in Europe have such diverse characteristics that the
elements traditionally considered in the literature to identify 'low cost airports' may not
be,  in practice,  essential for low-cost operations. As the low-cost segment matures and
LCCs move to larger airports, it may be impractical to distinguish between two types of
airports ("low cost" and "not low cost").
Our analysis  found three attributes that may be desirable for airports targeting at
LCCs but they are, in fact, applicable to any airport: to provide (or allow) quick aircraft
turnaround time; to ultimately charge low (aeronautical) fees; and to provide access to low
fares for passengers. Moreover, existing infrastructure can be mediated by the attitude of
airport management towards LCCs and by flexibility to adapt to changing requirements,
thus keeping up with the evolution of airline business models.
The extent to which LCCs evolve and consolidate in an airport system is related to the
development  of  physical  infrastructure  (through  capacity  expansion  or  the
181
development/emergence  of  new  primary  or  secondary  airports)  but  also  to  changing
market  conditions  for  airlines  and  airports.  A  new  paradigm  in  airport  strategic
development is required in order to benefit  from the opportunities presented by these
dynamics. Our research argues that such paradigm should incorporate the planning and
design of infrastructure and the definition of a matching business strategy.
In fact,  the traditional  approach to airport  planning,  master plans,  focuses only in
infrastructure development and does not allow managers to be proactive in defining a
strategy that could shape the future of their airports. Airports, as organisations in other
industries,  should  be  able  to  define  a  unique  position  for  their  target  customers  to
differentiate them from competitors.
8.1 Research contributions
This  dissertation  argues  that  the  ascendency  of  LCCs  has  been  in  the  core  of
significant changes in the aviation industry, and that those changes impacted significantly
the way airports face strategic planning. The experience of Europe has clearly shown the
impact on the airports that LCCs use in the continent. Then, building upon the findings, the
dissertation proposes a framework to support the process of airport strategic planning by
integrating infrastructure development and strategy formulation.
8.1.1 Contributions to research
Our  research  presents  an  updated  review  of  the  airport  business  in  the  current
context. It proposes novel perspectives regarding airport stakeholders, airport customers,
the  airport  product,  and  six  generic  approaches  that,  in  general  terms,  identify  the
strategic focus that airports follow nowadays. It also argues in favour of the existence of
competition between airports and summarises different areas in which they compete.
In addition, using a mixed methodology, this dissertation have analysed the impact of
LCCs for a large sample of European airports. No other study had been so comprehensive
and detailed in collecting and analysing information at this scale. Our analysis expands the
traditional notion of 'low cost airports' by considering the airports that LCCs actually use
nowadays. It also contributes to the field by compiling a significant amount of evidence
and data that was not previously organised in a single study.
We also propose a conceptual model for the dynamic evolution of airports that can be
further  developed  as  a  formal  model  to  aid  decision  making  in  future  scenarios.  The
conceptual  model  identified  four  mechanisms  that  trigger  different  traffic  patterns,
particularly in what concerns the low-cost segment. These mechanisms are associated to
infrastructure expansion and to market disruptions.
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8.1.2 Contributions to practice
We expect our research can help airport planners and managers, and practitioners in
general,  to  better  understand  the  context  of  the  industry  in  a  liberalised  competitive
environment.  Moreover,  we  have  compiled  extensive  data  and  performed  systematic
analyses that can be used to support airport benchmarking.
More  importantly,  our  research  proposes  a  novel  framework  that  complements
existent methods for airport strategic planning.  This framework aims at facilitating the
design of a differentiation strategy that delivers a unique position for an airport in a rather
competitive  market.  It  also helps planners and managers  to identify the most  relevant
stakeholders,  to  ensure  that  the  strategy  can  be  materialised.  In  addition,  we  have
developed a short case study that demonstrates the applicability of the framework.
8.2 Research questions revisited
This dissertation followed two main research questions focusing on the process of
airport strategic planning and on the impact that LCCs have on that planning process. In
order to summarise the main outcomes of the research, this section revisits the questions
to provide a concise answer in each case. The answers offer a quick reference, rather than
a  replacement  for  the  detailed  analysis  presented  along  the  dissertation,  as  Table  18
relates.
Table 18: Sections of the dissertation where research questions are addressed in detail.
Research question Addressed in detail in
Question 1 Chapter 7 and Chapter 3
Question 2.1 Chapter 5 and section 5.3.3
Question 2.2 Chapter 4, sections 4.3 and 4.4, Chapter 5 and Chapter 6
Question 2.3 Chapter 6 and Chapter 7
Question 2.4 Chapter 7, Chapter 5 and Chapter 6
8.2.1 Question 1
How should European airports design strategies to deal with the increased uncertainty
produced by the liberalisation of the airline/airport industry and the ascendency of LCCs?
The rise of LCCs significantly increased competition between airlines and created a
more volatile environment for airports. In a liberalised context, airlines are free to start
and drop routes at will from/to whichever airport they deem convenient. Thus airports are
more  likely  to  be  affected  by  decisions  made  by  airlines  in  relation  to  abandoning,
downsizing or growing operations.
Liberalisation  in  Europe  have  also  contributed  to  increase  competition  between
airports. To thrive in a competitive environment airports should design strategies to define
a unique position before their customers. In order to identify the value proposition that
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delivers  such  unique  position,  airport  planners  or  managers  should  identify  a  set  of
differentiation factors that match a given strategic focus for the airport. It is paramount
that the strategy that implements the differentiation factors is aligned with available or
planned infrastructure, and vice versa.
This  dissertation has presented an integrated framework to support planners and
managers in this process. The [New] Airport Business Network allows them first to select
the most appropriate differentiation factors according to the characteristics of the airport
site, the intended strategic focus and the target customers; then the service packages (that
an airport offers as its product) that need to be implemented in order to ensure that the
airport can effectively deploy the differentiation factors; and finally the stakeholders that
are involved in the provision of the service packages to the airport customers.
In  designing  their  strategies,  airport  planners  and  managers  should  tailor  the
elements of the proposed framework to the particular features of each case.  Moreover,
taking  uncertainty  into  account,  they  must  include  flexibility  in  the  definition  of  the
specific  characteristics  of  the  service  packages  (especially  those  involving  physical
infrastructure)  and  allow  for  strategic  adaptation  in  case  market  conditions  change
drastically. In this sense, the proposed framework can complement traditional approaches
for airport planning and design.
8.2.2 Question 2
In what way have LCCs influenced airport strategic planning?
In particular:
i) Question 2.1
To what extent have European airports implemented low-cost facilities?
14 airports in Europe market specific facilities for the use of LCCs. These facilities
include  separate  passenger  buildings  (i.e.  terminals),  and  piers  or  concourses  within
existing terminals. Only in two cases (Copenhagen and Bordeaux) the low-cost facilities
were purpose-built from scratch. In other 5 cases (Amsterdam, Lyon, Marseille, Bremen
and Tampere)  they were redeveloped specifically  with LCCs in mind.  In the remaining
cases the facilities came to be marketed as 'low-cost' only after a change in the main users.
In all these 14 airports there are LCCs that do not use the low-cost facilities (notably
Vueling that only uses the “low-cost terminal” at Paris Charles de Gaulle) and in many of
them there are other users (particularly charter and regional airlines).
In recent years, few airports in Europe have been built or redeveloped especially for
LCCs (certainly Warsaw Modlin and Oslo Rygge; and to a lesser extent London Southend,
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Eindhoven and Lublin). Others were built expecting to attract mainly LCCs but have not
been able to secure significant traffic (e.g. Vatry in France, Beja in Portugal, and also Ciudad
Real and Region de Murcia in Spain). But the most renowned cases of “low cost airports”
are  regional  airports  with  modest  passenger  buildings  that  accompanied  the  initial
development  of  the  (now)  major  LCCs  (e.g.  Milan  Bergamo,  London  Luton,  Brussels
Charleroi, Liverpool, Paris Beauvais and Frankfurt Hahn).
ii) Question 2.2
To  what  extent  do  LCCs  operating  in  Europe  use  airport  facilities  developed  for
traditional airlines?
The five European airports with the largest capacity (available seats) deployed by
LCCs  in  2013  were  not  originally  developed  with  LCCs  in  mind:  Barcelona,  London
Gatwick, London Stansted, Istanbul Sabiha Gokcen and Oslo. This pattern is replicated in
the majority of the airports that concentrate most of low-cost services in Europe. This
means that, besides the cases mentioned in the previous question, LCCs have expanded in
Europe  using  airports  that,  for  the  most  part,  had  facilities  developed  for  traditional
airlines.
The ascendency of LCCs in Europe is evident in small regional or secondary airports
in metropolitan areas, as it is also in the largest ones. In 2013, LCCs had a market share
above 25% in 129 airports out of 171 studied in detail in this dissertation. Yet 6 airports
(Amsterdam,  Madrid,  Paris  Orly,  Rome  Fiumicino,  Copenhagen  and  Paris  Charles  de
Gaulle), in which the market share of LCCs was below this level, significantly contributed to
low-cost traffic at European level.
iii) Question 2.3
Is the implementation of low-cost facilities setting new standards for airport design? If
so, in what ways?
From the previous answers, we can state that specific low-cost facilities are not as
widespread as the use of regular facilities by LCCs in airports that do not feature “low-cost
terminals”. The ascendency of LCCs in Europe may have increased awareness of airport
charges as a relevant element in a competitive environment. This encourages airports to
consider more carefully the feasibility of expansion projects and to take more into account
the perspective of airlines on the development of new facilities. Likewise, the design of
passenger buildings now tends to allocate more space for non-aeronautical activities to
increase revenues, even in airports with a stronger focus on LCCs.
Passengers travelling in LCCs usually take fewer bags and perform on-line check-in
before arriving to the airport. This reduces the space required for check-in counters. In
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addition, as LCCs tend to perform quicker aircraft turnarounds in comparison with FSCs,
other airport processes need to be streamlined in order to be performed quicker too. In
the  end,  the  total  space  required  for  passenger  processing  diminishes.  Airports  may
consider this aspect when designing new facilities or refurbishing old ones, as LCCs are
able to process more passengers per gate in a given period of time.
The ascendency of LCCs has certainly made all airlines more cost aware, and airports
must  respond accordingly.  Some new airports  have been developed with this  in  mind,
allowing for less space per passenger but more efficient processes, along with less walking
time  to  access  gates  and aircraft  (e.g.  Warsaw Modlin,  Lublin,  London  Southend).  The
design of the passenger building at Berlin Brandenburg20 includes a pier that allows for
walking access to the aircraft and reduces the cost in deploying jet bridges.
Many other projects of airport expansion in Europe have gone ahead following more
traditional  design  standards.  Dublin,  Barcelona,  Heathrow,  Alicante  and  Malaga  have
examples  of  new  terminals  in  a  more  classical  design  (i.e.  unique  architectural
monuments). The traditional planing process for new infrastructure usually takes too long
to accommodate market developments that occur in shorter periods.  Therefore, several
forms of flexibility have been implemented even in some of these projects as well. The use
of  open  shared-use  spaces  within  passenger  buildings  and  modularity  is  increasingly
popular in airport design.
Concerning air side facilities, there are no particular changes associated to the rise of
LCCs.  LCCs  use  the  same  aircraft  as  other  airlines  and are  bound by  the  same  safety
regulations and procedures. Smaller regional airports that became visible thanks to LCCs
may feature a rather simple air side with a single apron located near a single runway, but
this  is  more related to their  size and it  is  a  common characteristic  at  many European
airports.  Also,  LCCs  have  large  operations  at  airports  with more intricate  runway  and
taxiway systems such as Paris Charles de Gaulle, Amsterdam Schiphol or Madrid Barajas.
iv) Question 2.4
Is  the  establishment  of  LCCs  in  existing  facilities  setting  new guidelines  for  airport
strategy? If so, in what ways?
LCCs in Europe extensively use existing facilities that were not designed specifically
for this type of operations. The ascendency of LCCs has contributed to change the attitude
of airport managers towards these airlines. In order to develop traffic, some airports have
explicitly developed strategies in which LCCs play a relevant role (e.g. London Gatwick).
20 This is currently the only major development of a new airport in Europe, along with a new Istanbul airport,
as new developments in London and Lisbon have not taken off.
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Even if  the strategies are not as explicit  or documented,  many European airports have
embraced LCCs to pursue mutual growth.
LCCs  were  first  lured  by  some  airports  with  incentive  programs  for  route
development. Although many LCCs continue to benefit from this kind of programs due to
the flexibility they have to deploy their fleet, airport incentives are increasingly common in
Europe and are available to any type of airline. In many cases airports and airlines have
entered into long-term agreements that set common objectives and incentives for 5 to 10
years.
In line with the previous answers, airports have also adapted their infrastructure and
processes  for  the  use  of  LCCs.  Notably,  they  have  converted  previous  “bus  gates”  to
boarding gates that allow for walking access to the aircraft in adjacent stands. However,
this research work claims that in their strategic planning airports should allow for flexible
designs and strategic adaptation to cope not only with the ascendency of LCCs but also
with any future market developments not foreseeable at present.
8.3 Limitations of the research
As  the  geographical  scope  of  this  dissertation  is  bound  to  Europe  some  of  the
outcomes of the analysis may not be entirely generalisable for airports worldwide. Specific
regulation  and  organisational  settings  may  influence  airport  development  in  different
ways.  The  process  of  liberalisation in  Europe  is  different  from other  processes  in  the
world, particularly in the sense that it is transnational. In addition, the level of maturity of
the low-cost segment in Europe is higher than in other regions. The combination of these
aspects may result in different outcomes for other locations.
Nevertheless, we have used the geographical scope to provide examples from which
more general, interesting insights can be derived. We have taken the context into account
in  our  analysis,  when  necessary,  and  we  consider  the  findings  can  be  used to  set  up
possible scenarios in other regions with similar developments.
Moreover, given the number of airports that we have studied in detail, and the large
amount  of  variables  that  we  have  analysed  for  each  airport,  part  of  the  quantitative
exploration  was  restricted  to  a  transversal  approach.  Thus  the  analysis  presented  in
chapter  5 is  mainly  based  in  data  collected  for  the  year  2013,  except  for  financial
parameters for which up to date information was not available. For this reason, financial
information was not considered representative enough to draw conclusive insights.
Naturally, the information used to build our database may have changed after data
collection. To minimise negative effects in the analysis, we pointed out when the changes
that  we  were  aware  of  were  considered  relevant.  In  addition  the  dynamic  analysis
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presented in chapter  6 also aimed at identifying more stable patterns with multi-annual
data.
8.4 Future work
There are three topics in which we consider our research could be further developed
in a natural and useful way. The first one is the analysis on aircraft turnaround times. We
have identified a source of reliable data and a possible methodology for the analysis, but
more research is required to explore the topic to its full potential. It could be interesting to
analyse  actual  turnaround  times  instead  of  scheduled  ones.  Likewise,  there  are  more
nuances to investigate within the turnaround practices of each airline, in particular how
these  practices  differ  between  based  and  non-based  aircraft  (considering  that  the
turnaround time at hubs and bases may tend to be longer than at other airports).
The  second  topic  concerns  the  development  of  a  formal  model  for  the  dynamic
evolution of airport  systems.  We consider that  our conceptual  model could be usefully
explored by using system dynamics  methodologies.  A more formal  model  might  prove
valuable  for  traffic  forecasting  considering  uncertainty,  as  well  as  for  evaluating  the
viability and desirability of new airports in a given region.
Finally, the third topic relates to the application of the [New] Airport Business Network
as a framework for airport strategic planning.  We have studied the case of Lelystad to
illustrate  the  application  of  the  framework  but  more  work  is  required  to  test  our
propositions. First, a more comprehensive and detailed application to the case of Lelystad
would surely be quite useful. Then the application to other different cases would nurture
the framework and enhance its practical utility.
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